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/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
/*
* Gather (Read) entire SSL3 records from socket into buffer.
*
* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
#include "cert.h"
#include "ssl.h"
#include "sslimpl.h"
#include "sslproto.h"
#include "ssl3prot.h"
struct ssl2GatherStr {
/* true when ssl3_GatherData encounters an SSLv2 handshake */
PRBool isV2;
/* number of bytes of padding appended to the message content */
PRUint8 padding;
};
typedef struct ssl2GatherStr ssl2Gather;
/* Caller should hold RecvBufLock. */
SECStatus
ssl3_InitGather(sslGather *gs)
{
gs->state = GS_INIT;
gs->writeOffset = 0;
gs->readOffset = 0;
gs->dtlsPacketOffset = 0;
gs->dtlsPacket.len = 0;
gs->rejectV2Records = PR_FALSE;
/* Allocate plaintext buffer to maximum possibly needed size. It needs to
* be larger than recordSizeLimit for TLS 1.0 and 1.1 compatability.
* The TLS 1.2 ciphertext is larger than the TLS 1.3 ciphertext. */
return sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->buf, TLS_1_2_MAX_CTEXT_LENGTH);
}
/* Caller must hold RecvBufLock. */
void
ssl3_DestroyGather(sslGather *gs)
{
if (gs) { /* the PORT_*Free functions check for NULL pointers. */
PORT_ZFree(gs->buf.buf, gs->buf.space);
PORT_Free(gs->inbuf.buf);
PORT_Free(gs->dtlsPacket.buf);
}
}
/* Checks whether a given buffer is likely an SSLv3 record header. */
PRBool
ssl3_isLikelyV3Hello(const unsigned char *buf)
{
/* Even if this was a V2 record header we couldn't possibly parse it
* correctly as the second bit denotes a vaguely-defined security escape. */
if (buf[0] & 0x40) {
return PR_TRUE;
}
/* Check for a typical V3 record header. */
return (PRBool)(buf[0] >= ssl_ct_change_cipher_spec &&
buf[0] <= ssl_ct_application_data &&
buf[1] == MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0));
}
/*
* Attempt to read in an entire SSL3 record.
* Blocks here for blocking sockets, otherwise returns -1 with
* PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR when socket would block.
*
* returns 1 if received a complete SSL3 record.
* returns 0 if recv returns EOF
* returns -1 if recv returns < 0
* (The error value may have already been set to PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
*
* Caller must hold the recv buf lock.
*
* The Gather state machine has 3 states: GS_INIT, GS_HEADER, GS_DATA.
* GS_HEADER: waiting for the 5-byte SSL3 record header to come in.
* GS_DATA: waiting for the body of the SSL3 record to come in.
*
* This loop returns when either
* (a) an error or EOF occurs,
* (b) PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR,
* (c) data (entire SSL3 record) has been received.
*/
static int
ssl3_GatherData(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, int flags, ssl2Gather *ssl2gs)
{
unsigned char *bp;
unsigned char *lbp;
int nb;
int err;
int rv = 1;
PRUint8 v2HdrLength = 0;
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
if (gs->state == GS_INIT) {
gs->state = GS_HEADER;
gs->remainder = 5;
gs->offset = 0;
gs->writeOffset = 0;
gs->readOffset = 0;
gs->inbuf.len = 0;
}
lbp = gs->inbuf.buf;
for (;;) {
SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: gather state %d (need %d more)",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, gs->state, gs->remainder));
bp = ((gs->state != GS_HEADER) ? lbp : gs->hdr) + gs->offset;
nb = ssl_DefRecv(ss, bp, gs->remainder, flags);
if (nb > 0) {
PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "raw gather data:", bp, nb));
} else if (nb == 0) {
/* EOF */
SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: EOF", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
rv = 0;
break;
} else /* if (nb < 0) */ {
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: recv error %d", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
PR_GetError()));
rv = SECFailure;
break;
}
PORT_Assert((unsigned int)nb <= gs->remainder);
if ((unsigned int)nb > gs->remainder) {
/* ssl_DefRecv is misbehaving! this error is fatal to SSL. */
gs->state = GS_INIT; /* so we don't crash next time */
rv = SECFailure;
break;
}
gs->offset += nb;
gs->remainder -= nb;
if (gs->state == GS_DATA)
gs->inbuf.len += nb;
/* if there's more to go, read some more. */
if (gs->remainder > 0) {
continue;
}
/* have received entire record header, or entire record. */
switch (gs->state) {
case GS_HEADER:
/* Check for SSLv2 handshakes. Always assume SSLv3 on clients,
* support SSLv2 handshakes only when ssl2gs != NULL.
