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/* vim:set ts=4 sw=2 sts=2 et ci: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at */
// HttpLog.h should generally be included first
#include "HttpLog.h"
#include "nsHttpNTLMAuth.h"
#include "nsIAuthModule.h"
#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
#include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h"
#include "plbase64.h"
#include "plstr.h"
#include "prnetdb.h"
#include "nsIPrefBranch.h"
#include "nsIHttpAuthenticableChannel.h"
#include "nsIURI.h"
#ifdef XP_WIN
# include "nsIChannel.h"
# include "nsIX509Cert.h"
# include "nsITransportSecurityInfo.h"
#include "mozilla/Attributes.h"
#include "mozilla/Base64.h"
#include "mozilla/CheckedInt.h"
#include "mozilla/Maybe.h"
#include "mozilla/Tokenizer.h"
#include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h"
#include "mozilla/Unused.h"
#include "nsNetUtil.h"
#include "nsIChannel.h"
#include "nsUnicharUtils.h"
#include "mozilla/net/HttpAuthUtils.h"
#include "mozilla/ClearOnShutdown.h"
namespace mozilla {
namespace net {
static const char kAllowProxies[] = "network.automatic-ntlm-auth.allow-proxies";
static const char kAllowNonFqdn[] =
static const char kTrustedURIs[] = "network.automatic-ntlm-auth.trusted-uris";
static const char kForceGeneric[] = "network.auth.force-generic-ntlm";
static const char kSSOinPBmode[] = "network.auth.private-browsing-sso";
StaticRefPtr<nsHttpNTLMAuth> nsHttpNTLMAuth::gSingleton;
static bool IsNonFqdn(nsIURI* uri) {
nsAutoCString host;
PRNetAddr addr;
if (NS_FAILED(uri->GetAsciiHost(host))) return false;
// return true if host does not contain a dot and is not an ip address
return !host.IsEmpty() && !host.Contains('.') &&
PR_StringToNetAddr(host.BeginReading(), &addr) != PR_SUCCESS;
// Check to see if we should use our generic (internal) NTLM auth module.
static bool ForceGenericNTLM() {
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefs = do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
if (!prefs) return false;
bool flag = false;
if (NS_FAILED(prefs->GetBoolPref(kForceGeneric, &flag))) flag = false;
LOG(("Force use of generic ntlm auth module: %d\n", flag));
return flag;
// Check to see if we should use default credentials for this host or proxy.
static bool CanUseDefaultCredentials(nsIHttpAuthenticableChannel* channel,
bool isProxyAuth) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefs = do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
if (!prefs) {
return false;
// Proxy should go all the time, it's not considered a privacy leak
// to send default credentials to a proxy.
if (isProxyAuth) {
bool val;
if (NS_FAILED(prefs->GetBoolPref(kAllowProxies, &val))) val = false;
LOG(("Default credentials allowed for proxy: %d\n", val));
return val;
// Prevent using default credentials for authentication when we are in the
// private browsing mode (but not in "never remember history" mode) and when
// not explicitely allowed. Otherwise, it would cause a privacy data leak.
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> bareChannel = do_QueryInterface(channel);
if (NS_UsePrivateBrowsing(bareChannel)) {
bool ssoInPb;
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(prefs->GetBoolPref(kSSOinPBmode, &ssoInPb)) && ssoInPb) {
return true;
bool dontRememberHistory;
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(prefs->GetBoolPref("browser.privatebrowsing.autostart",
&dontRememberHistory)) &&
!dontRememberHistory) {
return false;
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
Unused << channel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
bool allowNonFqdn;
if (NS_FAILED(prefs->GetBoolPref(kAllowNonFqdn, &allowNonFqdn)))
allowNonFqdn = false;
if (allowNonFqdn && uri && IsNonFqdn(uri)) {
LOG(("Host is non-fqdn, default credentials are allowed\n"));
return true;
bool isTrustedHost = (uri && auth::URIMatchesPrefPattern(uri, kTrustedURIs));
LOG(("Default credentials allowed for host: %d\n", isTrustedHost));
return isTrustedHost;
// Dummy class for session state object. This class doesn't hold any data.
