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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim:set expandtab ts=4 sw=2 sts=2 cin: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
// HttpLog.h should generally be included first
#include "HttpLog.h"
#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
#include "mozilla/StoragePrincipalHelper.h"
#include "mozilla/Tokenizer.h"
#include "MockHttpAuth.h"
#include "nsHttpChannelAuthProvider.h"
#include "nsCRT.h"
#include "nsNetUtil.h"
#include "nsHttpHandler.h"
#include "nsIHttpAuthenticator.h"
#include "nsIHttpChannelInternal.h"
#include "nsIAuthPrompt2.h"
#include "nsIAuthPromptProvider.h"
#include "nsIInterfaceRequestor.h"
#include "nsIInterfaceRequestorUtils.h"
#include "nsEscape.h"
#include "nsAuthInformationHolder.h"
#include "nsIStringBundle.h"
#include "nsIPromptService.h"
#include "netCore.h"
#include "nsIHttpAuthenticableChannel.h"
#include "nsIURI.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsHttp.h"
#include "nsHttpBasicAuth.h"
#include "nsHttpDigestAuth.h"
#ifdef MOZ_AUTH_EXTENSION
# include "nsHttpNegotiateAuth.h"
#endif
#include "nsHttpNTLMAuth.h"
#include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h"
#include "nsIURL.h"
#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_network.h"
#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_prompts.h"
#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
#include "nsIProxiedChannel.h"
#include "nsIProxyInfo.h"
namespace mozilla::net {
#define SUBRESOURCE_AUTH_DIALOG_DISALLOW_ALL 0
#define SUBRESOURCE_AUTH_DIALOG_DISALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN 1
#define SUBRESOURCE_AUTH_DIALOG_ALLOW_ALL 2
#define HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_TOP_LEVEL_DOC 29
#define HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_SAME_ORIGIN_SUBRESOURCE 30
#define HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_SAME_ORIGIN_XHR 31
#define HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_NON_WEB_CONTENT 32
#define HTTP_AUTH_BASIC_INSECURE 0
#define HTTP_AUTH_BASIC_SECURE 1
#define HTTP_AUTH_DIGEST_INSECURE 2
#define HTTP_AUTH_DIGEST_SECURE 3
#define HTTP_AUTH_NTLM_INSECURE 4
#define HTTP_AUTH_NTLM_SECURE 5
#define HTTP_AUTH_NEGOTIATE_INSECURE 6
#define HTTP_AUTH_NEGOTIATE_SECURE 7
#define MAX_DISPLAYED_USER_LENGTH 64
#define MAX_DISPLAYED_HOST_LENGTH 64
static void GetOriginAttributesSuffix(nsIChannel* aChan, nsACString& aSuffix) {
OriginAttributes oa;
// Deliberately ignoring the result and going with defaults
if (aChan) {
StoragePrincipalHelper::GetOriginAttributesForNetworkState(aChan, oa);
}
oa.CreateSuffix(aSuffix);
}
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::nsHttpChannelAuthProvider()
: mProxyAuth(false),
mTriedProxyAuth(false),
mTriedHostAuth(false),
mSuppressDefensiveAuth(false),
mCrossOrigin(false),
mConnectionBased(false),
mHttpHandler(gHttpHandler) {}
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::~nsHttpChannelAuthProvider() {
MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
MOZ_ASSERT(!mAuthChannel, "Disconnect wasn't called");
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::Init(nsIHttpAuthenticableChannel* channel) {
MOZ_ASSERT(channel, "channel expected!");
mAuthChannel = channel;
nsresult rv = mAuthChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(mURI));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
rv = mAuthChannel->GetIsSSL(&mUsingSSL);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsIProxiedChannel> proxied(channel);
if (proxied) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIProxyInfo> pi;
rv = proxied->GetProxyInfo(getter_AddRefs(pi));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
if (pi) {
nsAutoCString proxyType;
rv = pi->GetType(proxyType);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
mProxyUsingSSL = proxyType.EqualsLiteral("https");
}
}
rv = mURI->GetAsciiHost(mHost);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
// reject the URL if it doesn't specify a host
if (mHost.IsEmpty()) return NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
rv = mURI->GetPort(&mPort);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> bareChannel = do_QueryInterface(channel);
mIsPrivate = NS_UsePrivateBrowsing(bareChannel);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::ProcessAuthentication(uint32_t httpStatus,
bool SSLConnectFailed) {
LOG(
("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::ProcessAuthentication "
"[this=%p channel=%p code=%u SSLConnectFailed=%d]\n",
this, mAuthChannel, httpStatus, SSLConnectFailed));
MOZ_ASSERT(mAuthChannel, "Channel not initialized");
nsCOMPtr<nsIProxyInfo> proxyInfo;
nsresult rv = mAuthChannel->GetProxyInfo(getter_AddRefs(proxyInfo));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
if (proxyInfo) {
mProxyInfo = do_QueryInterface(proxyInfo);
if (!mProxyInfo) return NS_ERROR_NO_INTERFACE;
}
nsAutoCString challenges;
mProxyAuth = (httpStatus == 407);
rv = PrepareForAuthentication(mProxyAuth);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
if (mProxyAuth) {
// only allow a proxy challenge if we have a proxy server configured.
// otherwise, we could inadvertently expose the user's proxy
// credentials to an origin server. We could attempt to proceed as
// if we had received a 401 from the server, but why risk flirting
// with trouble? IE similarly rejects 407s when a proxy server is
// not configured, so there's no reason not to do the same.
if (!UsingHttpProxy()) {
LOG(("rejecting 407 when proxy server not configured!\n"));
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
if (UsingSSL() && !SSLConnectFailed) {
// we need to verify that this challenge came from the proxy
// server itself, and not some server on the other side of the
// SSL tunnel.
