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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "pk11pub.h"
#include "cryptohi.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "nsNSSComponent.h"
#include "nsProxyRelease.h"
#include "jsapi.h"
#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
#include "mozilla/Utf8.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/CryptoBuffer.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/CryptoKey.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/KeyAlgorithmProxy.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/TypedArray.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WebCryptoCommon.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WebCryptoTask.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerRef.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/RootedDictionary.h"
// Template taken from security/nss/lib/util/templates.c
// This (or SGN_EncodeDigestInfo) would ideally be exported
// by NSS and until that happens we have to keep our own copy.
const SEC_ASN1Template SGN_DigestInfoTemplate[] = {
{SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0, NULL, sizeof(SGNDigestInfo)},
{SEC_ASN1_INLINE, offsetof(SGNDigestInfo, digestAlgorithm),
SEC_ASN1_GET(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate)},
{SEC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, offsetof(SGNDigestInfo, digest)},
{
0,
}};
namespace mozilla::dom {
// Pre-defined identifiers for telemetry histograms
enum TelemetryMethod {
TM_ENCRYPT = 0,
TM_DECRYPT = 1,
TM_SIGN = 2,
TM_VERIFY = 3,
TM_DIGEST = 4,
TM_GENERATEKEY = 5,
TM_DERIVEKEY = 6,
TM_DERIVEBITS = 7,
TM_IMPORTKEY = 8,
TM_EXPORTKEY = 9,
TM_WRAPKEY = 10,
TM_UNWRAPKEY = 11
};
enum TelemetryAlgorithm {
// Please make additions at the end of the list,
// to preserve comparability of histograms over time
TA_UNKNOWN = 0,
// encrypt / decrypt
TA_AES_CBC = 1,
TA_AES_CFB = 2,
TA_AES_CTR = 3,
TA_AES_GCM = 4,
TA_RSAES_PKCS1 = 5, // NB: This algorithm has been removed
TA_RSA_OAEP = 6,
// sign/verify
TA_RSASSA_PKCS1 = 7,
TA_RSA_PSS = 8,
TA_HMAC_SHA_1 = 9,
TA_HMAC_SHA_224 = 10,
TA_HMAC_SHA_256 = 11,
TA_HMAC_SHA_384 = 12,
TA_HMAC_SHA_512 = 13,
// digest
TA_SHA_1 = 14,
TA_SHA_224 = 15,
TA_SHA_256 = 16,
TA_SHA_384 = 17,
TA_SHA_512 = 18,
// Later additions
TA_AES_KW = 19,
TA_ECDH = 20,
TA_PBKDF2 = 21,
TA_ECDSA = 22,
TA_HKDF = 23,
TA_DH = 24,
};
// Convenience functions for extracting / converting information
// OOM-safe CryptoBuffer initialization, suitable for constructors
#define ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(dst, src) \
if (!dst.Assign(src)) { \
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR; \
return; \
}
// OOM-safe CryptoBuffer-to-SECItem copy, suitable for DoCrypto
#define ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena, dst, src) \
if (!src.ToSECItem(arena, dst)) { \
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR; \
}
// OOM-safe CryptoBuffer copy, suitable for DoCrypto
#define ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(dst, src) \
if (!dst.Assign(src)) { \
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR; \
}
// Safety check for algorithms that use keys, suitable for constructors
#define CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(keyAlg, algName) \
{ \
if (!NORMALIZED_EQUALS(keyAlg.mName, algName)) { \
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR; \
return; \
} \
}
class ClearException {
public:
explicit ClearException(JSContext* aCx) : mCx(aCx) {}
~ClearException() { JS_ClearPendingException(mCx); }
private:
JSContext* mCx;
};
template <class OOS>
static nsresult GetAlgorithmName(JSContext* aCx, const OOS& aAlgorithm,
nsString& aName) {
ClearException ce(aCx);
if (aAlgorithm.IsString()) {
// If string, then treat as algorithm name
aName.Assign(aAlgorithm.GetAsString());
} else {
// Coerce to algorithm and extract name
JS::Rooted<JS::Value> value(aCx,
JS::ObjectValue(*aAlgorithm.GetAsObject()));
Algorithm alg;
if (!alg.Init(aCx, value)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
aName = alg.mName;
}
if (!NormalizeToken(aName, aName)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
template <class T, class OOS>
static nsresult Coerce(JSContext* aCx, T& aTarget, const OOS& aAlgorithm) {
ClearException ce(aCx);
if (!aAlgorithm.IsObject()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
JS::Rooted<JS::Value> value(aCx, JS::ObjectValue(*aAlgorithm.GetAsObject()));
if (!aTarget.Init(aCx, value)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
inline size_t MapHashAlgorithmNameToBlockSize(const nsString& aName) {
if (aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA1) ||
aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA256)) {
return 512;
}
if (aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA384) ||
aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA512)) {
return 1024;
}
return 0;
}
inline nsresult GetKeyLengthForAlgorithm(JSContext* aCx,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
size_t& aLength) {
aLength = 0;
// Extract algorithm name
nsString algName;
if (NS_FAILED(GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
// Read AES key length from given algorithm object.
