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* This file contains prototypes for experimental SSL functions.
* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at */
#ifndef __sslexp_h_
#define __sslexp_h_
#include "ssl.h"
#include "sslerr.h"
/* The functions in this header file are not guaranteed to remain available in
* future NSS versions. Code that uses these functions needs to safeguard
* against the function not being available. */
#define SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API(name, arglist, args) \
(SSL_GetExperimentalAPI(name) \
? ((SECStatus(*) arglist)SSL_GetExperimentalAPI(name))args \
: SECFailure)
* SSL_GetExtensionSupport() returns whether NSS supports a particular TLS
* extension.
* - ssl_ext_none indicates that NSS does not support the extension and
* extension hooks can be installed.
* - ssl_ext_native indicates that NSS supports the extension natively, but
* allows an application to override that support and install its own
* extension hooks.
* - ssl_ext_native_only indicates that NSS supports the extension natively
* and does not permit custom extension hooks to be installed. These
* extensions are critical to the functioning of NSS.
typedef enum {
} SSLExtensionSupport;
#define SSL_GetExtensionSupport(extension, support) \
SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_GetExtensionSupport", \
(PRUint16 _extension, \
SSLExtensionSupport * _support), \
(extension, support))
* Custom extension hooks.
* The SSL_InstallExtensionHooks() registers two callback functions for use
* with the identified extension type.
* Installing extension hooks disables the checks in TLS 1.3 that ensure that
* extensions are only added to the correct messages. The application is
* responsible for ensuring that extensions are only sent with the right message
* or messages.
* Installing an extension handler does not disable checks for whether an
* extension can be used in a message that is a response to an extension in
* another message. Extensions in ServerHello, EncryptedExtensions and the
* server Certificate messages are rejected unless the client sends an extension
* in the ClientHello. Similarly, a client Certificate message cannot contain
* extensions that don't appear in a CertificateRequest (in TLS 1.3).
* Setting both |writer| and |handler| to NULL removes any existing hooks for
* that extension.
* == SSLExtensionWriter
* An SSLExtensionWriter function is responsible for constructing the contents
* of an extension. This function is called during the construction of all
* handshake messages where an extension might be included.
* - The |fd| argument is the socket file descriptor.
* - The |message| argument is the TLS handshake message type. The writer will
* be called for every handshake message that NSS sends. Most extensions
* should only be sent in a subset of messages. NSS doesn’t check that
* extension writers don’t violate protocol rules regarding which message an
* extension can be sent in.
* - The |data| argument is a pointer to a buffer that should be written to with
* any data for the extension.
* - The |len| argument is an outparam indicating how many bytes were written to
* |data|. The value referenced by |len| is initialized to zero, so an
* extension that is empty does not need to write to this value.
* - The |maxLen| indicates the maximum number of bytes that can be written to
* |data|.
* - The |arg| argument is the value of the writerArg that was passed during
* installation.
* An SSLExtensionWriter function returns PR_TRUE if an extension should be
* written, and PR_FALSE otherwise.
* If there is an error, return PR_FALSE; if the error is truly fatal, the
* application can mark the connection as failed. However, recursively calling
* functions that alter the file descriptor in the callback - such as PR_Close()
* - should be avoided.
* Note: The ClientHello message can be sent twice in TLS 1.3. An
* SSLExtensionWriter will be called twice with the same arguments in that case;
* NSS does not distinguish between a first and second ClientHello. It is up to
* the application to track this if it needs to act differently each time. In
* most cases the correct behaviour is to provide an identical extension on each
* invocation.
* == SSLExtensionHandler
* An SSLExtensionHandler function consumes a handshake message. This function
* is called when an extension is present.
* - The |fd| argument is the socket file descriptor.
* - The |message| argument is the TLS handshake message type. This can be used
* to validate that the extension was included in the correct handshake
* message.
* - The |data| argument points to the contents of the extension.
* - The |len| argument contains the length of the extension.
* - The |alert| argument is an outparam that allows an application to choose
* which alert is sent in the case of a fatal error.
* - The |arg| argument is the value of the handlerArg that was passed during
* installation.
* An SSLExtensionHandler function returns SECSuccess when the extension is
* process successfully. It can return SECFailure to cause the handshake to
* fail. If the value of alert is written to, NSS will generate a fatal alert
* using the provided alert code. The value of |alert| is otherwise not used.
typedef PRBool(PR_CALLBACK *SSLExtensionWriter)(
PRFileDesc *fd, SSLHandshakeType message,
PRUint8 *data, unsigned int *len, unsigned int maxLen, void *arg);
typedef SECStatus(PR_CALLBACK *SSLExtensionHandler)(
PRFileDesc *fd, SSLHandshakeType message,
const PRUint8 *data, unsigned int len,
SSLAlertDescription *alert, void *arg);
#define SSL_InstallExtensionHooks(fd, extension, writer, writerArg, \
handler, handlerArg) \
SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_InstallExtensionHooks", \
(PRFileDesc * _fd, PRUint16 _extension, \
SSLExtensionWriter _writer, void *_writerArg, \
SSLExtensionHandler _handler, void *_handlerArg), \
(fd, extension, writer, writerArg, \
handler, handlerArg))
* Create an anti-replay context for supporting 0-RTT in TLS 1.3 on servers.