// Instead we use its existence as a flag. See ChallengeReceived.
class nsNTLMSessionState final : public nsISupports {
~nsNTLMSessionState() = default;
already_AddRefed<nsIHttpAuthenticator> nsHttpNTLMAuth::GetOrCreate() {
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpAuthenticator> authenticator;
if (gSingleton) {
authenticator = gSingleton;
} else {
gSingleton = new nsHttpNTLMAuth();
authenticator = gSingleton;
return authenticator.forget();
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsHttpNTLMAuth, nsIHttpAuthenticator)
nsHttpNTLMAuth::ChallengeReceived(nsIHttpAuthenticableChannel* channel,
const char* challenge, bool isProxyAuth,
nsISupports** sessionState,
nsISupports** continuationState,
bool* identityInvalid) {
LOG(("nsHttpNTLMAuth::ChallengeReceived [ss=%p cs=%p]\n", *sessionState,
// Use the native NTLM if available
mUseNative = true;
// NOTE: we don't define any session state, but we do use the pointer.
*identityInvalid = false;
// Start a new auth sequence if the challenge is exactly "NTLM".
// If native NTLM auth apis are available and enabled through prefs,
// try to use them.
if (PL_strcasecmp(challenge, "NTLM") == 0) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIAuthModule> module;
// Check to see if we should default to our generic NTLM auth module
// through UseGenericNTLM. (We use native auth by default if the
// system provides it.) If *sessionState is non-null, we failed to
// instantiate a native NTLM module the last time, so skip trying again.
bool forceGeneric = ForceGenericNTLM();
if (!forceGeneric && !*sessionState) {
// Check for approved default credentials hosts and proxies. If
// *continuationState is non-null, the last authentication attempt
// failed so skip default credential use.
if (!*continuationState &&
CanUseDefaultCredentials(channel, isProxyAuth)) {
// Try logging in with the user's default credentials. If
// successful, |identityInvalid| is false, which will trigger
// a default credentials attempt once we return.
module = nsIAuthModule::CreateInstance("sys-ntlm");
#ifdef XP_WIN
else {
// Try to use native NTLM and prompt the user for their domain,
// username, and password. (only supported by windows nsAuthSSPI
// module.) Note, for servers that use LMv1 a weak hash of the user's
// password will be sent. We rely on windows internal apis to decide
// whether we should support this older, less secure version of the
// protocol.
module = nsIAuthModule::CreateInstance("sys-ntlm");
*identityInvalid = true;
#endif // XP_WIN
if (!module) LOG(("Native sys-ntlm auth module not found.\n"));
#ifdef XP_WIN
// On windows, never fall back unless the user has specifically requested
// so.
if (!forceGeneric && !module) return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
// If no native support was available. Fall back on our internal NTLM
// implementation.
if (!module) {
if (!*sessionState) {
// Remember the fact that we cannot use the "sys-ntlm" module,
// so we don't ever bother trying again for this auth domain.
RefPtr<nsNTLMSessionState> state = new nsNTLMSessionState();
// Use our internal NTLM implementation. Note, this is less secure,
// see bug 520607 for details.
LOG(("Trying to fall back on internal ntlm auth.\n"));
module = nsIAuthModule::CreateInstance("ntlm");
mUseNative = false;
// Prompt user for domain, username, and password.
*identityInvalid = true;
// If this fails, then it means that we cannot do NTLM auth.
if (!module) {
LOG(("No ntlm auth modules available.\n"));
// A non-null continuation state implies that we failed to authenticate.