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW)) {
RootedDictionary<AesDerivedKeyParams> params(aCx);
if (NS_FAILED(Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
if (params.mLength != 128 && params.mLength != 192 &&
params.mLength != 256) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
aLength = params.mLength;
return NS_OK;
}
// Read HMAC key length from given algorithm object or
// determine key length as the block size of the given hash.
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
RootedDictionary<HmacDerivedKeyParams> params(aCx);
if (NS_FAILED(Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
// Return the passed length, if any.
if (params.mLength.WasPassed()) {
aLength = params.mLength.Value();
return NS_OK;
}
nsString hashName;
if (NS_FAILED(GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, hashName))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
// Return the given hash algorithm's block size as the key length.
size_t length = MapHashAlgorithmNameToBlockSize(hashName);
if (length == 0) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
aLength = length;
return NS_OK;
}
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
inline bool MapOIDTagToNamedCurve(SECOidTag aOIDTag, nsString& aResult) {
switch (aOIDTag) {
case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP256R1:
aResult.AssignLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_NAMED_CURVE_P256);
break;
case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP384R1:
aResult.AssignLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_NAMED_CURVE_P384);
break;
case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP521R1:
aResult.AssignLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_NAMED_CURVE_P521);
break;
default:
return false;
}
return true;
}
inline SECOidTag MapHashAlgorithmNameToOID(const nsString& aName) {
SECOidTag hashOID(SEC_OID_UNKNOWN);
if (aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA1)) {
hashOID = SEC_OID_SHA1;
} else if (aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA256)) {
hashOID = SEC_OID_SHA256;
} else if (aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA384)) {
hashOID = SEC_OID_SHA384;
} else if (aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA512)) {
hashOID = SEC_OID_SHA512;
}
return hashOID;
}
inline CK_MECHANISM_TYPE MapHashAlgorithmNameToMgfMechanism(
const nsString& aName) {
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech(UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM);
if (aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA1)) {
mech = CKG_MGF1_SHA1;
} else if (aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA256)) {
mech = CKG_MGF1_SHA256;
} else if (aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA384)) {
mech = CKG_MGF1_SHA384;
} else if (aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA512)) {
mech = CKG_MGF1_SHA512;
}
return mech;
}
// Implementation of WebCryptoTask methods
void WebCryptoTask::DispatchWithPromise(Promise* aResultPromise) {
mResultPromise = aResultPromise;
// Fail if an error was set during the constructor
MAYBE_EARLY_FAIL(mEarlyRv)
// Perform pre-NSS operations, and fail if they fail
mEarlyRv = BeforeCrypto();
MAYBE_EARLY_FAIL(mEarlyRv)
// Skip dispatch if we're already done. Otherwise launch a CryptoTask
if (mEarlyComplete) {
CallCallback(mEarlyRv);
return;
}
// Store calling thread
mOriginalEventTarget = GetCurrentSerialEventTarget();
// If we are running on a worker thread we must hold the worker
// alive while we work on the thread pool. Otherwise the worker
// private may get torn down before we dispatch back to complete
// the transaction.