* To use 0-RTT on a server, you must create an anti-replay context using
* SSL_CreateAntiReplayContext and set that on the socket with
* SSL_SetAntiReplayContext. Failing to set a context on the server will result
* in all 0-RTT being rejected. Connections will complete, but early data will
* be rejected.
* Anti-replay contexts are reference counted and are released with
* SSL_ReleaseAntiReplayContext.
* NSS uses a Bloom filter to track the ClientHello messages that it receives
* (specifically, it uses the PSK binder). This function initializes a pair of
* Bloom filters. The two filters are alternated over time, with new
* ClientHello messages recorded in the current filter and, if they are not
* already present, being checked against the previous filter. If the
* ClientHello is found, then early data is rejected, but the handshake is
* allowed to proceed.
* The false-positive probability of Bloom filters means that some valid
* handshakes will be marked as potential replays. Early data will be rejected
* for a false positive. To minimize this and to allow a trade-off of space
* against accuracy, the size of the Bloom filter can be set by this function.
* The first tuning parameter to consider is |window|, which determines the
* window over which ClientHello messages will be tracked. This also causes
* early data to be rejected if a ClientHello contains a ticket age parameter
* that is outside of this window (see Section 8.3 of RFC 8446 for details).
* Set |window| to account for any potential sources of clock error. |window|
* is the entire width of the window, which is symmetrical. Therefore to allow
* 5 seconds of clock error in both directions, set the value to 10 seconds
* (i.e., 10 * PR_USEC_PER_SEC).
* After calling this function, early data will be rejected until |window|
* elapses. This prevents replay across crashes and restarts. Only call this
* function once to avoid inadvertently disabling 0-RTT (use PR_CallOnce() to
* avoid this problem).
* The primary tuning parameter is |bits| which determines the amount of memory
* allocated to each Bloom filter. NSS will allocate two Bloom filters, each
* |2^(bits - 3)| octets in size. The value of |bits| is primarily driven by
* the number of connections that are expected in any time window. Note that
* this needs to account for there being two filters both of which have
* (presumably) independent false positive rates. The following formulae can be
* used to find a value of |bits| and |k| given a chosen false positive
* probability |p| and the number of requests expected in a given window |n|:
* bits = log2(n) + log2(-ln(1 - sqrt(1 - p))) + 1.0575327458897952
* k = -log2(p)
* ... where log2 and ln are base 2 and e logarithms respectively. For a target
* false positive rate of 1% and 1000 handshake attempts, this produces bits=14
* and k=7. This results in two Bloom filters that are 2kB each in size. Note
* that rounding |k| and |bits| up causes the false positive probability for
* these values to be a much lower 0.123%.
* IMPORTANT: This anti-replay scheme has several weaknesses. See the TLS 1.3
* specification for the details of the generic problems with this technique.
* In addition to the generic anti-replay weaknesses, the state that the server
* maintains is in local memory only. Servers that operate in a cluster, even
* those that use shared memory for tickets, will not share anti-replay state.
* Early data can be replayed at least once with every server instance that will
* accept tickets that are encrypted with the same key.
typedef struct SSLAntiReplayContextStr SSLAntiReplayContext;
#define SSL_CreateAntiReplayContext(now, window, k, bits, ctx) \
SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_CreateAntiReplayContext", \
(PRTime _now, PRTime _window, \
unsigned int _k, unsigned int _bits, \
SSLAntiReplayContext **_ctx), \
(now, window, k, bits, ctx))
#define SSL_SetAntiReplayContext(fd, ctx) \
SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_SetAntiReplayContext", \
(PRFileDesc * _fd, SSLAntiReplayContext * _ctx), \
(fd, ctx))
#define SSL_ReleaseAntiReplayContext(ctx) \
SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_ReleaseAntiReplayContext", \
(SSLAntiReplayContext * _ctx), \
* This function allows a server application to generate a session ticket that
* will embed the provided token.
* This function will cause a NewSessionTicket message to be sent by a server.
* This happens even if SSL_ENABLE_SESSION_TICKETS is disabled. This allows a
* server to suppress the usually automatic generation of a session ticket at
* the completion of the handshake - which do not include any token - and to
* control when session tickets are transmitted.
* This function will fail unless the socket has an active TLS 1.3 session.
* Earlier versions of TLS do not support the spontaneous sending of the
* NewSessionTicket message. It will also fail when external PSK
* authentication has been negotiated.
#define SSL_SendSessionTicket(fd, appToken, appTokenLen) \
(PRFileDesc * _fd, const PRUint8 *_appToken, \
unsigned int _appTokenLen), \
(fd, appToken, appTokenLen))
* A stateless retry handler gives an application some control over NSS handling
* of ClientHello messages.
* SSL_HelloRetryRequestCallback() installs a callback that allows an
* application to control how NSS sends HelloRetryRequest messages. This
* handler is only used on servers and will only be called if the server selects
* TLS 1.3. Support for older TLS versions could be added in other releases.
* The SSLHelloRetryRequestCallback is invoked during the processing of a
* TLS 1.3 ClientHello message. It takes the following arguments:
* - |firstHello| indicates if the NSS believes that this is an initial
* ClientHello. An initial ClientHello will never include a cookie extension,
* though it may contain a session ticket.
