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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at */
#ifndef nsIDNService_h__
#define nsIDNService_h__
#include "nsIIDNService.h"
#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
#include "nsUnicodeScriptCodes.h"
#include "nsWeakReference.h"
#include "unicode/uidna.h"
#include "mozilla/Mutex.h"
#include "mozilla/net/IDNBlocklistUtils.h"
#include "nsString.h"
class nsIPrefBranch;
// nsIDNService
class nsIDNService final : public nsIIDNService,
public nsSupportsWeakReference {
nsresult Init();
virtual ~nsIDNService();
enum stringPrepFlag {
* Convert the following characters that must be recognized as label
* separators per RFC 3490 to ASCII full stop characters
* U+3002 (ideographic full stop)
* U+FF0E (fullwidth full stop)
* U+FF61 (halfwidth ideographic full stop)
void normalizeFullStops(nsAString& s);
* Convert and encode a DNS label in ACE/punycode.
* @param flag
* if eStringPrepIgnoreErrors, all non-ASCII labels are
* converted to punycode.
* if eStringPrepForUI, only labels that are considered safe
* for display are converted.
* @see isLabelSafe
* if eStringPrepForDNS and stringPrep finds an illegal
* character, returns NS_FAILURE and out is empty
nsresult stringPrepAndACE(const nsAString& in, nsACString& out,
stringPrepFlag flag);
* Convert a DNS label using the stringprep profile defined in RFC 3454
nsresult stringPrep(const nsAString& in, nsAString& out, stringPrepFlag flag);
* Decode an ACE-encoded DNS label to UTF-8
* @param flag
* if eStringPrepForUI and the label is not considered safe to
* display, the output is the same as the input
* @see isLabelSafe
nsresult decodeACE(const nsACString& in, nsACString& out,
stringPrepFlag flag);
* Convert complete domain names between UTF8 and ACE and vice versa
* @param flag is passed to decodeACE or stringPrepAndACE for each
* label individually, so the output may contain some labels in
* punycode and some in UTF-8
nsresult UTF8toACE(const nsACString& input, nsACString& ace,
stringPrepFlag flag);
nsresult ACEtoUTF8(const nsACString& input, nsACString& _retval,
stringPrepFlag flag);
bool isInWhitelist(const nsACString& host);
void prefsChanged(const char* pref);
static void PrefChanged(const char* aPref, void* aSelf) {
auto* self = static_cast<nsIDNService*>(aSelf);
mozilla::MutexAutoLock lock(self->mLock);
* Determine whether a label is considered safe to display to the user
* according to the algorithm defined in UTR 39 and the profile
* selected in mRestrictionProfile.
* For the ASCII-only profile, returns false for all labels containing
* non-ASCII characters.
* For the other profiles, returns false for labels containing any of
* the following:
* Characters in scripts other than the "recommended scripts" and
* "aspirational scripts" defined in
* This includes codepoints that are not defined as Unicode
* characters
* Illegal combinations of scripts (@see illegalScriptCombo)
* Numbers from more than one different numbering system
* Sequences of the same non-spacing mark
* Both simplified-only and traditional-only Chinese characters
* XXX this test was disabled by bug 857481
bool isLabelSafe(const nsAString& label);
* Determine whether a combination of scripts in a single label is
* permitted according to the algorithm defined in UTR 39 and the
* profile selected in mRestrictionProfile.
* For the "Highly restrictive" profile, all characters in each
* identifier must be from a single script, or from the combinations:
* Latin + Han + Hiragana + Katakana;
* Latin + Han + Bopomofo; or
* Latin + Han + Hangul
* For the "Moderately restrictive" profile, Latin is also allowed
* with other scripts except Cyrillic and Greek
bool illegalScriptCombo(mozilla::unicode::Script script,
int32_t& savedScript);
* Convert a DNS label from ASCII to Unicode using IDNA2008
nsresult IDNA2008ToUnicode(const nsACString& input, nsAString& output);
* Convert a DNS label to a normalized form conforming to IDNA2008
nsresult IDNA2008StringPrep(const nsAString& input, nsAString& output,
stringPrepFlag flag);
// We use this mutex to guard access to:
// |mIDNBlocklist|, |mShowPunycode|, |mRestrictionProfile|,
// |mIDNUseWhitelist|.
// These members can only be updated on the main thread and
// read on any thread. Therefore, acquiring the mutex is required
// only for threads other than the main thread.
mozilla::Mutex mLock{"IDNService"};
// guarded by mLock
nsTArray<mozilla::net::BlocklistRange> mIDNBlocklist;
* Flag set by the pref network.IDN_show_punycode. When it is true,
* IDNs containing non-ASCII characters are always displayed to the
* user in punycode
* guarded by mLock
bool mShowPunycode = false;
* Restriction-level Detection profiles defined in UTR 39
* and selected by the pref network.IDN.restriction_profile
enum restrictionProfile {
// guarded by mLock;
restrictionProfile mRestrictionProfile{eASCIIOnlyProfile};
// guarded by mLock;
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> mIDNWhitelistPrefBranch;
// guarded by mLock
bool mIDNUseWhitelist = false;
#endif // nsIDNService_h__