* Always assume v3 after we received the first record. */
if (!ssl2gs ||
ss->gs.rejectV2Records ||
ssl3_isLikelyV3Hello(gs->hdr)) {
/* Should have a non-SSLv2 record header in gs->hdr. Extract
* the length of the following encrypted data, and then
* read in the rest of the record into gs->inbuf. */
gs->remainder = (gs->hdr[3] << 8) | gs->hdr[4];
gs->hdrLen = SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH;
} else {
/* Probably an SSLv2 record header. No need to handle any
* security escapes (gs->hdr[0] & 0x40) as we wouldn't get
* here if one was set. See ssl3_isLikelyV3Hello(). */
gs->remainder = ((gs->hdr[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | gs->hdr[1];
ssl2gs->isV2 = PR_TRUE;
v2HdrLength = 2;
/* Is it a 3-byte header with padding? */
if (!(gs->hdr[0] & 0x80)) {
ssl2gs->padding = gs->hdr[2];
v2HdrLength++;
}
}
/* If it is NOT an SSLv2 header */
if (!v2HdrLength) {
/* Check if default RFC specified max ciphertext/record
* limits are respected. Checks for used record size limit
* extension boundaries are done in
* ssl3con.c/ssl3_HandleRecord() for tls and dtls records.
*
* -> For TLS 1.2 records MUST NOT be longer than
* 2^14 + 2048 bytes.
* -> For TLS 1.3 records MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + 256 bytes.
* -> For older versions this MAY be enforced, we do it.
* [RFC8446 Section 5.2, RFC5246 Section 6.2.3]. */
if (gs->remainder > TLS_1_2_MAX_CTEXT_LENGTH ||
(gs->remainder > TLS_1_3_MAX_CTEXT_LENGTH &&
ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)) {
SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow);
gs->state = GS_INIT;
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
return SECFailure;
}
}
gs->state = GS_DATA;
gs->offset = 0;
gs->inbuf.len = 0;
if (gs->remainder > gs->inbuf.space) {
err = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->inbuf, gs->remainder);
if (err) { /* realloc has set error code to no mem. */
return err;
}
lbp = gs->inbuf.buf;
}
/* When we encounter an SSLv2 hello we've read 2 or 3 bytes too
* many into the gs->hdr[] buffer. Copy them over into inbuf so
* that we can properly process the hello record later. */
if (v2HdrLength) {
/* Reject v2 records that don't even carry enough data to
* resemble a valid ClientHello header. */
if (gs->remainder < SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES) {
SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO);
return SECFailure;
}
PORT_Assert(lbp);
gs->inbuf.len = 5 - v2HdrLength;
PORT_Memcpy(lbp, gs->hdr + v2HdrLength, gs->inbuf.len);
gs->remainder -= gs->inbuf.len;
lbp += gs->inbuf.len;
}
if (gs->remainder > 0) {
break; /* End this case. Continue around the loop. */
}
/* FALL THROUGH if (gs->remainder == 0) as we just received
* an empty record and there's really no point in calling
* ssl_DefRecv() with buf=NULL and len=0. */
case GS_DATA:
/*
** SSL3 record has been completely received.
*/
SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[%d]: got record of %d bytes",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, gs->inbuf.len));
/* reject any v2 records from now on */
ss->gs.rejectV2Records = PR_TRUE;
gs->state = GS_INIT;
return 1;
}
}
return rv;
}
/*
* Read in an entire DTLS record.