* - |clientToken| includes a token previously provided by the application. If
* |clientTokenLen| is 0, then |clientToken| may be NULL.
* - If |firstHello| is PR_FALSE, the value that was provided in the
* |retryToken| outparam of previous invocations of this callback will be
* present here.
* - If |firstHello| is PR_TRUE, and the handshake is resuming a session, then
* this will contain any value that was passed in the |token| parameter of
* SSL_SendNewSessionTicket() method (see below). If this is not resuming a
* session, then the token will be empty (and this value could be NULL).
* - |clientTokenLen| is the length of |clientToken|.
* - |retryToken| is an item that callback can write to. This provides NSS with
* a token. This token is encrypted and integrity protected and embedded in
* the cookie extension of a HelloRetryRequest. The value of this field is
* only used if the handler returns ssl_stateless_retry_check. NSS allocates
* space for this value.
* - |retryTokenLen| is an outparam for the length of the token. If this value
* is not set, or set to 0, an empty token will be sent.
* - |retryTokenMax| is the size of the space allocated for retryToken. An
* application cannot write more than this many bytes to retryToken.
* - |arg| is the same value that was passed to
* SSL_InstallStatelessRetryHandler().
* The handler can validate any the value of |clientToken|, query the socket
* status (using SSL_GetPreliminaryChannelInfo() for example) and decide how to
* proceed:
* - Returning ssl_hello_retry_fail causes the handshake to fail. This might be
* used if the token is invalid or the application wishes to abort the
* handshake.
* - Returning ssl_hello_retry_accept causes the handshake to proceed.
* - Returning ssl_hello_retry_request causes NSS to send a HelloRetryRequest
* message and request a second ClientHello. NSS generates a cookie extension
* and embeds the value of |retryToken|. The value of |retryToken| value may
* be left empty if the application does not require any additional context to
* validate a second ClientHello attempt. This return code cannot be used to
* reject a second ClientHello (i.e., when firstHello is PR_FALSE); NSS will
* abort the handshake if this value is returned from a second call.
* - Returning ssl_hello_retry_reject_0rtt causes NSS to proceed normally, but
* to reject 0-RTT. Use this if there is something in the token that
* indicates that 0-RTT might be unsafe.
* An application that chooses to perform a stateless retry can discard the
* server socket. All necessary state to continue the TLS handshake will be
* included in the cookie extension. This makes it possible to use a new socket
* to handle the remainder of the handshake. The existing socket can be safely
* discarded.
* If the same socket is retained, the information in the cookie will be checked
* for consistency against the existing state of the socket. Any discrepancy
* will result in the connection being closed.
* Tokens should be kept as small as possible. NSS sets a limit on the size of
* tokens, which it passes in |retryTokenMax|. Depending on circumstances,
* observing a smaller limit might be desirable or even necessary. For
* instance, having HelloRetryRequest and ClientHello fit in a single packet has
* significant performance benefits.
typedef enum {
} SSLHelloRetryRequestAction;
typedef SSLHelloRetryRequestAction(PR_CALLBACK *SSLHelloRetryRequestCallback)(
PRBool firstHello, const PRUint8 *clientToken, unsigned int clientTokenLen,
PRUint8 *retryToken, unsigned int *retryTokenLen, unsigned int retryTokMax,
void *arg);
#define SSL_HelloRetryRequestCallback(fd, cb, arg) \
SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_HelloRetryRequestCallback", \
(PRFileDesc * _fd, \
SSLHelloRetryRequestCallback _cb, void *_arg), \
(fd, cb, arg))
/* Update traffic keys (TLS 1.3 only).
* The |requestUpdate| flag determines whether to request an update from the
* remote peer.
#define SSL_KeyUpdate(fd, requestUpdate) \
(PRFileDesc * _fd, PRBool _requestUpdate), \
(fd, requestUpdate))
/* This function allows a server application to trigger
* re-authentication (TLS 1.3 only) after handshake.
* This function will cause a CertificateRequest message to be sent by
* a server. This can be called once at a time, and is not allowed
* until an answer is received.
* This function is not allowed for use with DTLS or when external
* PSK authentication has been negotiated. SECFailure is returned
* in both cases.
* The AuthCertificateCallback is called when the answer is received.
* If the answer is accepted by the server, the value returned by
* SSL_PeerCertificate() is replaced. If you need to remember all the
* certificates, you will need to call SSL_PeerCertificate() and save
* what you get before calling this.
* If the AuthCertificateCallback returns SECFailure, the connection
* is aborted.
#define SSL_SendCertificateRequest(fd) \
SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_SendCertificateRequest", \
(PRFileDesc * _fd), \
* Session cache API.
* Information that can be retrieved about a resumption token.
* See SSL_GetResumptionTokenInfo for details about how to use this API.
* Note that peerCert points to a certificate in the NSS database and must be
* copied by the application if it should be used after NSS shutdown or after
* calling SSL_DestroyResumptionTokenInfo.
typedef struct SSLResumptionTokenInfoStr {
PRUint16 length;
CERTCertificate *peerCert;
PRUint8 *alpnSelection;
PRUint32 alpnSelectionLen;
PRUint32 maxEarlyDataSize;
PRTime expirationTime; /* added in NSS 3.41 */
} SSLResumptionTokenInfo;
* Allows applications to retrieve information about a resumption token.