if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
WorkerPrivate* workerPrivate = GetCurrentThreadWorkerPrivate();
MOZ_ASSERT(workerPrivate);
RefPtr<StrongWorkerRef> workerRef =
StrongWorkerRef::Create(workerPrivate, "WebCryptoTask");
if (NS_WARN_IF(!workerRef)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_BINDING_ABORTED;
} else {
mWorkerRef = new ThreadSafeWorkerRef(workerRef);
}
}
MAYBE_EARLY_FAIL(mEarlyRv);
// dispatch to thread pool
if (!EnsureNSSInitializedChromeOrContent()) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
MAYBE_EARLY_FAIL(mEarlyRv);
mEarlyRv = NS_DispatchBackgroundTask(this);
MAYBE_EARLY_FAIL(mEarlyRv)
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
WebCryptoTask::Run() {
// Run heavy crypto operations on the thread pool, off the original thread.
if (!IsOnOriginalThread()) {
mRv = CalculateResult();
// Back to the original thread, i.e. continue below.
mOriginalEventTarget->Dispatch(this, NS_DISPATCH_NORMAL);
return NS_OK;
}
// We're now back on the calling thread.
CallCallback(mRv);
// Stop holding the worker thread alive now that the async work has
// been completed.
mWorkerRef = nullptr;
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult WebCryptoTask::Cancel() {
MOZ_ASSERT(IsOnOriginalThread());
FailWithError(NS_BINDING_ABORTED);
return NS_OK;
}
void WebCryptoTask::FailWithError(nsresult aRv) {
MOZ_ASSERT(IsOnOriginalThread());
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_RESOLVED, false);
// Blindly convert nsresult to DOMException
// Individual tasks must ensure they pass the right values
mResultPromise->MaybeReject(aRv);
// Manually release mResultPromise while we're on the main thread
mResultPromise = nullptr;
mWorkerRef = nullptr;
Cleanup();
}
nsresult WebCryptoTask::CalculateResult() {
MOZ_ASSERT(!IsOnOriginalThread());
return DoCrypto();
}
void WebCryptoTask::CallCallback(nsresult rv) {
MOZ_ASSERT(IsOnOriginalThread());
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
FailWithError(rv);
return;
}
nsresult rv2 = AfterCrypto();
if (NS_FAILED(rv2)) {
FailWithError(rv2);
return;
}
Resolve();
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_RESOLVED, true);
// Manually release mResultPromise while we're on the main thread
mResultPromise = nullptr;
Cleanup();
}
// Some generic utility classes
class FailureTask : public WebCryptoTask {
public:
explicit FailureTask(nsresult aRv) { mEarlyRv = aRv; }
};
class ReturnArrayBufferViewTask : public WebCryptoTask {
protected:
CryptoBuffer mResult;
private:
// Returns mResult as an ArrayBufferView, or an error
virtual void Resolve() override {
TypedArrayCreator<ArrayBuffer> ret(mResult);
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(ret);
}
};
class DeferredData {
public:
template <class T>
void SetData(const T& aData) {
mDataIsSet = mData.Assign(aData);
}
protected:
DeferredData() : mDataIsSet(false) {}
CryptoBuffer mData;
bool mDataIsSet;
};
class AesTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask, public DeferredData {
public:
AesTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
bool aEncrypt)
: mMechanism(CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM),
mTagLength(0),
mCounterLength(0),
mEncrypt(aEncrypt) {
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aEncrypt);
}
AesTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
const CryptoOperationData& aData, bool aEncrypt)
: mMechanism(CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM),
mTagLength(0),
mCounterLength(0),
mEncrypt(aEncrypt) {
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aEncrypt);
SetData(aData);
}
void Init(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
bool aEncrypt) {
nsString algName;
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
if (!mSymKey.Assign(aKey.GetSymKey())) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
return;
}
// Check that we got a reasonable key