LOG(("rejecting 407 from origin server!\n"));
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
rv = mAuthChannel->GetProxyChallenges(challenges);
} else {
rv = mAuthChannel->GetWWWChallenges(challenges);
}
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
nsAutoCString creds;
rv = GetCredentials(challenges, mProxyAuth, creds);
if (rv == NS_ERROR_IN_PROGRESS) return rv;
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
LOG(("unable to authenticate\n"));
} else {
// set the authentication credentials
if (mProxyAuth) {
rv = mAuthChannel->SetProxyCredentials(creds);
} else {
rv = mAuthChannel->SetWWWCredentials(creds);
}
}
return rv;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::AddAuthorizationHeaders(
bool aDontUseCachedWWWCreds) {
LOG(
("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::AddAuthorizationHeaders? "
"[this=%p channel=%p]\n",
this, mAuthChannel));
MOZ_ASSERT(mAuthChannel, "Channel not initialized");
nsCOMPtr<nsIProxyInfo> proxyInfo;
nsresult rv = mAuthChannel->GetProxyInfo(getter_AddRefs(proxyInfo));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
if (proxyInfo) {
mProxyInfo = do_QueryInterface(proxyInfo);
if (!mProxyInfo) return NS_ERROR_NO_INTERFACE;
}
uint32_t loadFlags;
rv = mAuthChannel->GetLoadFlags(&loadFlags);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
// this getter never fails
nsHttpAuthCache* authCache = gHttpHandler->AuthCache(mIsPrivate);
// check if proxy credentials should be sent
if (!ProxyHost().IsEmpty() && UsingHttpProxy()) {
SetAuthorizationHeader(authCache, nsHttp::Proxy_Authorization, "http"_ns,
ProxyHost(), ProxyPort(),
""_ns, // proxy has no path
mProxyIdent);
}
if (loadFlags & nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS) {
LOG(("Skipping Authorization header for anonymous load\n"));
return NS_OK;
}
if (aDontUseCachedWWWCreds) {
LOG(
("Authorization header already present:"
" skipping adding auth header from cache\n"));
return NS_OK;
}
// check if server credentials should be sent
nsAutoCString path, scheme;
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(GetCurrentPath(path)) &&
NS_SUCCEEDED(mURI->GetScheme(scheme))) {
SetAuthorizationHeader(authCache, nsHttp::Authorization, scheme, Host(),
Port(), path, mIdent);
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::CheckForSuperfluousAuth() {
LOG(
("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::CheckForSuperfluousAuth? "
"[this=%p channel=%p]\n",
this, mAuthChannel));
MOZ_ASSERT(mAuthChannel, "Channel not initialized");
// we've been called because it has been determined that this channel is
// getting loaded without taking the userpass from the URL. if the URL
// contained a userpass, then (provided some other conditions are true),
// we'll give the user an opportunity to abort the channel as this might be
// an attempt to spoof a different site (see bug 232567).
if (!ConfirmAuth("SuperfluousAuth", true)) {
// calling cancel here sets our mStatus and aborts the HTTP
// transaction, which prevents OnDataAvailable events.
Unused << mAuthChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_SUPERFLUOS_AUTH);
return NS_ERROR_SUPERFLUOS_AUTH;
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::Cancel(nsresult status) {
MOZ_ASSERT(mAuthChannel, "Channel not initialized");
if (mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable) {
mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable->Cancel(status);
mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable = nullptr;
}
if (mGenerateCredentialsCancelable) {
mGenerateCredentialsCancelable->Cancel(status);
mGenerateCredentialsCancelable = nullptr;
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::Disconnect(nsresult status) {
mAuthChannel = nullptr;
if (mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable) {
mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable->Cancel(status);
mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable = nullptr;
}
if (mGenerateCredentialsCancelable) {
mGenerateCredentialsCancelable->Cancel(status);
mGenerateCredentialsCancelable = nullptr;
}
NS_IF_RELEASE(mProxyAuthContinuationState);
NS_IF_RELEASE(mAuthContinuationState);
return NS_OK;
}
// helper function for getting an auth prompt from an interface requestor
static void GetAuthPrompt(nsIInterfaceRequestor* ifreq, bool proxyAuth,
nsIAuthPrompt2** result) {
if (!ifreq) return;
uint32_t promptReason;
if (proxyAuth) {
promptReason = nsIAuthPromptProvider::PROMPT_PROXY;
} else {
promptReason = nsIAuthPromptProvider::PROMPT_NORMAL;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIAuthPromptProvider> promptProvider = do_GetInterface(ifreq);
if (promptProvider) {
promptProvider->GetAuthPrompt(promptReason, NS_GET_IID(nsIAuthPrompt2),
reinterpret_cast<void**>(result));
} else {
NS_QueryAuthPrompt2(ifreq, result);
}
}
// generate credentials for the given challenge, and update the auth cache.
nsresult nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GenCredsAndSetEntry(
nsIHttpAuthenticator* auth, bool proxyAuth, const nsACString& scheme,
const nsACString& host, int32_t port, const nsACString& directory,
const nsACString& realm, const nsACString& challenge,
const nsHttpAuthIdentity& ident, nsCOMPtr<nsISupports>& sessionState,
nsACString& result) {
nsresult rv;
nsISupports* ss = sessionState;
// set informations that depend on whether
// we're authenticating against a proxy
// or a webserver
nsISupports** continuationState;
if (proxyAuth) {
continuationState = &mProxyAuthContinuationState;
} else {
continuationState = &mAuthContinuationState;
}
rv = auth->GenerateCredentialsAsync(
mAuthChannel, this, challenge, proxyAuth, ident.Domain(), ident.User(),
ident.Password(), ss, *continuationState,
getter_AddRefs(mGenerateCredentialsCancelable));
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
// Calling generate credentials async, results will be dispatched to the
// main thread by calling OnCredsGenerated method
return NS_ERROR_IN_PROGRESS;
}
uint32_t generateFlags;
rv = auth->GenerateCredentials(
mAuthChannel, challenge, proxyAuth, ident.Domain(), ident.User(),
ident.Password(), &ss, &*continuationState, &generateFlags, result);
sessionState.swap(ss);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
// don't log this in release build since it could contain sensitive info.
#ifdef DEBUG
LOG(("generated creds: %s\n", result.BeginReading()));
#endif
return UpdateCache(auth, scheme, host, port, directory, realm, challenge,
ident, result, generateFlags, sessionState, proxyAuth);
}
nsresult nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::UpdateCache(
nsIHttpAuthenticator* auth, const nsACString& scheme,
const nsACString& host, int32_t port, const nsACString& directory,
const nsACString& realm, const nsACString& challenge,
const nsHttpAuthIdentity& ident, const nsACString& creds,
uint32_t generateFlags, nsISupports* sessionState, bool aProxyAuth) {
nsresult rv;
uint32_t authFlags;
rv = auth->GetAuthFlags(&authFlags);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
// find out if this authenticator allows reuse of credentials and/or
// challenge.
bool saveCreds =
0 != (authFlags & nsIHttpAuthenticator::REUSABLE_CREDENTIALS);
bool saveChallenge =
0 != (authFlags & nsIHttpAuthenticator::REUSABLE_CHALLENGE);
bool saveIdentity =
0 == (generateFlags & nsIHttpAuthenticator::USING_INTERNAL_IDENTITY);
// this getter never fails
nsHttpAuthCache* authCache = gHttpHandler->AuthCache(mIsPrivate);
nsAutoCString suffix;
if (!aProxyAuth) {
// We don't isolate proxy credentials cache entries with the origin suffix
// as it would only annoy users with authentication dialogs popping up.