* This does not require a TLS session.
* - The |tokenData| argument is a pointer to the resumption token as byte array
* of length |tokenLen|.
* - The |token| argument is a pointer to a SSLResumptionTokenInfo struct of
* of |len|. The struct gets filled by this function.
* See SSL_DestroyResumptionTokenInfo for information about how to manage the
* |token| memory.
#define SSL_GetResumptionTokenInfo(tokenData, tokenLen, token, len) \
SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_GetResumptionTokenInfo", \
(const PRUint8 *_tokenData, unsigned int _tokenLen, \
SSLResumptionTokenInfo *_token, PRUintn _len), \
(tokenData, tokenLen, token, len))
* SSL_GetResumptionTokenInfo allocates memory in order to populate |tokenInfo|.
* Any SSLResumptionTokenInfo struct filled with SSL_GetResumptionTokenInfo
* has to be freed with SSL_DestroyResumptionTokenInfo.
#define SSL_DestroyResumptionTokenInfo(tokenInfo) \
"SSL_DestroyResumptionTokenInfo", \
(SSLResumptionTokenInfo * _tokenInfo), \
* This is the function signature for function pointers used as resumption
* token callback. The caller has to copy the memory at |resumptionToken| with
* length |len| before returning.
* - The |fd| argument is the socket file descriptor.
* - The |resumptionToken| is a pointer to the resumption token as byte array
* of length |len|.
* - The |ctx| is a void pointer to the context set by the application in
* SSL_SetResumptionTokenCallback.
typedef SECStatus(PR_CALLBACK *SSLResumptionTokenCallback)(
PRFileDesc *fd, const PRUint8 *resumptionToken, unsigned int len,
void *ctx);
* This allows setting a callback for external session caches to store
* resumption tokens.
* - The |fd| argument is the socket file descriptor.
* - The |cb| is a function pointer to an implementation of
* SSLResumptionTokenCallback.
* - The |ctx| is a pointer to some application specific context, which is
* returned when |cb| is called.
#define SSL_SetResumptionTokenCallback(fd, cb, ctx) \
"SSL_SetResumptionTokenCallback", \
(PRFileDesc * _fd, SSLResumptionTokenCallback _cb, void *_ctx), \
(fd, cb, ctx))
* This allows setting a resumption token for a session.
* The function returns SECSuccess iff the resumption token can be used,
* SECFailure in any other case. The caller should remove the |token| from its
* cache when the function returns SECFailure.
* - The |fd| argument is the socket file descriptor.
* - The |token| is a pointer to the resumption token as byte array
* of length |len|.
#define SSL_SetResumptionToken(fd, token, len) \
"SSL_SetResumptionToken", \
(PRFileDesc * _fd, const PRUint8 *_token, const unsigned int _len), \
(fd, token, len))
/* TLS 1.3 allows a server to set a limit on the number of bytes of early data
* that can be received. This allows that limit to be set. This function has no
* effect on a client. */
#define SSL_SetMaxEarlyDataSize(fd, size) \
(PRFileDesc * _fd, PRUint32 _size), \
(fd, size))
/* If |enabled|, a GREASE ECH extension will be sent in every ClientHello,
* unless a valid and supported ECHConfig is configured to the socket
* (in which case real ECH takes precedence). If |!enabled|, it is not sent.*/
#define SSL_EnableTls13GreaseEch(fd, enabled) \
SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_EnableTls13GreaseEch", \
(PRFileDesc * _fd, PRBool _enabled), (fd, enabled))
/* If |enabled|, a server receiving a Client Hello containing the ech_is_inner
* (and not encrypted_client_hello) extension will respond with the ECH
* acceptance signal. This signals the client to continue with the inner
* transcript rather than outer. */
#define SSL_EnableTls13BackendEch(fd, enabled) \
SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_EnableTls13BackendEch", \
(PRFileDesc * _fd, PRBool _enabled), (fd, enabled))
/* Called by the client after an initial ECH connection fails with
* SSL_ERROR_ECH_RETRY_WITH_ECH. Returns compatible ECHConfigs, which
* are configured via SetClientEchConfigs for an ECH retry attempt.
* These configs MUST NOT be used for more than the single retry
* attempt. Subsequent connections MUST use advertised ECHConfigs. */
#define SSL_GetEchRetryConfigs(fd, out) \
(PRFileDesc * _fd, \
SECItem * _out), \
(fd, out))
/* Called to remove all ECHConfigs from a socket (fd). */
#define SSL_RemoveEchConfigs(fd) \
(PRFileDesc * _fd), \
/* Set the ECHConfig and key pair on a socket (server side)
* fd -- the socket
* pubKey -- the server's SECKEYPublicKey for HPKE/ECH.
* privateKey -- the server's SECKEYPrivateKey for HPKE/ECH.
* record/recordLen -- the encoded DNS record (not base64)
#define SSL_SetServerEchConfigs(fd, pubKey, \
privKey, record, recordLen) \
(PRFileDesc * _fd, \
const SECKEYPublicKey *_pubKey, \
const SECKEYPrivateKey *_privKey, \
const PRUint8 *_record, unsigned int _recordLen), \
(fd, pubKey, privKey, \
record, recordLen))
/* Set ECHConfig(s) on a client. The first supported ECHConfig will be used.