if ((mSymKey.Length() != 16) && (mSymKey.Length() != 24) &&
(mSymKey.Length() != 32)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
// Cache parameters depending on the specific algorithm
TelemetryAlgorithm telemetryAlg;
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC)) {
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC);
mMechanism = CKM_AES_CBC_PAD;
telemetryAlg = TA_AES_CBC;
RootedDictionary<AesCbcParams> params(aCx);
nsresult rv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
return;
}
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mIv, params.mIv)
if (mIv.Length() != 16) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
return;
}
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR)) {
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR);
mMechanism = CKM_AES_CTR;
telemetryAlg = TA_AES_CTR;
RootedDictionary<AesCtrParams> params(aCx);
nsresult rv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mIv, params.mCounter)
if (mIv.Length() != 16) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
return;
}
mCounterLength = params.mLength;
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM)) {
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM);
mMechanism = CKM_AES_GCM;
telemetryAlg = TA_AES_GCM;
RootedDictionary<AesGcmParams> params(aCx);
nsresult rv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
return;
}
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mIv, params.mIv)
if (params.mAdditionalData.WasPassed()) {
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mAad, params.mAdditionalData.Value())
}
// 32, 64, 96, 104, 112, 120 or 128
mTagLength = 128;
if (params.mTagLength.WasPassed()) {
mTagLength = params.mTagLength.Value();
if ((mTagLength > 128) ||
!(mTagLength == 32 || mTagLength == 64 ||
(mTagLength >= 96 && mTagLength % 8 == 0))) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
return;
}
}
} else {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, telemetryAlg);
}
private:
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mMechanism;
CryptoBuffer mSymKey;
CryptoBuffer mIv; // Initialization vector
CryptoBuffer mAad; // Additional Authenticated Data
uint8_t mTagLength;
uint8_t mCounterLength;
bool mEncrypt;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override {
nsresult rv;
if (!mDataIsSet) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
UniquePLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
if (!arena) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Construct the parameters object depending on algorithm
SECItem param = {siBuffer, nullptr, 0};
CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctrParams;
CK_GCM_PARAMS gcmParams;
switch (mMechanism) {
case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena.get(), &param, mIv);
break;
case CKM_AES_CTR:
ctrParams.ulCounterBits = mCounterLength;
MOZ_ASSERT(mIv.Length() == 16);
memcpy(&ctrParams.cb, mIv.Elements(), 16);
param.type = siBuffer;
param.data = (unsigned char*)&ctrParams;
param.len = sizeof(ctrParams);
break;
case CKM_AES_GCM:
gcmParams.pIv = mIv.Elements();
gcmParams.ulIvLen = mIv.Length();
gcmParams.ulIvBits = gcmParams.ulIvLen * 8;
gcmParams.pAAD = mAad.Elements();
gcmParams.ulAADLen = mAad.Length();
gcmParams.ulTagBits = mTagLength;
param.type = siBuffer;
param.data = (unsigned char*)&gcmParams;
param.len = sizeof(gcmParams);
break;
default:
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
// Import the key
SECItem keyItem = {siBuffer, nullptr, 0};
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena.get(), &keyItem, mSymKey);
UniquePK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
MOZ_ASSERT(slot.get());
UniquePK11SymKey symKey(PK11_ImportSymKey(slot.get(), mMechanism,
PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_ENCRYPT,
&keyItem, nullptr));
if (!symKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
}
// Check whether the integer addition would overflow.