*
* Blocks here for blocking sockets, otherwise returns -1 with
* PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR when socket would block.
*
* This is simpler than SSL because we are reading on a datagram socket
* and datagrams must contain >=1 complete records.
*
* returns 1 if received a complete DTLS record.
* returns 0 if recv returns EOF
* returns -1 if recv returns < 0
* (The error value may have already been set to PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
*
* Caller must hold the recv buf lock.
*
* This loop returns when either
* (a) an error or EOF occurs,
* (b) PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR,
* (c) data (entire DTLS record) has been received.
*/
static int
dtls_GatherData(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, int flags)
{
int nb;
PRUint8 contentType;
unsigned int headerLen;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
PRBool dtlsLengthPresent = PR_TRUE;
SSL_TRC(30, ("dtls_GatherData"));
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
gs->state = GS_HEADER;
gs->offset = 0;
if (gs->dtlsPacketOffset == gs->dtlsPacket.len) { /* No data left */
gs->dtlsPacketOffset = 0;
gs->dtlsPacket.len = 0;
/* Resize to the maximum possible size so we can fit a full datagram.
* This leads to record_overflow errors if records/ciphertexts greater
* than the buffer (= maximum record) size are to be received.
* DTLS Record errors are dropped silently. [RFC6347, Section 4.1.2.7].
* Checks for record size limit extension boundaries are performed in
* ssl3con.c/ssl3_HandleRecord() for tls and dtls records.
*
* -> For TLS 1.2 records MUST NOT be longer than 2^14 + 2048 bytes.
* -> For TLS 1.3 records MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + 256 bytes.
* -> For older versions this MAY be enforced, we do it.
* [RFC8446 Section 5.2, RFC5246 Section 6.2.3]. */
if (ss->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
if (gs->dtlsPacket.space < DTLS_1_2_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH) {
rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->dtlsPacket, DTLS_1_2_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH);
}
} else { /* version >= TLS 1.3 */
if (gs->dtlsPacket.space != DTLS_1_3_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH) {
/* During Hello and version negotiation older DTLS versions with
* greater possible packets are used. The buffer must therefore
* be "truncated" by clearing and reallocating it */
sslBuffer_Clear(&gs->dtlsPacket);
rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->dtlsPacket, DTLS_1_3_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH);
}
}
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return -1; /* Code already set. */
}
/* recv() needs to read a full datagram at a time */
nb = ssl_DefRecv(ss, gs->dtlsPacket.buf, gs->dtlsPacket.space, flags);
if (nb > 0) {
PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "raw gather data:", gs->dtlsPacket.buf, nb));
} else if (nb == 0) {
/* EOF */
SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: EOF", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
return 0;
} else /* if (nb < 0) */ {
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: recv error %d", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
PR_GetError()));
/* DTLS Record Errors, including overlong records, are silently
* dropped [RFC6347, Section 4.1.2.7]. */
return -1;
}
gs->dtlsPacket.len = nb;
}
contentType = gs->dtlsPacket.buf[gs->dtlsPacketOffset];
if (dtls_IsLongHeader(ss->version, contentType)) {
headerLen = 13;
} else if (contentType == ssl_ct_application_data) {
headerLen = 7;
} else if (dtls_IsDtls13Ciphertext(ss->version, contentType)) {
/* We don't support CIDs.
*
* This condition is met on all invalid outer content types.
* For lower DTLS versions as well as the inner content types,
* this is checked in ssl3con.c/ssl3_HandleNonApplicationData().
*
* In DTLS generally invalid records SHOULD be silently discarded,
* no alert is sent [RFC6347, Section 4.1.2.7].