* fd -- the socket
* echConfigs/echConfigsLen -- the ECHConfigs structure (not base64)
#define SSL_SetClientEchConfigs(fd, echConfigs, echConfigsLen) \
(PRFileDesc * _fd, \
const PRUint8 *_echConfigs, \
unsigned int _echConfigsLen), \
(fd, echConfigs, echConfigsLen))
* Generate an encoded ECHConfig structure (presumably server side).
* publicName -- the public_name value to be placed in SNI.
* hpkeSuites -- the HPKE cipher suites that can be used
* hpkeSuitesCount -- the number of suites in hpkeSuites
* kemId -- the HKPE KEM ID value
* group -- the named group this key corresponds to
* pubKey -- the public key for the key pair
* pad -- the maximum length to pad to
* out/outlen/maxlen -- where to output the data
#define SSL_EncodeEchConfig(publicName, hpkeSuites, hpkeSuitesCount, \
kemId, pubKey, maxNameLen, out, outlen, \
maxlen) \
(const char *_publicName, \
const PRUint32 *_hpkeSuites, \
unsigned int _hpkeSuitesCount, \
HpkeKemId _kemId, \
const SECKEYPublicKey *_pubKey, \
PRUint16 _maxNameLen, \
PRUint8 *_out, unsigned int *_outlen, \
unsigned int _maxlen), \
(publicName, hpkeSuites, hpkeSuitesCount, \
kemId, pubKey, maxNameLen, out, outlen, \
/* SSL_SetSecretCallback installs a callback that TLS calls when it installs new
* traffic secrets.
* SSLSecretCallback is called with the current epoch and the corresponding
* secret; this matches the epoch used in DTLS 1.3, even if the socket is
* operating in stream mode:
* - client_early_traffic_secret corresponds to epoch 1
* - {client|server}_handshake_traffic_secret is epoch 2
* - {client|server}_application_traffic_secret_{N} is epoch 3+N
* The callback is invoked separately for read secrets (client secrets on the
* server; server secrets on the client), and write secrets.
* This callback is only called if (D)TLS 1.3 is negotiated.
typedef void(PR_CALLBACK *SSLSecretCallback)(
PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint16 epoch, SSLSecretDirection dir, PK11SymKey *secret,
void *arg);
#define SSL_SecretCallback(fd, cb, arg) \
(PRFileDesc * _fd, SSLSecretCallback _cb, void *_arg), \
(fd, cb, arg))
/* SSL_RecordLayerWriteCallback() is used to replace the TLS record layer. This
* function installs a callback that TLS calls when it would otherwise encrypt
* and write a record to the underlying NSPR IO layer. The application is
* responsible for ensuring that these records are encrypted and written.
* Calling this API also disables reads from the underlying NSPR layer. The
* application is expected to push data when it is available using
* SSL_RecordLayerData().
* When data would be written, the provided SSLRecordWriteCallback with the
* epoch, TLS content type, and the data. The data provided to the callback is
* not split into record-sized writes. If the callback returns SECFailure, the
* write will be considered to have failed; in particular, PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR
* is not handled specially.
* If TLS 1.3 is in use, the epoch indicates the expected level of protection
* that the record would receive, this matches that used in DTLS 1.3:
* - epoch 0 corresponds to no record protection
* - epoch 1 corresponds to 0-RTT
* - epoch 2 corresponds to TLS handshake
* - epoch 3 and higher are application data
* Prior versions of TLS use epoch 1 and higher for application data.
* This API is not supported for DTLS.
typedef SECStatus(PR_CALLBACK *SSLRecordWriteCallback)(
PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint16 epoch, SSLContentType contentType,
const PRUint8 *data, unsigned int len, void *arg);
#define SSL_RecordLayerWriteCallback(fd, writeCb, arg) \
SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_RecordLayerWriteCallback", \
(PRFileDesc * _fd, SSLRecordWriteCallback _wCb, \
void *_arg), \
(fd, writeCb, arg))
/* SSL_RecordLayerData() is used to provide new data to TLS. The application
* indicates the epoch (see the description of SSL_RecordLayerWriteCallback()),
* content type, and the data that was received. The application is responsible
* for removing any encryption or other protection before passing data to this
* function.
* This returns SECSuccess if the data was successfully processed. If this
* function is used to drive the handshake and the caller needs to know when the
* handshake is complete, a call to SSL_ForceHandshake will return SECSuccess
* when the handshake is complete.
* This API is not supported for DTLS sockets.
#define SSL_RecordLayerData(fd, epoch, ct, data, len) \
(PRFileDesc * _fd, PRUint16 _epoch, \
SSLContentType _contentType, \
const PRUint8 *_data, unsigned int _len), \
(fd, epoch, ct, data, len))
* SSL_GetCurrentEpoch() returns the read and write epochs that the socket is
* currently using. NULL values for readEpoch or writeEpoch are ignored.
* See SSL_RecordLayerWriteCallback() for details on epochs.