if (std::numeric_limits<CryptoBuffer::size_type>::max() - 16 <
mData.Length()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
// Initialize the output buffer (enough space for padding / a full tag)
if (!mResult.SetLength(mData.Length() + 16, fallible)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
uint32_t outLen = 0;
// Perform the encryption/decryption
if (mEncrypt) {
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_Encrypt(
symKey.get(), mMechanism, &param, mResult.Elements(), &outLen,
mResult.Length(), mData.Elements(), mData.Length()));
} else {
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_Decrypt(
symKey.get(), mMechanism, &param, mResult.Elements(), &outLen,
mResult.Length(), mData.Elements(), mData.Length()));
}
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
mResult.TruncateLength(outLen);
return rv;
}
};
// This class looks like an encrypt/decrypt task, like AesTask,
// but it is only exposed to wrapKey/unwrapKey, not encrypt/decrypt
class AesKwTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask, public DeferredData {
public:
AesKwTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
bool aEncrypt)
: mMechanism(CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP), mEncrypt(aEncrypt) {
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aEncrypt);
}
AesKwTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
const CryptoOperationData& aData, bool aEncrypt)
: mMechanism(CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP), mEncrypt(aEncrypt) {
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aEncrypt);
SetData(aData);
}
void Init(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
bool aEncrypt) {
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW);
nsString algName;
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
if (!mSymKey.Assign(aKey.GetSymKey())) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
return;
}
// Check that we got a reasonable key
if ((mSymKey.Length() != 16) && (mSymKey.Length() != 24) &&
(mSymKey.Length() != 32)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_AES_KW);
}
private:
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mMechanism;
CryptoBuffer mSymKey;
bool mEncrypt;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override {
nsresult rv;
if (!mDataIsSet) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Check that the input is a multiple of 64 bits long
if (mData.Length() == 0 || mData.Length() % 8 != 0) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
UniquePLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
if (!arena) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Import the key
SECItem keyItem = {siBuffer, nullptr, 0};
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena.get(), &keyItem, mSymKey);
UniquePK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
MOZ_ASSERT(slot.get());
UniquePK11SymKey symKey(PK11_ImportSymKey(slot.get(), mMechanism,
PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_WRAP,
&keyItem, nullptr));
if (!symKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
}
// Import the data to a SECItem
SECItem dataItem = {siBuffer, nullptr, 0};
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena.get(), &dataItem, mData);
// Parameters for the fake keys
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE fakeMechanism = CKM_SHA_1_HMAC;
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE fakeOperation = CKA_SIGN;
if (mEncrypt) {
// Import the data into a fake PK11SymKey structure
UniquePK11SymKey keyToWrap(
PK11_ImportSymKey(slot.get(), fakeMechanism, PK11_OriginUnwrap,
fakeOperation, &dataItem, nullptr));
if (!keyToWrap) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Encrypt and return the wrapped key
// AES-KW encryption results in a wrapped key 64 bits longer
if (!mResult.SetLength(mData.Length() + 8, fallible)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
SECItem resultItem = {siBuffer, mResult.Elements(),
(unsigned int)mResult.Length()};
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_WrapSymKey(mMechanism, nullptr, symKey.get(),
keyToWrap.get(), &resultItem));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
} else {
// Decrypt the ciphertext into a temporary PK11SymKey
// Unwrapped key should be 64 bits shorter
int keySize = mData.Length() - 8;
UniquePK11SymKey unwrappedKey(
PK11_UnwrapSymKey(symKey.get(), mMechanism, nullptr, &dataItem,
fakeMechanism, fakeOperation, keySize));
if (!unwrappedKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Export the key to get the cleartext
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_ExtractKeyValue(unwrappedKey.get()));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mResult, PK11_GetKeyData(unwrappedKey.get()));
}
return rv;
}
};
class RsaOaepTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask, public DeferredData {
public:
RsaOaepTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
bool aEncrypt)
: mPrivKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey()),
mPubKey(aKey.GetPublicKey()),
mEncrypt(aEncrypt) {
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aEncrypt);
}
RsaOaepTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
const CryptoOperationData& aData, bool aEncrypt)
: mPrivKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey()),
mPubKey(aKey.GetPublicKey()),
mEncrypt(aEncrypt) {
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aEncrypt);
SetData(aData);
}
void Init(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
bool aEncrypt) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_RSA_OAEP);
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP);
if (mEncrypt) {
if (!mPubKey) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
return;
}
mStrength = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(mPubKey.get());
} else {
if (!mPrivKey) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
return;
}
mStrength = PK11_GetPrivateModulusLen(mPrivKey.get());
}
// The algorithm could just be given as a string
// in which case there would be no label specified.