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> chan = do_QueryInterface(mAuthChannel);
GetOriginAttributesSuffix(chan, suffix);
}
// create a cache entry. we do this even though we don't yet know that
// these credentials are valid b/c we need to avoid prompting the user
// more than once in case the credentials are valid.
//
// if the credentials are not reusable, then we don't bother sticking
// them in the auth cache.
rv = authCache->SetAuthEntry(scheme, host, port, directory, realm,
saveCreds ? creds : ""_ns,
saveChallenge ? challenge : ""_ns, suffix,
saveIdentity ? &ident : nullptr, sessionState);
return rv;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::ClearProxyIdent() {
LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::ClearProxyIdent [this=%p]\n", this));
mProxyIdent.Clear();
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::PrepareForAuthentication(bool proxyAuth) {
LOG(
("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::PrepareForAuthentication "
"[this=%p channel=%p]\n",
this, mAuthChannel));
if (!proxyAuth) {
// reset the current proxy continuation state because our last
// authentication attempt was completed successfully.
NS_IF_RELEASE(mProxyAuthContinuationState);
LOG((" proxy continuation state has been reset"));
}
if (!UsingHttpProxy() || mProxyAuthType.IsEmpty()) return NS_OK;
// We need to remove any Proxy_Authorization header left over from a
// non-request based authentication handshake (e.g., for NTLM auth).
nsresult rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpAuthenticator> precedingAuth;
nsCString proxyAuthType;
rv = GetAuthenticator(mProxyAuthType, proxyAuthType,
getter_AddRefs(precedingAuth));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
uint32_t precedingAuthFlags;
rv = precedingAuth->GetAuthFlags(&precedingAuthFlags);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
if (!(precedingAuthFlags & nsIHttpAuthenticator::REQUEST_BASED)) {
nsAutoCString challenges;
rv = mAuthChannel->GetProxyChallenges(challenges);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
// delete the proxy authorization header because we weren't
// asked to authenticate
rv = mAuthChannel->SetProxyCredentials(""_ns);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
LOG((" cleared proxy authorization header"));
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
class MOZ_STACK_CLASS ChallengeParser final : Tokenizer {
public:
explicit ChallengeParser(const nsACString& aChallenges)
: Tokenizer(aChallenges, nullptr, "") {
Record();
}
Maybe<nsDependentCSubstring> GetNext() {
Token t;
nsDependentCSubstring result;
bool inQuote = false;
while (Next(t)) {
if (t.Type() == TOKEN_EOL) {
Claim(result, ClaimInclusion::EXCLUDE_LAST);
SkipWhites(WhiteSkipping::INCLUDE_NEW_LINE);
Record();
inQuote = false;
if (!result.IsEmpty()) {
return Some(result);
}
} else if (t.Equals(Token::Char(',')) && !inQuote) {
// Sometimes we get multiple challenges separated by a comma.
// This is not great, as it's slightly ambiguous. We check if something
// is a new challenge by matching agains <param_name> =
// If the , isn't followed by a word and = then most likely
// it is the name of an authType.
const char* prevCursorPos = mCursor;
const char* prevRollbackPos = mRollback;
auto hasWordAndEqual = [&]() {
SkipWhites();
nsDependentCSubstring word;
if (!ReadWord(word)) {
return false;
}
SkipWhites();
return Check(Token::Char('='));
};
if (!hasWordAndEqual()) {
// This is not a parameter. It means the `,` character starts a
// different challenge.
// We'll revert the cursor and return the contents so far.
mCursor = prevCursorPos;
mRollback = prevRollbackPos;
Claim(result, ClaimInclusion::EXCLUDE_LAST);
SkipWhites();
Record();
if (!result.IsEmpty()) {
return Some(result);
}
}
} else if (t.Equals(Token::Char('"'))) {
inQuote = !inQuote;
}
}
Claim(result, Tokenizer::ClaimInclusion::INCLUDE_LAST);
SkipWhites();
Record();
if (!result.IsEmpty()) {
return Some(result);
}
return Nothing{};
}
};
enum ChallengeRank {
Unknown = 0,
Basic = 1,
Digest = 2,
NTLM = 3,
Negotiate = 4,
};
ChallengeRank Rank(const nsACString& aChallenge) {
if (StringBeginsWith(aChallenge, "Negotiate"_ns,
nsCaseInsensitiveCStringComparator)) {
return ChallengeRank::Negotiate;
}
if (StringBeginsWith(aChallenge, "NTLM"_ns,
nsCaseInsensitiveCStringComparator)) {
return ChallengeRank::NTLM;
}
if (StringBeginsWith(aChallenge, "Digest"_ns,
nsCaseInsensitiveCStringComparator)) {
return ChallengeRank::Digest;
}
if (StringBeginsWith(aChallenge, "Basic"_ns,
nsCaseInsensitiveCStringComparator)) {
return ChallengeRank::Basic;
}
return ChallengeRank::Unknown;
}
nsresult nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetCredentials(
const nsACString& aChallenges, bool proxyAuth, nsCString& creds) {
LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetCredentials"));
nsAutoCString challenges(aChallenges);
using AuthChallenge = struct AuthChallenge {
nsDependentCSubstring challenge;
uint16_t algorithm = 0;
ChallengeRank rank = ChallengeRank::Unknown;
void operator=(const AuthChallenge& aOther) {
challenge.Rebind(aOther.challenge, 0);
algorithm = aOther.algorithm;
rank = aOther.rank;
}
};
nsTArray<AuthChallenge> cc;
ChallengeParser p(challenges);
while (true) {
auto next = p.GetNext();
if (next.isNothing()) {
break;
}
AuthChallenge ac{next.ref(), 0};
nsAutoCString realm, domain, nonce, opaque;
bool stale = false;
uint16_t qop = 0;
ac.rank = Rank(ac.challenge);
if (StringBeginsWith(ac.challenge, "Digest"_ns,
nsCaseInsensitiveCStringComparator)) {
Unused << nsHttpDigestAuth::ParseChallenge(ac.challenge, realm, domain,
nonce, opaque, &stale,
&ac.algorithm, &qop);
}
cc.AppendElement(ac);
}
cc.StableSort([](const AuthChallenge& lhs, const AuthChallenge& rhs) {
if (StaticPrefs::network_auth_choose_most_secure_challenge()) {
// Different auth types
if (lhs.rank != rhs.rank) {
return lhs.rank < rhs.rank ? 1 : -1;
}
// If they're the same auth type, and not a Digest, then we treat them
// as equal (don't reorder them).