#define SSL_GetCurrentEpoch(fd, readEpoch, writeEpoch) \
(PRFileDesc * _fd, PRUint16 * _readEpoch, \
PRUint16 * _writeEpoch), \
(fd, readEpoch, writeEpoch))
* The following AEAD functions expose an AEAD primitive that uses a ciphersuite
* to set parameters. The ciphersuite determines the Hash function used by
* HKDF, the AEAD function, and the size of key and IV. This is only supported
* for TLS 1.3.
* The key and IV are generated using the TLS KDF with a custom label. That is
* HKDF-Expand-Label(secret, labelPrefix + " key" or " iv", "", L).
* The encrypt and decrypt functions use a nonce construction identical to that
* used in TLS. The lower bits of the IV are XORed with the 64-bit counter to
* produce the nonce. Otherwise, this is an AEAD interface similar to that
* described in RFC 5116.
* Note: SSL_MakeAead internally calls SSL_MakeVariantAead with a variant of
* "stream", behaving as noted above. If "datagram" variant is passed instead,
* the Label prefix used in HKDF-Expand is "dtls13" instead of "tls13 ". See
* 7.1 of RFC 8446 and draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-34. */
typedef struct SSLAeadContextStr SSLAeadContext;
#define SSL_MakeAead(version, cipherSuite, secret, \
labelPrefix, labelPrefixLen, ctx) \
(PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite, \
PK11SymKey * _secret, \
const char *_labelPrefix, \
unsigned int _labelPrefixLen, \
SSLAeadContext **_ctx), \
(version, cipherSuite, secret, \
labelPrefix, labelPrefixLen, ctx))
#define SSL_MakeVariantAead(version, cipherSuite, variant, secret, \
labelPrefix, labelPrefixLen, ctx) \
(PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite, \
SSLProtocolVariant _variant, \
PK11SymKey * _secret, \
const char *_labelPrefix, \
unsigned int _labelPrefixLen, \
SSLAeadContext **_ctx), \
(version, cipherSuite, variant, secret, \
labelPrefix, labelPrefixLen, ctx))
#define SSL_AeadEncrypt(ctx, counter, aad, aadLen, in, inLen, \
output, outputLen, maxOutputLen) \
(const SSLAeadContext *_ctx, PRUint64 _counter, \
const PRUint8 *_aad, unsigned int _aadLen, \
const PRUint8 *_in, unsigned int _inLen, \
PRUint8 *_out, unsigned int *_outLen, \
unsigned int _maxOut), \
(ctx, counter, aad, aadLen, in, inLen, \
output, outputLen, maxOutputLen))
#define SSL_AeadDecrypt(ctx, counter, aad, aadLen, in, inLen, \
output, outputLen, maxOutputLen) \
(const SSLAeadContext *_ctx, PRUint64 _counter, \
const PRUint8 *_aad, unsigned int _aadLen, \
const PRUint8 *_in, unsigned int _inLen, \
PRUint8 *_output, unsigned int *_outLen, \
unsigned int _maxOut), \
(ctx, counter, aad, aadLen, in, inLen, \
output, outputLen, maxOutputLen))
#define SSL_DestroyAead(ctx) \
(SSLAeadContext * _ctx), \
/* SSL_HkdfExtract and SSL_HkdfExpandLabel implement the functions from TLS,
* using the version and ciphersuite to set parameters. This allows callers to
* use these TLS functions as a KDF. This is only supported for TLS 1.3.
* SSL_HkdfExtract produces a key with a mechanism that is suitable for input to
* SSL_HkdfExpandLabel (and SSL_HkdfExpandLabelWithMech). */
#define SSL_HkdfExtract(version, cipherSuite, salt, ikm, keyp) \
(PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite, \
PK11SymKey * _salt, PK11SymKey * _ikm, \
PK11SymKey * *_keyp), \
(version, cipherSuite, salt, ikm, keyp))
/* SSL_HkdfExpandLabel and SSL_HkdfVariantExpandLabel produce a key with a
* mechanism that is suitable for input to SSL_HkdfExpandLabel or SSL_MakeAead.
* Note: SSL_HkdfVariantExpandLabel internally calls SSL_HkdfExpandLabel with
* a default "stream" variant. If "datagram" variant is passed instead, the
* Label prefix used in HKDF-Expand is "dtls13" instead of "tls13 ". See 7.1 of
* RFC 8446 and draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-34. */
#define SSL_HkdfExpandLabel(version, cipherSuite, prk, \
hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen, keyp) \
(PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite, \
PK11SymKey * _prk, \
const PRUint8 *_hsHash, unsigned int _hsHashLen, \
const char *_label, unsigned int _labelLen, \
PK11SymKey **_keyp), \
(version, cipherSuite, prk, \
hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen, keyp))
#define SSL_HkdfVariantExpandLabel(version, cipherSuite, prk, \
hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen, variant, \
keyp) \
SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_HkdfVariantExpandLabel", \
(PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite, \
PK11SymKey * _prk, \
const PRUint8 *_hsHash, unsigned int _hsHashLen, \
const char *_label, unsigned int _labelLen, \
SSLProtocolVariant _variant, \
PK11SymKey **_keyp), \
(version, cipherSuite, prk, \
hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen, variant, \
/* SSL_HkdfExpandLabelWithMech and SSL_HkdfVariantExpandLabelWithMech use the KDF
* from the selected TLS version and cipher suite, as with the other calls, but
* the provided mechanism and key size. This allows the key to be used more widely.