*/
if (contentType & 0x10) {
PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE);
gs->dtlsPacketOffset = 0;
gs->dtlsPacket.len = 0;
return -1;
}
dtlsLengthPresent = (contentType & 0x04) == 0x04;
PRUint8 dtlsSeqNoSize = (contentType & 0x08) ? 2 : 1;
PRUint8 dtlsLengthBytes = dtlsLengthPresent ? 2 : 0;
headerLen = 1 + dtlsSeqNoSize + dtlsLengthBytes;
} else {
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: invalid first octet (%d) for DTLS",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, contentType));
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE);
gs->dtlsPacketOffset = 0;
gs->dtlsPacket.len = 0;
return -1;
}
/* At this point we should have >=1 complete records lined up in
* dtlsPacket. Read off the header.
*/
if ((gs->dtlsPacket.len - gs->dtlsPacketOffset) < headerLen) {
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: rest of DTLS packet "
"too short to contain header",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
gs->dtlsPacketOffset = 0;
gs->dtlsPacket.len = 0;
return -1;
}
memcpy(gs->hdr, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&gs->dtlsPacket) + gs->dtlsPacketOffset,
headerLen);
gs->hdrLen = headerLen;
gs->dtlsPacketOffset += headerLen;
/* Have received SSL3 record header in gs->hdr. */
if (dtlsLengthPresent) {
gs->remainder = (gs->hdr[headerLen - 2] << 8) |
gs->hdr[headerLen - 1];
} else {
gs->remainder = gs->dtlsPacket.len - gs->dtlsPacketOffset;
}
if ((gs->dtlsPacket.len - gs->dtlsPacketOffset) < gs->remainder) {
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: rest of DTLS packet too short "
"to contain rest of body",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
gs->dtlsPacketOffset = 0;
gs->dtlsPacket.len = 0;
return -1;
}
/* OK, we have at least one complete packet, copy into inbuf */
gs->inbuf.len = 0;
rv = sslBuffer_Append(&gs->inbuf,
SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&gs->dtlsPacket) + gs->dtlsPacketOffset,
gs->remainder);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return -1; /* code already set. */
}
gs->offset = gs->remainder;
gs->dtlsPacketOffset += gs->remainder;
gs->state = GS_INIT;
SSL_TRC(20, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: dtls gathered record type=%d len=%d",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, contentType, gs->inbuf.len));
return 1;
}
/* Gather in a record and when complete, Handle that record.
* Repeat this until the handshake is complete,
* or until application data is available.
*
* Returns 1 when the handshake is completed without error, or
* application data is available.
* Returns 0 if ssl3_GatherData hits EOF.
* Returns -1 on read error, or PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, or handleRecord error.
*
* Called from ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake in sslcon.c,
* and from SSL_ForceHandshake in sslsecur.c
* and from ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord below (<- DoRecv in sslsecur.c).
*
* Caller must hold the recv buf lock.
*/
int
ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(sslSocket *ss, int flags)
{
int rv;
SSL3Ciphertext cText;
PRBool keepGoing = PR_TRUE;
if (ss->ssl3.fatalAlertSent) {
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Cannot gather data; fatal alert already sent",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILED);
return -1;
}
SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
/* ssl3_HandleRecord may end up eventually calling ssl_FinishHandshake,
* which requires the 1stHandshakeLock, which must be acquired before the
* RecvBufLock.
*/
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss));
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
do {
PRBool processingEarlyData;
ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
processingEarlyData = ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted;
/* Without this, we may end up wrongly reporting
* SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_* errors if we receive any records from the
* peer while we are waiting to be restarted.
*/
if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) {
ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
return -1;
}
/* If we have a detached record layer, don't ever gather. */
if (ss->recordWriteCallback) {
PRBool done = ss->firstHsDone;
ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
if (done) {
return 1;
}
PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
return -1;
}
ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
/* State for SSLv2 client hello support. */
ssl2Gather ssl2gs = { PR_FALSE, 0 };
ssl2Gather *ssl2gs_ptr = NULL;
/* If we're a server and waiting for a client hello, accept v2. */
if (ss->sec.isServer && ss->opt.enableV2CompatibleHello &&
ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_client_hello) {
ssl2gs_ptr = &ssl2gs;
}
/* bring in the next sslv3 record. */
if (ss->recvdCloseNotify) {
/* RFC 5246 Section 7.2.1:
* Any data received after a closure alert is ignored.