if (lhs.rank != ChallengeRank::Digest) {
return 0;
}
} else {
// Non-digest challenges should not be reordered when the pref is off.
if (lhs.algorithm == 0 || rhs.algorithm == 0) {
return 0;
}
}
// Same algorithm.
if (lhs.algorithm == rhs.algorithm) {
return 0;
}
return lhs.algorithm < rhs.algorithm ? 1 : -1;
});
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpAuthenticator> auth;
nsCString authType; // force heap allocation to enable string sharing since
// we'll be assigning this value into mAuthType.
// set informations that depend on whether we're authenticating against a
// proxy or a webserver
nsISupports** currentContinuationState;
nsCString* currentAuthType;
if (proxyAuth) {
currentContinuationState = &mProxyAuthContinuationState;
currentAuthType = &mProxyAuthType;
} else {
currentContinuationState = &mAuthContinuationState;
currentAuthType = &mAuthType;
}
nsresult rv = NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
bool gotCreds = false;
// figure out which challenge we can handle and which authenticator to use.
for (size_t i = 0; i < cc.Length(); i++) {
rv = GetAuthenticator(cc[i].challenge, authType, getter_AddRefs(auth));
LOG(("trying auth for %s", authType.get()));
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
//
// if we've already selected an auth type from a previous challenge
// received while processing this channel, then skip others until
// we find a challenge corresponding to the previously tried auth
// type.
//
if (!currentAuthType->IsEmpty() && authType != *currentAuthType) continue;
//
// we allow the routines to run all the way through before we
// decide if they are valid.
//
// we don't worry about the auth cache being altered because that
// would have been the last step, and if the error is from updating
// the authcache it wasn't really altered anyway. -CTN
//
// at this point the code is really only useful for client side
// errors (it will not automatically fail over to do a different
// auth type if the server keeps rejecting what is being sent, even
// if a particular auth method only knows 1 thing, like a
// non-identity based authentication method)
//
rv = GetCredentialsForChallenge(cc[i].challenge, authType, proxyAuth,
auth, creds);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
gotCreds = true;
*currentAuthType = authType;
break;
}
if (rv == NS_ERROR_IN_PROGRESS) {
// authentication prompt has been invoked and result is
// expected asynchronously, save current challenge being
// processed and all remaining challenges to use later in
// OnAuthAvailable and now immediately return
mCurrentChallenge = cc[i].challenge;
// imperfect; does not save server-side preference ordering.
// instead, continues with remaining string as provided by client
mRemainingChallenges.Truncate();
while (i + 1 < cc.Length()) {
i++;
mRemainingChallenges.Append(cc[i].challenge);
mRemainingChallenges.Append("\n"_ns);
}
return rv;
}
// reset the auth type and continuation state
NS_IF_RELEASE(*currentContinuationState);
currentAuthType->Truncate();
}
}
if (!gotCreds && !currentAuthType->IsEmpty()) {
// looks like we never found the auth type we were looking for.
// reset the auth type and continuation state, and try again.
currentAuthType->Truncate();
NS_IF_RELEASE(*currentContinuationState);
rv = GetCredentials(challenges, proxyAuth, creds);
}
return rv;
}
nsresult nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetAuthorizationMembers(
bool proxyAuth, nsACString& scheme, nsCString& host, int32_t& port,
nsACString& path, nsHttpAuthIdentity*& ident,
nsISupports**& continuationState) {
if (proxyAuth) {
MOZ_ASSERT(UsingHttpProxy(),
"proxyAuth is true, but no HTTP proxy is configured!");
host = ProxyHost();
port = ProxyPort();
ident = &mProxyIdent;
scheme.AssignLiteral("http");
continuationState = &mProxyAuthContinuationState;
} else {
host = Host();
port = Port();
ident = &mIdent;
nsresult rv;
rv = GetCurrentPath(path);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
rv = mURI->GetScheme(scheme);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
continuationState = &mAuthContinuationState;
}
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetCredentialsForChallenge(
const nsACString& aChallenge, const nsACString& aAuthType, bool proxyAuth,
nsIHttpAuthenticator* auth, nsCString& creds) {
LOG(
("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetCredentialsForChallenge "
"[this=%p channel=%p proxyAuth=%d challenges=%s]\n",
this, mAuthChannel, proxyAuth, nsCString(aChallenge).get()));
// this getter never fails
nsHttpAuthCache* authCache = gHttpHandler->AuthCache(mIsPrivate);
uint32_t authFlags;
nsresult rv = auth->GetAuthFlags(&authFlags);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
nsAutoCString realm;
ParseRealm(aChallenge, realm);
// if no realm, then use the auth type as the realm. ToUpperCase so the
// ficticious realm stands out a bit more.
// XXX this will cause some single signon misses!
// XXX this was meant to be used with NTLM, which supplies no realm.