* Note: SSL_HkdfExpandLabelWithMech internally calls SSL_HkdfVariantExpandLabelWithMech
* with a default "stream" variant. If "datagram" variant is passed instead, the
* Label prefix used in HKDF-Expand is "dtls13" instead of "tls13 ". See 7.1 of
* RFC 8446 and draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-34. */
#define SSL_HkdfExpandLabelWithMech(version, cipherSuite, prk, \
hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen, \
mech, keySize, keyp) \
SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_HkdfExpandLabelWithMech", \
(PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite, \
PK11SymKey * _prk, \
const PRUint8 *_hsHash, unsigned int _hsHashLen, \
const char *_label, unsigned int _labelLen, \
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE _mech, unsigned int _keySize, \
PK11SymKey **_keyp), \
(version, cipherSuite, prk, \
hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen, \
mech, keySize, keyp))
#define SSL_HkdfVariantExpandLabelWithMech(version, cipherSuite, prk, \
hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen, \
mech, keySize, variant, keyp) \
SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_HkdfVariantExpandLabelWithMech", \
(PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite, \
PK11SymKey * _prk, \
const PRUint8 *_hsHash, unsigned int _hsHashLen, \
const char *_label, unsigned int _labelLen, \
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE _mech, unsigned int _keySize, \
SSLProtocolVariant _variant, \
PK11SymKey **_keyp), \
(version, cipherSuite, prk, \
hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen, \
mech, keySize, variant, keyp))
/* SSL_SetTimeFunc overrides the default time function (PR_Now()) and provides
* an alternative source of time for the socket. This is used in testing, and in
* applications that need better control over how the clock is accessed. Set the
* function to NULL to use PR_Now().*/
typedef PRTime(PR_CALLBACK *SSLTimeFunc)(void *arg);
#define SSL_SetTimeFunc(fd, f, arg) \
(PRFileDesc * _fd, SSLTimeFunc _f, void *_arg), \
(fd, f, arg))
/* Create a delegated credential (DC) for the draft-ietf-tls-subcerts extension
* using the given certificate |cert| and its signing key |certPriv| and write
* the serialized DC to |out|. The
* parameters are:
* - the DC public key |dcPub|;
* - the DC signature scheme |dcCertVerifyAlg|, used to verify the handshake.
* - the DC time-to-live |dcValidFor|, the number of seconds from now for which
* the DC should be valid; and
* - the current time |now|.
* The signing algorithm used to verify the DC signature is deduced from
* |cert|.
* It's the caller's responsibility to ensure the input parameters are all
* valid. This procedure is meant primarily for testing; for this purpose it is
* useful to do no validation.
#define SSL_DelegateCredential(cert, certPriv, dcPub, dcCertVerifyAlg, \
dcValidFor, now, out) \
SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_DelegateCredential", \
(const CERTCertificate *_cert, \
const SECKEYPrivateKey *_certPriv, \
const SECKEYPublicKey *_dcPub, \
SSLSignatureScheme _dcCertVerifyAlg, \
PRUint32 _dcValidFor, \
PRTime _now, \
SECItem *_out), \
(cert, certPriv, dcPub, dcCertVerifyAlg, dcValidFor, \
now, out))
/* New functions created to permit get/set the CipherSuites Order for the
* handshake (Client Hello).
* The *Get function puts the current set of active (enabled and policy set as
* PR_TRUE) cipher suites in the cipherOrder outparam. Cipher suites that
* aren't active aren't included. The paramenters are:
* - PRFileDesc *fd = FileDescriptor to get information.
* - PRUint16 *cipherOrder = The memory allocated for cipherOrder needs to be
* SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers() * sizeof(PRUint16) or more.
* - PRUint16 numCiphers = The number of active ciphersuites listed in
* *cipherOrder is written here.
* The *Set function permits reorder the CipherSuites list for the Handshake
* (Client Hello). The default ordering defined in ssl3con.c is enough in
* almost all cases. But, if the client needs some hardening or performance
* adjusts related to CipherSuites, this can be done with this function.
* The caller has to be aware about the risk of call this function while a
* handshake are being processed in this fd/socket. For example, if you disable
* a cipher after the handshake and this cipher was choosen for that
* connection, something bad will happen.
* The parameters are:
* - PRFileDesc *fd = FileDescriptor to change.
* - const PRUint16 *cipherOrder = Must receive all ciphers to be ordered, in
* the desired order. They will be set in the begin of the list. Only
* suites listed by SSL_ImplementedCiphers() can be included.
* - PRUint16 numCiphers = Must receive the number of items in *cipherOrder.
* */
#define SSL_CipherSuiteOrderGet(fd, cipherOrder, numCiphers) \
(PRFileDesc * _fd, PRUint16 * _cipherOrder, \
unsigned int *_numCiphers), \
(fd, cipherOrder, numCiphers))
#define SSL_CipherSuiteOrderSet(fd, cipherOrder, numCiphers) \
(PRFileDesc * _fd, const PRUint16 *_cipherOrder, \
PRUint16 _numCiphers), \
(fd, cipherOrder, numCiphers))
* The following functions expose a masking primitive that uses ciphersuite and
* version information to set paramaters for the masking key and mask generation
* logic. This is only supported for TLS 1.3.