*/
return 0;
}
if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
/* If we're a server waiting for a ClientHello then pass
* ssl2gs to support SSLv2 ClientHello messages. */
rv = ssl3_GatherData(ss, &ss->gs, flags, ssl2gs_ptr);
} else {
rv = dtls_GatherData(ss, &ss->gs, flags);
/* If we got a would block error, that means that no data was
* available, so we check the timer to see if it's time to
* retransmit */
if (rv == SECFailure &&
(PORT_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)) {
dtls_CheckTimer(ss);
/* Restore the error in case something succeeded */
PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
}
}
if (rv <= 0) {
return rv;
}
if (ssl2gs.isV2) {
rv = ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(ss, ss->gs.inbuf.buf,
ss->gs.inbuf.len,
ssl2gs.padding);
if (rv < 0) {
return rv;
}
} else {
/* decipher it, and handle it if it's a handshake.
* If it's application data, ss->gs.buf will not be empty upon return.
* If it's a change cipher spec, alert, or handshake message,
* ss->gs.buf.len will be 0 when ssl3_HandleRecord returns SECSuccess.
*
* cText only needs to be valid for this next function call, so
* it can borrow gs.hdr.
*/
cText.hdr = ss->gs.hdr;
cText.hdrLen = ss->gs.hdrLen;
cText.buf = &ss->gs.inbuf;
rv = ssl3_HandleRecord(ss, &cText);
}
#ifdef DEBUG
/* In Debug builds free gather ciphertext buffer after each decryption
* for advanced ASAN coverage/utilization. The buffer content has been
* used at this point, ssl3_HandleRecord() and thereby the decryption
* functions are only called from this point of the implementation. */
sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->gs.inbuf);
#endif
if (rv < 0) {
return ss->recvdCloseNotify ? 0 : rv;
}
if (ss->gs.buf.len > 0) {
/* We have application data to return to the application. This
* prioritizes returning application data to the application over
* completing any renegotiation handshake we may be doing.
*/
PORT_Assert(ss->firstHsDone);
break;
}
PORT_Assert(keepGoing);
ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake) {
/* We are done with the current handshake so stop trying to
* handshake. Note that it would be safe to test ss->firstHsDone
* instead of ss->ssl3.hs.ws. By testing ss->ssl3.hs.ws instead,
* we prioritize completing a renegotiation handshake over sending
* application data.
*/
PORT_Assert(ss->firstHsDone);
PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart);
keepGoing = PR_FALSE;
} else if (ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart) {
/* Prioritize sending application data over trying to complete
* the handshake if we're false starting.
*
* If we were to do this check at the beginning of the loop instead
* of here, then this function would become be a no-op after
* receiving the ServerHelloDone in the false start case, and we
* would never complete the handshake.
*/
PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone);
if (ssl3_WaitingForServerSecondRound(ss)) {
keepGoing = PR_FALSE;
} else {
ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
}
} else if (processingEarlyData &&
ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_done &&
!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData)) {
/* If we were processing early data and we are no longer, then force
* the handshake to block. This ensures that early data is
* delivered to the application before the handshake completes. */
ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
return -1;
}
ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
} while (keepGoing);
/* Service the DTLS timer so that the post-handshake timers
* fire. */
if (IS_DTLS(ss) && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake)) {
dtls_CheckTimer(ss);
}
ss->gs.readOffset = 0;
ss->gs.writeOffset = ss->gs.buf.len;
return 1;
}
/* Repeatedly gather in a record and when complete, Handle that record.
* Repeat this until some application data is received.
*
* Returns 1 when application data is available.
* Returns 0 if ssl3_GatherData hits EOF.
* Returns -1 on read error, or PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, or handleRecord error.
*
* Called from DoRecv in sslsecur.c
* Caller must hold the recv buf lock.