/*
if (realm.IsEmpty()) {
realm = authType;
ToUpperCase(realm);
}
*/
// set informations that depend on whether
// we're authenticating against a proxy
// or a webserver
nsAutoCString host;
int32_t port;
nsHttpAuthIdentity* ident;
nsAutoCString path, scheme;
bool identFromURI = false;
nsISupports** continuationState;
rv = GetAuthorizationMembers(proxyAuth, scheme, host, port, path, ident,
continuationState);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
uint32_t loadFlags;
rv = mAuthChannel->GetLoadFlags(&loadFlags);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
// Fill only for non-proxy auth, proxy credentials are not OA-isolated.
nsAutoCString suffix;
if (!proxyAuth) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> chan = do_QueryInterface(mAuthChannel);
GetOriginAttributesSuffix(chan, suffix);
// if this is the first challenge, then try using the identity
// specified in the URL.
if (mIdent.IsEmpty()) {
GetIdentityFromURI(authFlags, mIdent);
identFromURI = !mIdent.IsEmpty();
}
if ((loadFlags & nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS) && !identFromURI) {
LOG(("Skipping authentication for anonymous non-proxy request\n"));
return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
}
// Let explicit URL credentials pass
// regardless of the LOAD_ANONYMOUS flag
} else if ((loadFlags & nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS) && !UsingHttpProxy()) {
LOG(("Skipping authentication for anonymous non-proxy request\n"));
return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
}
//
// if we already tried some credentials for this transaction, then
// we need to possibly clear them from the cache, unless the credentials
// in the cache have changed, in which case we'd want to give them a
// try instead.
//
nsHttpAuthEntry* entry = nullptr;
Unused << authCache->GetAuthEntryForDomain(scheme, host, port, realm, suffix,
&entry);
// hold reference to the auth session state (in case we clear our
// reference to the entry).
nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> sessionStateGrip;
if (entry) sessionStateGrip = entry->mMetaData;
// remember if we already had the continuation state. it means we are in
// the middle of the authentication exchange and the connection must be
// kept sticky then (and only then).
bool authAtProgress = !!*continuationState;
// for digest auth, maybe our cached nonce value simply timed out...
bool identityInvalid;
nsISupports* sessionState = sessionStateGrip;
rv = auth->ChallengeReceived(mAuthChannel, aChallenge, proxyAuth,
&sessionState, &*continuationState,
&identityInvalid);
sessionStateGrip.swap(sessionState);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
LOG((" identity invalid = %d\n", identityInvalid));
if (mConnectionBased && identityInvalid) {
// If the flag is set and identity is invalid, it means we received the
// first challange for a new negotiation round after negotiating a
// connection based auth failed (invalid password). The mConnectionBased
// flag is set later for the newly received challenge, so here it reflects
// the previous 401/7 response schema.
rv = mAuthChannel->CloseStickyConnection();
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
if (!proxyAuth) {
// We must clear proxy ident in the following scenario + explanation:
// - we are authenticating to an NTLM proxy and an NTLM server
// - we successfully authenticated to the proxy, mProxyIdent keeps
// the user name/domain and password, the identity has also been cached
// - we just threw away the connection because we are now asking for
// creds for the server (WWW auth)
// - hence, we will have to auth to the proxy again as well
// - if we didn't clear the proxy identity, it would be considered
// as non-valid and we would ask the user again ; clearing it forces
// use of the cached identity and not asking the user again
ClearProxyIdent();
}
}
mConnectionBased = !!(authFlags & nsIHttpAuthenticator::CONNECTION_BASED);
// It's legal if the peer closes the connection after the first 401/7.
// Making the connection sticky will prevent its restart giving the user
// a 'network reset' error every time. Hence, we mark the connection
// as restartable.
mAuthChannel->ConnectionRestartable(!authAtProgress);
if (identityInvalid) {
if (entry) {
if (ident->Equals(entry->Identity())) {
if (!identFromURI) {
LOG((" clearing bad auth cache entry\n"));
// ok, we've already tried this user identity, so clear the
// corresponding entry from the auth cache.
authCache->ClearAuthEntry(scheme, host, port, realm, suffix);
entry = nullptr;
ident->Clear();
}
} else if (!identFromURI ||
(ident->User() == entry->Identity().User() &&
!(loadFlags & (nsIChannel::LOAD_ANONYMOUS |
nsIChannel::LOAD_EXPLICIT_CREDENTIALS)))) {
LOG((" taking identity from auth cache\n"));
// the password from the auth cache is more likely to be
// correct than the one in the URL. at least, we know that it
// works with the given username. it is possible for a server
// to distinguish logons based on the supplied password alone,
// but that would be quite unusual... and i don't think we need
// to worry about such unorthodox cases.
*ident = entry->Identity();
identFromURI = false;
if (entry->Creds()[0] != '\0') {
LOG((" using cached credentials!\n"));
creds.Assign(entry->Creds());
return entry->AddPath(path);
}
}
} else if (!identFromURI) {
// hmm... identity invalid, but no auth entry! the realm probably
// changed (see bug 201986).
ident->Clear();
}
if (!entry && ident->IsEmpty()) {
uint32_t level = nsIAuthPrompt2::LEVEL_NONE;
if ((!proxyAuth && mUsingSSL) || (proxyAuth && mProxyUsingSSL)) {
level = nsIAuthPrompt2::LEVEL_SECURE;
} else if (authFlags & nsIHttpAuthenticator::IDENTITY_ENCRYPTED) {
level = nsIAuthPrompt2::LEVEL_PW_ENCRYPTED;
}
// Collect statistics on how frequently the various types of HTTP
// authentication are used over SSL and non-SSL connections.
if (Telemetry::CanRecordPrereleaseData()) {
if ("basic"_ns.Equals(aAuthType, nsCaseInsensitiveCStringComparator)) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(
Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_TYPE_STATS,
UsingSSL() ? HTTP_AUTH_BASIC_SECURE : HTTP_AUTH_BASIC_INSECURE);
} else if ("digest"_ns.Equals(aAuthType,
nsCaseInsensitiveCStringComparator)) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(
Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_TYPE_STATS,
UsingSSL() ? HTTP_AUTH_DIGEST_SECURE : HTTP_AUTH_DIGEST_INSECURE);
} else if ("ntlm"_ns.Equals(aAuthType,
nsCaseInsensitiveCStringComparator)) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(
Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_TYPE_STATS,
UsingSSL() ? HTTP_AUTH_NTLM_SECURE : HTTP_AUTH_NTLM_INSECURE);
} else if ("negotiate"_ns.Equals(aAuthType,
nsCaseInsensitiveCStringComparator)) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_TYPE_STATS,
UsingSSL() ? HTTP_AUTH_NEGOTIATE_SECURE
: HTTP_AUTH_NEGOTIATE_INSECURE);
}
}
// Depending on the pref setting, the authentication dialog may be
// blocked for all sub-resources, blocked for cross-origin
// sub-resources, or always allowed for sub-resources.
// For more details look at the bug 647010.