* The key and IV are generated using the TLS KDF with a custom label. That is
* HKDF-Expand-Label(secret, label, "", L), where |label| is an input to
* SSL_CreateMaskingContext.
* The mask generation logic in SSL_CreateMask is determined by the underlying
* symmetric cipher:
* - For AES-ECB, mask = AES-ECB(mask_key, sample). |len| must be <= 16 as
* the output is limited to a single block.
* - For CHACHA20, mask = ChaCha20(mask_key, sample[0..3], sample[4..15], {0}.len)
* That is, the low 4 bytes of |sample| used as the counter, the remaining 12 bytes
* the nonce. We encrypt |len| bytes of zeros, returning the raw key stream.
* The caller must pre-allocate at least |len| bytes for output. If the underlying
* cipher cannot produce the requested amount of data, SECFailure is returned.
typedef struct SSLMaskingContextStr {
PRUint16 version;
PRUint16 cipherSuite;
PK11SymKey *secret;
} SSLMaskingContext;
#define SSL_CreateMaskingContext(version, cipherSuite, secret, \
label, labelLen, ctx) \
SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_CreateMaskingContext", \
(PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite, \
PK11SymKey * _secret, \
const char *_label, \
unsigned int _labelLen, \
SSLMaskingContext **_ctx), \
(version, cipherSuite, secret, label, labelLen, ctx))
#define SSL_CreateVariantMaskingContext(version, cipherSuite, variant, \
secret, label, labelLen, ctx) \
SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_CreateVariantMaskingContext", \
(PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite, \
SSLProtocolVariant _variant, \
PK11SymKey * _secret, \
const char *_label, \
unsigned int _labelLen, \
SSLMaskingContext **_ctx), \
(version, cipherSuite, variant, secret, \
label, labelLen, ctx))
#define SSL_DestroyMaskingContext(ctx) \
SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_DestroyMaskingContext", \
(SSLMaskingContext * _ctx), \
#define SSL_CreateMask(ctx, sample, sampleLen, mask, maskLen) \
(SSLMaskingContext * _ctx, const PRUint8 *_sample, \
unsigned int _sampleLen, PRUint8 *_mask, \
unsigned int _maskLen), \
(ctx, sample, sampleLen, mask, maskLen))
#define SSL_SetDtls13VersionWorkaround(fd, enabled) \
SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_SetDtls13VersionWorkaround", \
(PRFileDesc * _fd, PRBool _enabled), (fd, enabled))
/* SSL_AddExternalPsk() and SSL_AddExternalPsk0Rtt() can be used to
* set an external PSK on a socket. If successful, this PSK will
* be used in all subsequent connection attempts for this socket.
* This has no effect if the maximum TLS version is < 1.3.
* This API currently only accepts a single PSK, so multiple calls to
* either function will fail. An EPSK can be replaced by calling
* SSL_RemoveExternalPsk followed by SSL_AddExternalPsk.
* For both functions, the label is expected to be a unique identifier
* for the external PSK. Should en external PSK have the same label
* as a configured resumption PSK identity, the external PSK will
* take precedence.
* If you want to enable early data, you need to also provide a
* cipher suite for 0-RTT and a limit for the early data using
* SSL_AddExternalPsk0Rtt(). If you want to explicitly disallow
* certificate authentication, use SSL_AuthCertificateHook to set
* a callback that rejects all certificate chains.
#define SSL_AddExternalPsk(fd, psk, identity, identityLen, hash) \
(PRFileDesc * _fd, PK11SymKey * _psk, \
const PRUint8 *_identity, unsigned int _identityLen, \
SSLHashType _hash), \
(fd, psk, identity, identityLen, hash))
#define SSL_AddExternalPsk0Rtt(fd, psk, identity, identityLen, hash, \
zeroRttSuite, maxEarlyData) \
(PRFileDesc * _fd, PK11SymKey * _psk, \
const PRUint8 *_identity, unsigned int _identityLen, \
SSLHashType _hash, PRUint16 _zeroRttSuite, \
PRUint32 _maxEarlyData), \
(fd, psk, identity, identityLen, hash, \
zeroRttSuite, maxEarlyData))
/* SSLExp_RemoveExternalPsk() removes an external PSK from socket
* configuration. Returns SECSuccess if the PSK was removed
* successfully, and SECFailure otherwise. */
#define SSL_RemoveExternalPsk(fd, identity, identityLen) \
(PRFileDesc * _fd, const PRUint8 *_identity, \
unsigned int _identityLen), \
(fd, identity, identityLen))
/* Deprecated experimental APIs */
#define SSL_UseAltServerHelloType(fd, enable) SSL_DEPRECATED_EXPERIMENTAL_API
#define SSL_SetupAntiReplay(a, b, c) SSL_DEPRECATED_EXPERIMENTAL_API
#define SSL_EncodeESNIKeys(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j) SSL_DEPRECATED_EXPERIMENTAL_API
#endif /* __sslexp_h_ */