*/
int
ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord(sslSocket *ss, int flags)
{
int rv;
/* ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake requires both of these locks. */
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss));
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
do {
rv = ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(ss, flags);
} while (rv > 0 && ss->gs.buf.len == 0);
return rv;
}
static SECStatus
ssl_HandleZeroRttRecordData(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *data, unsigned int len)
{
PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer);
if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted) {
sslBuffer buf = { CONST_CAST(PRUint8, data), len, len, PR_TRUE };
return tls13_HandleEarlyApplicationData(ss, &buf);
}
if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_ignored &&
ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore != ssl_0rtt_ignore_none) {
/* We're ignoring 0-RTT so drop this record quietly. */
return SECSuccess;
}
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_APPLICATION_DATA);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Ensure that application data in the wrong epoch is blocked. */
static PRBool
ssl_IsApplicationDataPermitted(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 epoch)
{
/* Epoch 0 is never OK. */
if (epoch == 0) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
return ss->firstHsDone;
}
/* TLS 1.3 application data. */
if (epoch >= TrafficKeyApplicationData) {
return ss->firstHsDone;
}
/* TLS 1.3 early data is server only. Further checks aren't needed
* as those are handled in ssl_HandleZeroRttRecordData. */
if (epoch == TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData) {
return ss->sec.isServer;
}
return PR_FALSE;
}
SECStatus
SSLExp_RecordLayerData(PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint16 epoch,
SSLContentType contentType,
const PRUint8 *data, unsigned int len)
{
SECStatus rv;
sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
if (!ss) {
return SECFailure;
}
if (IS_DTLS(ss) || data == NULL || len == 0) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Run any handshake function. If SSL_RecordLayerData is the only way that
* the handshake is driven, then this is necessary to ensure that
* ssl_BeginClientHandshake or ssl_BeginServerHandshake is called. Note that
* the other function that might be set to ss->handshake,
* ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake, does nothing when this function is used. */
ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss);
rv = ssl_Do1stHandshake(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
goto early_loser; /* Rely on the existing code. */
}
if (contentType == ssl_ct_application_data &&
!ssl_IsApplicationDataPermitted(ss, epoch)) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
goto early_loser;
}
/* Then we can validate the epoch. */
PRErrorCode epochError;
ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
if (epoch < ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch) {
epochError = SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS; /* Too c/old. */
} else if (epoch > ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch) {
/* If a TLS 1.3 server is not expecting EndOfEarlyData,
* moving from 1 to 2 is a signal to execute the code
* as though that message had been received. Let that pass. */
if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
ss->opt.suppressEndOfEarlyData &&
ss->sec.isServer &&
ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch == TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData &&
epoch == TrafficKeyHandshake) {
epochError = 0;
} else {
epochError = PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR; /* Too warm/new. */
}
} else {
epochError = 0; /* Just right. */
}
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
if (epochError) {
PORT_SetError(epochError);
goto early_loser;
}
/* If the handshake is still running, we need to run that. */
rv = ssl_Do1stHandshake(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
goto early_loser;
}
/* 0-RTT needs its own special handling here. */
if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
epoch == TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData &&
contentType == ssl_ct_application_data) {
rv = ssl_HandleZeroRttRecordData(ss, data, len);
ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss);
return rv;
}
/* Finally, save the data... */
ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss);
rv = sslBuffer_Append(&ss->gs.buf, data, len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
/* ...and process it. Just saving application data is enough for it to be
* available to PR_Read(). */
if (contentType != ssl_ct_application_data) {
rv = ssl3_HandleNonApplicationData(ss, contentType, 0, 0, &ss->gs.buf);
/* This occasionally blocks, but that's OK here. */
if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
goto loser;
}
}
ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss);
return SECSuccess;
loser:
/* Make sure that any data is not used again. */
ss->gs.buf.len = 0;
ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
early_loser:
ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss);
return SECFailure;
}
SECStatus
SSLExp_GetCurrentEpoch(PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint16 *readEpoch,
PRUint16 *writeEpoch)
{
sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
if (!ss) {
return SECFailure;
}
ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
if (readEpoch) {
*readEpoch = ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch;
}
if (writeEpoch) {
*writeEpoch = ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch;
}
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
return SECSuccess;
}