// BlockPrompt will set mCrossOrigin parameter as well.
if (BlockPrompt(proxyAuth)) {
LOG((
"nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetCredentialsForChallenge: "
"Prompt is blocked [this=%p pref=%d img-pref=%d "
"non-web-content-triggered-pref=%d]\n",
this, StaticPrefs::network_auth_subresource_http_auth_allow(),
StaticPrefs::
network_auth_subresource_img_cross_origin_http_auth_allow(),
StaticPrefs::
network_auth_non_web_content_triggered_resources_http_auth_allow()));
return NS_ERROR_ABORT;
}
// at this point we are forced to interact with the user to get
// their username and password for this domain.
rv = PromptForIdentity(level, proxyAuth, realm, aAuthType, authFlags,
*ident);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
identFromURI = false;
}
}
if (identFromURI) {
// Warn the user before automatically using the identity from the URL
// to automatically log them into a site (see bug 232567).
if (!ConfirmAuth("AutomaticAuth", false)) {
// calling cancel here sets our mStatus and aborts the HTTP
// transaction, which prevents OnDataAvailable events.
rv = mAuthChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_ABORT);
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
// this return code alone is not equivalent to Cancel, since
// it only instructs our caller that authentication failed.
// without an explicit call to Cancel, our caller would just
// load the page that accompanies the HTTP auth challenge.
return NS_ERROR_ABORT;
}
}
//
// get credentials for the given user:pass
//
// always store the credentials we're trying now so that they will be used
// on subsequent links. This will potentially remove good credentials from
// the cache. This is ok as we don't want to use cached credentials if the
// user specified something on the URI or in another manner. This is so
// that we don't transparently authenticate as someone they're not
// expecting to authenticate as.
//
nsCString result;
rv = GenCredsAndSetEntry(auth, proxyAuth, scheme, host, port, path, realm,
aChallenge, *ident, sessionStateGrip, creds);
return rv;
}
bool nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::BlockPrompt(bool proxyAuth) {
// Verify that it's ok to prompt for credentials here, per spec
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannelInternal> chanInternal =
do_QueryInterface(mAuthChannel);
MOZ_ASSERT(chanInternal);
if (chanInternal->GetBlockAuthPrompt()) {
LOG(
("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::BlockPrompt: Prompt is blocked "
"[this=%p channel=%p]\n",
this, mAuthChannel));
return true;
}
if (proxyAuth) {
// Do not block auth-dialog if this is a proxy authentication.
return false;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> chan = do_QueryInterface(mAuthChannel);
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = chan->LoadInfo();
// We will treat loads w/o loadInfo as a top level document.
bool topDoc = true;
bool xhr = false;
bool nonWebContent = false;
if (loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() !=
ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
topDoc = false;
}
if (!topDoc) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> triggeringPrinc = loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal();
if (triggeringPrinc->IsSystemPrincipal()) {
nonWebContent = true;
}
}
if (loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() ==
ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST) {
xhr = true;
}
if (!topDoc && !xhr) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> topURI;
Unused << chanInternal->GetTopWindowURI(getter_AddRefs(topURI));
if (topURI) {
mCrossOrigin = !NS_SecurityCompareURIs(topURI, mURI, true);
} else {
nsIPrincipal* loadingPrinc = loadInfo->GetLoadingPrincipal();
MOZ_ASSERT(loadingPrinc);
mCrossOrigin = !loadingPrinc->IsSameOrigin(mURI);
}
}
if (Telemetry::CanRecordPrereleaseData()) {
if (topDoc) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_STATS_3,
HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_TOP_LEVEL_DOC);
} else if (nonWebContent) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_STATS_3,
HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_NON_WEB_CONTENT);
} else if (!mCrossOrigin) {
if (xhr) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_STATS_3,
HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_SAME_ORIGIN_XHR);
} else {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_STATS_3,
HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_SAME_ORIGIN_SUBRESOURCE);
}
} else {
Telemetry::Accumulate(
Telemetry::HTTP_AUTH_DIALOG_STATS_3,
static_cast<uint32_t>(loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType()));
}
}
if (!topDoc &&
!StaticPrefs::
network_auth_non_web_content_triggered_resources_http_auth_allow() &&
nonWebContent) {
return true;
}
switch (StaticPrefs::network_auth_subresource_http_auth_allow()) {
case SUBRESOURCE_AUTH_DIALOG_DISALLOW_ALL:
// Do not open the http-authentication credentials dialog for
// the sub-resources.
return !topDoc && !xhr;
case SUBRESOURCE_AUTH_DIALOG_DISALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN:
// Open the http-authentication credentials dialog for
// the sub-resources only if they are not cross-origin.
return !topDoc && !xhr && mCrossOrigin;
case SUBRESOURCE_AUTH_DIALOG_ALLOW_ALL:
// Allow the http-authentication dialog for subresources.
// If pref network.auth.subresource-img-cross-origin-http-auth-allow
// is set, http-authentication dialog for image subresources is
// blocked.
if (mCrossOrigin &&
!StaticPrefs::
network_auth_subresource_img_cross_origin_http_auth_allow() &&
loadInfo &&
((loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() ==
ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGE) ||
(loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() ==
ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGESET))) {
return true;
}
return false;
default:
// This is an invalid value.
MOZ_ASSERT(false, "A non valid value!");
}
return false;
}
inline void GetAuthType(const nsACString& aChallenge, nsCString& authType) {
auto spaceIndex = aChallenge.FindChar(' ');
authType = Substring(aChallenge, 0, spaceIndex);
// normalize to lowercase
ToLowerCase(authType);
}
nsresult nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetAuthenticator(
const nsACString& aChallenge, nsCString& authType,
nsIHttpAuthenticator** auth) {
LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetAuthenticator [this=%p channel=%p]\n",
this, mAuthChannel));
GetAuthType(aChallenge, authType);
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpAuthenticator> authenticator;
#ifdef MOZ_AUTH_EXTENSION
if (authType.EqualsLiteral("negotiate")) {
authenticator = nsHttpNegotiateAuth::GetOrCreate();
} else
#endif
if (authType.EqualsLiteral("basic")) {
authenticator = nsHttpBasicAuth::GetOrCreate();
} else if (authType.EqualsLiteral("digest")) {
authenticator = nsHttpDigestAuth::GetOrCreate();
} else if (authType.EqualsLiteral("ntlm")) {
authenticator = nsHttpNTLMAuth::GetOrCreate();
} else if (authType.EqualsLiteral("mock_auth") &&
PR_GetEnv("XPCSHELL_TEST_PROFILE_DIR")) {
authenticator = MockHttpAuth::Create();
} else {
return NS_ERROR_FACTORY_NOT_REGISTERED;
}
if (!authenticator) {
// If called during shutdown it's possible that the singleton authenticator
// was already cleared so we have a null one here.