// Blow away the old authentication state, and use the new one.
return NS_OK;
nsIHttpAuthenticableChannel* authChannel,
nsIHttpAuthenticatorCallback* aCallback, const char* challenge,
bool isProxyAuth, const char16_t* domain, const char16_t* username,
const char16_t* password, nsISupports* sessionState,
nsISupports* continuationState, nsICancelable** aCancellable) {
nsHttpNTLMAuth::GenerateCredentials(nsIHttpAuthenticableChannel* authChannel,
const char* challenge, bool isProxyAuth,
const char16_t* domain,
const char16_t* user, const char16_t* pass,
nsISupports** sessionState,
nsISupports** continuationState,
uint32_t* aFlags, char** creds)
*creds = nullptr;
*aFlags = 0;
// if user or password is empty, ChallengeReceived returned
// identityInvalid = false, that means we are using default user
// credentials; see nsAuthSSPI::Init method for explanation of this
// condition
if (!user || !pass) *aFlags = USING_INTERNAL_IDENTITY;
nsresult rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsIAuthModule> module = do_QueryInterface(*continuationState, &rv);
void *inBuf, *outBuf;
uint32_t inBufLen, outBufLen;
Maybe<nsTArray<uint8_t>> certArray;
// initial challenge
if (PL_strcasecmp(challenge, "NTLM") == 0) {
// NTLM service name format is 'HTTP@host' for both http and https
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
rv = authChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
nsAutoCString serviceName, host;
rv = uri->GetAsciiHost(host);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
// initialize auth module
uint32_t reqFlags = nsIAuthModule::REQ_DEFAULT;
if (isProxyAuth) reqFlags |= nsIAuthModule::REQ_PROXY_AUTH;
rv = module->Init(serviceName.get(), reqFlags, domain, user, pass);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
// This update enables updated Windows machines (Win7 or patched previous
// versions) and Linux machines running Samba (updated for Channel
// Binding), to perform Channel Binding when authenticating using NTLMv2
// and an outer secure channel.
// Currently only implemented for Windows, linux support will be landing in
// a separate patch, update this #ifdef accordingly then.
#if defined(XP_WIN) /* || defined (LINUX) */
// We should retrieve the server certificate and compute the CBT,
// but only when we are using the native NTLM implementation and
// not the internal one.
// It is a valid case not having the security info object. This
// occures when we connect an https site through an ntlm proxy.
// After the ssl tunnel has been created, we get here the second
// time and now generate the CBT from now valid security info.
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel = do_QueryInterface(authChannel, &rv);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> security;
rv = channel->GetSecurityInfo(getter_AddRefs(security));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsITransportSecurityInfo> secInfo = do_QueryInterface(security);
if (mUseNative && secInfo) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> cert;
rv = secInfo->GetServerCert(getter_AddRefs(cert));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
rv = cert->GetRawDER(*certArray);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
// If there is a server certificate, we pass it along the
// first time we call GetNextToken().
inBufLen = certArray->Length();
inBuf = certArray->Elements();
} else {
// If there is no server certificate, we don't pass anything.
inBufLen = 0;
inBuf = nullptr;
#else // Extended protection update is just for Linux and Windows machines.
inBufLen = 0;
inBuf = nullptr;
} else {
// decode challenge; skip past "NTLM " to the start of the base64
// encoded data.
int len = strlen(challenge);
if (len < 6) return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED; // bogus challenge
challenge += 5;
len -= 5;
// strip off any padding (see bug 230351)
while (len && challenge[len - 1] == '=') len--;
// decode into the input secbuffer
rv = Base64Decode(challenge, len, (char**)&inBuf, &inBufLen);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
rv = module->GetNextToken(inBuf, inBufLen, &outBuf, &outBufLen);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
// base64 encode data in output buffer and prepend "NTLM "
CheckedUint32 credsLen = ((CheckedUint32(outBufLen) + 2) / 3) * 4;
credsLen += 5; // "NTLM "
credsLen += 1; // null terminate
if (!credsLen.isValid()) {
} else {
*creds = (char*)moz_xmalloc(credsLen.value());
memcpy(*creds, "NTLM ", 5);
PL_Base64Encode((char*)outBuf, outBufLen, *creds + 5);
(*creds)[credsLen.value() - 1] = '\0'; // null terminate
// OK, we are done with |outBuf|
// inBuf needs to be freed if it's not pointing into certArray
if (inBuf && !certArray) {
return rv;
nsHttpNTLMAuth::GetAuthFlags(uint32_t* flags) {
return NS_OK;
} // namespace net
} // namespace mozilla