return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
}
MOZ_ASSERT(authenticator);
authenticator.forget(auth);
return NS_OK;
}
// buf contains "domain\user"
static void ParseUserDomain(const nsAString& buf, nsDependentSubstring& user,
nsDependentSubstring& domain) {
auto backslashPos = buf.FindChar(u'\\');
if (backslashPos != kNotFound) {
domain.Rebind(buf, 0, backslashPos);
user.Rebind(buf, backslashPos + 1);
}
}
void nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetIdentityFromURI(uint32_t authFlags,
nsHttpAuthIdentity& ident) {
LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::GetIdentityFromURI [this=%p channel=%p]\n",
this, mAuthChannel));
bool hasUserPass;
if (NS_FAILED(mURI->GetHasUserPass(&hasUserPass)) || !hasUserPass) {
return;
}
nsAutoString userBuf;
nsAutoString passBuf;
// XXX i18n
nsAutoCString buf;
nsresult rv = mURI->GetUsername(buf);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return;
}
NS_UnescapeURL(buf);
CopyUTF8toUTF16(buf, userBuf);
rv = mURI->GetPassword(buf);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return;
}
NS_UnescapeURL(buf);
CopyUTF8toUTF16(buf, passBuf);
nsDependentSubstring user(userBuf, 0);
nsDependentSubstring domain(u""_ns, 0);
if (authFlags & nsIHttpAuthenticator::IDENTITY_INCLUDES_DOMAIN) {
ParseUserDomain(userBuf, user, domain);
}
ident = nsHttpAuthIdentity(domain, user, passBuf);
}
void nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::ParseRealm(const nsACString& aChallenge,
nsACString& realm) {
//
// From RFC2617 section 1.2, the realm value is defined as such:
//
// realm = "realm" "=" realm-value
// realm-value = quoted-string
//
// but, we'll accept anything after the the "=" up to the first space, or
// end-of-line, if the string is not quoted.
//
Tokenizer t(aChallenge);
// The challenge begins with the authType.
// If we can't find that something has probably gone wrong.
t.SkipWhites();
nsDependentCSubstring authType;
if (!t.ReadWord(authType)) {
return;
}
// Will return true if the tokenizer advanced the cursor - false otherwise.
auto readParam = [&](nsDependentCSubstring& key, nsAutoCString& value) {
key.Rebind(EmptyCString(), 0);
value.Truncate();
t.SkipWhites();
if (!t.ReadWord(key)) {
return false;
}
t.SkipWhites();
if (!t.CheckChar('=')) {
return true;
}
t.SkipWhites();
Tokenizer::Token token1;
t.Record();
if (!t.Next(token1)) {
return true;
}
nsDependentCSubstring sub;
bool hasQuote = false;
if (token1.Equals(Tokenizer::Token::Char('"'))) {
hasQuote = true;
} else {
t.Claim(sub, Tokenizer::ClaimInclusion::INCLUDE_LAST);
value.Append(sub);
}
t.Record();
Tokenizer::Token token2;
while (t.Next(token2)) {
if (hasQuote && token2.Equals(Tokenizer::Token::Char('"')) &&
!token1.Equals(Tokenizer::Token::Char('\\'))) {
break;
}
if (!hasQuote && (token2.Type() == Tokenizer::TokenType::TOKEN_WS ||
token2.Type() == Tokenizer::TokenType::TOKEN_EOL)) {
break;
}
t.Claim(sub, Tokenizer::ClaimInclusion::INCLUDE_LAST);
if (!sub.Equals(R"(\)")) {
value.Append(sub);
}
t.Record();
token1 = token2;
}
return true;
};
while (!t.CheckEOF()) {
nsDependentCSubstring key;
nsAutoCString value;
// If we couldn't read anything, and the input isn't followed by a ,
// then we exit.
if (!readParam(key, value) && !t.Check(Tokenizer::Token::Char(','))) {
break;
}
// When we find the first instance of realm we exit.
// Theoretically there should be only one instance and we should fail
// if there are more, but we're trying to preserve existing behaviour.
if (key.Equals("realm"_ns, nsCaseInsensitiveCStringComparator)) {
realm = value;
break;
}
}
}
class nsHTTPAuthInformation : public nsAuthInformationHolder {
public:
nsHTTPAuthInformation(uint32_t aFlags, const nsString& aRealm,
const nsACString& aAuthType)
: nsAuthInformationHolder(aFlags, aRealm, aAuthType) {}
void SetToHttpAuthIdentity(uint32_t authFlags, nsHttpAuthIdentity& identity);
};
void nsHTTPAuthInformation::SetToHttpAuthIdentity(
uint32_t authFlags, nsHttpAuthIdentity& identity) {
identity = nsHttpAuthIdentity(Domain(), User(), Password());
}
nsresult nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::PromptForIdentity(
uint32_t level, bool proxyAuth, const nsACString& realm,
const nsACString& authType, uint32_t authFlags, nsHttpAuthIdentity& ident) {
LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::PromptForIdentity [this=%p channel=%p]\n",
this, mAuthChannel));
nsresult rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsIInterfaceRequestor> callbacks;
rv = mAuthChannel->GetNotificationCallbacks(getter_AddRefs(callbacks));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadGroup> loadGroup;
rv = mAuthChannel->GetLoadGroup(getter_AddRefs(loadGroup));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsIAuthPrompt2> authPrompt;
GetAuthPrompt(callbacks, proxyAuth, getter_AddRefs(authPrompt));
if (!authPrompt && loadGroup) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIInterfaceRequestor> cbs;
loadGroup->GetNotificationCallbacks(getter_AddRefs(cbs));
GetAuthPrompt(cbs, proxyAuth, getter_AddRefs(authPrompt));
}
if (!authPrompt) return NS_ERROR_NO_INTERFACE;
// XXX i18n: need to support non-ASCII realm strings (see bug 41489)
NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 realmU(realm);
// prompt the user...
uint32_t promptFlags = 0;
if (proxyAuth) {
promptFlags |= nsIAuthInformation::AUTH_PROXY;
if (mTriedProxyAuth) promptFlags |= nsIAuthInformation::PREVIOUS_FAILED;
mTriedProxyAuth = true;
} else {
promptFlags |= nsIAuthInformation::AUTH_HOST;
if (mTriedHostAuth) promptFlags |= nsIAuthInformation::PREVIOUS_FAILED;
mTriedHostAuth = true;
}
if (authFlags & nsIHttpAuthenticator::IDENTITY_INCLUDES_DOMAIN) {
promptFlags |= nsIAuthInformation::NEED_DOMAIN;
}
if (mCrossOrigin) {
promptFlags |= nsIAuthInformation::CROSS_ORIGIN_SUB_RESOURCE;
}
RefPtr<nsHTTPAuthInformation> holder =
new nsHTTPAuthInformation(promptFlags, realmU, authType);
if (!holder) return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel(do_QueryInterface(mAuthChannel, &rv));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
rv = authPrompt->AsyncPromptAuth(channel, this, nullptr, level, holder,
getter_AddRefs(mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable));
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
// indicate using this error code that authentication prompt
// result is expected asynchronously
rv = NS_ERROR_IN_PROGRESS;
} else {
// Fall back to synchronous prompt
bool retval = false;
rv = authPrompt->PromptAuth(channel, level, holder, &retval);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
if (!retval) {
rv = NS_ERROR_ABORT;
} else {
holder->SetToHttpAuthIdentity(authFlags, ident);
}
}
// remember that we successfully showed the user an auth dialog
if (!proxyAuth) mSuppressDefensiveAuth = true;
if (mConnectionBased) {
// Connection can be reset by the server in the meantime user is entering
// the credentials. Result would be just a "Connection was reset" error.
// Hence, we drop the current regardless if the user would make it on time
// to provide credentials.
// It's OK to send the NTLM type 1 message (response to the plain "NTLM"
// challenge) on a new connection.
{
DebugOnly<nsresult> rv = mAuthChannel->CloseStickyConnection();
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
}
}
return rv;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::OnAuthAvailable(
nsISupports* aContext, nsIAuthInformation* aAuthInfo) {
LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::OnAuthAvailable [this=%p channel=%p]", this,
mAuthChannel));
mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable = nullptr;
if (!mAuthChannel) return NS_OK;
nsresult rv;
nsAutoCString host;
int32_t port;
nsHttpAuthIdentity* ident;
nsAutoCString path, scheme;
nsISupports** continuationState;
rv = GetAuthorizationMembers(mProxyAuth, scheme, host, port, path, ident,
continuationState);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) OnAuthCancelled(aContext, false);
nsAutoCString realm;
ParseRealm(mCurrentChallenge, realm);
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> chan = do_QueryInterface(mAuthChannel);
nsAutoCString suffix;
if (!mProxyAuth) {
// Fill only for non-proxy auth, proxy credentials are not OA-isolated.
GetOriginAttributesSuffix(chan, suffix);
}
nsHttpAuthCache* authCache = gHttpHandler->AuthCache(mIsPrivate);
nsHttpAuthEntry* entry = nullptr;
Unused << authCache->GetAuthEntryForDomain(scheme, host, port, realm, suffix,
&entry);
nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> sessionStateGrip;
if (entry) sessionStateGrip = entry->mMetaData;
nsAuthInformationHolder* holder =
static_cast<nsAuthInformationHolder*>(aAuthInfo);
*ident =
nsHttpAuthIdentity(holder->Domain(), holder->User(), holder->Password());
nsAutoCString unused;
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpAuthenticator> auth;
rv = GetAuthenticator(mCurrentChallenge, unused, getter_AddRefs(auth));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
MOZ_ASSERT(false, "GetAuthenticator failed");
OnAuthCancelled(aContext, true);
return NS_OK;
}
nsCString creds;
rv = GenCredsAndSetEntry(auth, mProxyAuth, scheme, host, port, path, realm,
mCurrentChallenge, *ident, sessionStateGrip, creds);
mCurrentChallenge.Truncate();
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
OnAuthCancelled(aContext, true);
return NS_OK;
}
return ContinueOnAuthAvailable(creds);
}
NS_IMETHODIMP nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::OnAuthCancelled(nsISupports* aContext,
bool userCancel) {
LOG(("nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::OnAuthCancelled [this=%p channel=%p]", this,
mAuthChannel));
mAsyncPromptAuthCancelable = nullptr;
if (!mAuthChannel) return NS_OK;
// When user cancels or auth fails we want to close the connection for
// connection based schemes like NTLM. Some servers don't like re-negotiation
// on the same connection.
nsresult rv;
if (mConnectionBased) {
rv = mAuthChannel->CloseStickyConnection();
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
mConnectionBased = false;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel = do_QueryInterface(mAuthChannel);
if (channel) {
nsresult status;
Unused << channel->GetStatus(&status);
if (NS_FAILED(status)) {
// If the channel is already cancelled, there is no need to deal with the
// rest challenges.
LOG((" Clear mRemainingChallenges, since mAuthChannel is cancelled"));
mRemainingChallenges.Truncate();
}
}
if (userCancel) {
if (!mRemainingChallenges.IsEmpty()) {
// there are still some challenges to process, do so
// Get rid of current continuationState to avoid reusing it in
// next challenges since it is no longer relevant.
if (mProxyAuth) {
NS_IF_RELEASE(mProxyAuthContinuationState);
} else {
NS_IF_RELEASE(mAuthContinuationState);
}
nsAutoCString creds;
rv = GetCredentials(mRemainingChallenges, mProxyAuth, creds);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
// GetCredentials loaded the credentials from the cache or
// some other way in a synchronous manner, process those
// credentials now
mRemainingChallenges.Truncate();
return ContinueOnAuthAvailable(creds);
}
if (rv == NS_ERROR_IN_PROGRESS) {
// GetCredentials successfully queued another authprompt for
// a challenge from the list, we are now waiting for the user
// to provide the credentials
return NS_OK;
}
// otherwise, we failed...
}
mRemainingChallenges.Truncate();
}
rv = mAuthChannel->OnAuthCancelled(userCancel);
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP nsHttpChannelAuthProvider::OnCredsGenerated(
const nsACString& aGeneratedCreds, uint32_t aFlags, nsresult aResult,
nsISupports* aSessionState, nsISupports* aContinuationState) {
nsresult rv;
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
// When channel is closed, do not proceed