if (!aAlgorithm.IsString()) {
RootedDictionary<RsaOaepParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
if (params.mLabel.WasPassed()) {
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mLabel, params.mLabel.Value());
}
}
// Otherwise mLabel remains the empty octet string, as intended
KeyAlgorithm& hashAlg = aKey.Algorithm().mRsa.mHash;
mHashMechanism = KeyAlgorithmProxy::GetMechanism(hashAlg);
mMgfMechanism = MapHashAlgorithmNameToMgfMechanism(hashAlg.mName);
// Check we found appropriate mechanisms.
if (mHashMechanism == UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM ||
mMgfMechanism == UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
}
private:
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mHashMechanism;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mMgfMechanism;
UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey mPrivKey;
UniqueSECKEYPublicKey mPubKey;
CryptoBuffer mLabel;
uint32_t mStrength;
bool mEncrypt;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override {
nsresult rv;
if (!mDataIsSet) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Ciphertext is an integer mod the modulus, so it will be
// no longer than mStrength octets
if (!mResult.SetLength(mStrength, fallible)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS oaepParams;
oaepParams.source = CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED;
oaepParams.pSourceData = mLabel.Length() ? mLabel.Elements() : nullptr;
oaepParams.ulSourceDataLen = mLabel.Length();
oaepParams.mgf = mMgfMechanism;
oaepParams.hashAlg = mHashMechanism;
SECItem param;
param.type = siBuffer;
param.data = (unsigned char*)&oaepParams;
param.len = sizeof(oaepParams);
uint32_t outLen = 0;
if (mEncrypt) {
// PK11_PubEncrypt() checks the plaintext's length and fails if it is too
// long to encrypt, i.e. if it is longer than (k - 2hLen - 2) with 'k'
// being the length in octets of the RSA modulus n and 'hLen' being the
// output length in octets of the chosen hash function.
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_PubEncrypt(
mPubKey.get(), CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP, &param, mResult.Elements(), &outLen,
mResult.Length(), mData.Elements(), mData.Length(), nullptr));
} else {
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_PrivDecrypt(
mPrivKey.get(), CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP, &param, mResult.Elements(),
&outLen, mResult.Length(), mData.Elements(), mData.Length()));
}
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
mResult.TruncateLength(outLen);
return NS_OK;
}
};
class HmacTask : public WebCryptoTask {
public:
HmacTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
const CryptoOperationData& aSignature,
const CryptoOperationData& aData, bool aSign)
: mMechanism(aKey.Algorithm().Mechanism()), mSign(aSign) {
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC);
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mData, aData);
if (!aSign) {
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mSignature, aSignature);
}
if (!mSymKey.Assign(aKey.GetSymKey())) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
return;
}
// Check that we got a symmetric key
if (mSymKey.Length() == 0) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
TelemetryAlgorithm telemetryAlg;
switch (mMechanism) {
case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
telemetryAlg = TA_HMAC_SHA_1;
break;
case CKM_SHA224_HMAC:
telemetryAlg = TA_HMAC_SHA_224;
break;
case CKM_SHA256_HMAC:
telemetryAlg = TA_HMAC_SHA_256;
break;
case CKM_SHA384_HMAC:
telemetryAlg = TA_HMAC_SHA_384;
break;
case CKM_SHA512_HMAC:
telemetryAlg = TA_HMAC_SHA_512;
break;
default:
telemetryAlg = TA_UNKNOWN;
}
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, telemetryAlg);
}
private:
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mMechanism;
CryptoBuffer mSymKey;
CryptoBuffer mData;
CryptoBuffer mSignature;
CryptoBuffer mResult;
bool mSign;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override {
// Initialize the output buffer
if (!mResult.SetLength(HASH_LENGTH_MAX, fallible)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
UniquePLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
if (!arena) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Import the key
uint32_t outLen;
SECItem keyItem = {siBuffer, nullptr, 0};
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena.get(), &keyItem, mSymKey);
UniquePK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
MOZ_ASSERT(slot.get());
UniquePK11SymKey symKey(PK11_ImportSymKey(slot.get(), mMechanism,
PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_SIGN,
&keyItem, nullptr));
if (!symKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
}
// Compute the MAC
SECItem param = {siBuffer, nullptr, 0};
UniquePK11Context ctx(
PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mMechanism, CKA_SIGN, symKey.get(), &param));
if (!ctx.get()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
nsresult rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_DigestBegin(ctx.get()));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
rv = MapSECStatus(
PK11_DigestOp(ctx.get(), mData.Elements(), mData.Length()));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_DigestFinal(ctx.get(), mResult.Elements(), &outLen,
mResult.Length()));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
mResult.TruncateLength(outLen);
return rv;
}
// Returns mResult as an ArrayBufferView, or an error
virtual void Resolve() override {
if (mSign) {
// Return the computed MAC
TypedArrayCreator<ArrayBuffer> ret(mResult);
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(ret);
} else {
// Compare the MAC to the provided signature
// No truncation allowed
bool equal = (mResult.Length() == mSignature.Length());
if (equal) {
int cmp = NSS_SecureMemcmp(mSignature.Elements(), mResult.Elements(),
mSignature.Length());
equal = (cmp == 0);
}
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(equal);
}
}
};
class AsymmetricSignVerifyTask : public WebCryptoTask {
public:
AsymmetricSignVerifyTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey,
const CryptoOperationData& aSignature,
const CryptoOperationData& aData, bool aSign)
: mOidTag(SEC_OID_UNKNOWN),
mHashMechanism(UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM),
mMgfMechanism(UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM),
mPrivKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey()),
mPubKey(aKey.GetPublicKey()),
mSaltLength(0),
mSign(aSign),
mVerified(false),
mAlgorithm(Algorithm::UNKNOWN) {
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mData, aData);
if (!aSign) {
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mSignature, aSignature);
}
nsString algName;
nsString hashAlgName;
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1)) {
mAlgorithm = Algorithm::RSA_PKCS1;
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_RSASSA_PKCS1);
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1);
hashAlgName = aKey.Algorithm().mRsa.mHash.mName;
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_PSS)) {
mAlgorithm = Algorithm::RSA_PSS;
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_RSA_PSS);
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_PSS);
KeyAlgorithm& hashAlg = aKey.Algorithm().mRsa.mHash;
hashAlgName = hashAlg.mName;
mHashMechanism = KeyAlgorithmProxy::GetMechanism(hashAlg);
mMgfMechanism = MapHashAlgorithmNameToMgfMechanism(hashAlgName);
// Check we found appropriate mechanisms.
if (mHashMechanism == UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM ||
mMgfMechanism == UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
RootedDictionary<RsaPssParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
mSaltLength = params.mSaltLength;
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA)) {
mAlgorithm = Algorithm::ECDSA;
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_ECDSA);
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA);
// For ECDSA, the hash name comes from the algorithm parameter
RootedDictionary<EcdsaParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, hashAlgName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
} else {
// This shouldn't happen; CreateSignVerifyTask shouldn't create
// one of these unless it's for the above algorithms.
MOZ_ASSERT(false);
}
// Must have a valid algorithm by now.
MOZ_ASSERT(mAlgorithm != Algorithm::UNKNOWN);
// Determine hash algorithm to use.
mOidTag = MapHashAlgorithmNameToOID(hashAlgName);
if (mOidTag == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
// Check that we have the appropriate key
if ((mSign && !mPrivKey) || (!mSign && !mPubKey)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
return;
}
}
private:
SECOidTag mOidTag;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mHashMechanism;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mMgfMechanism;
UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey mPrivKey;
UniqueSECKEYPublicKey mPubKey;
CryptoBuffer mSignature;
CryptoBuffer mData;
uint32_t mSaltLength;
bool mSign;
bool mVerified;
// The signature algorithm to use.
enum class Algorithm : uint8_t { ECDSA, RSA_PKCS1, RSA_PSS, UNKNOWN };
Algorithm mAlgorithm;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override {
SECStatus rv;
UniqueSECItem hash(
::SECITEM_AllocItem(nullptr, nullptr, HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(mOidTag)));
if (!hash) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Compute digest over given data.
rv = PK11_HashBuf(mOidTag, hash->data, mData.Elements(), mData.Length());
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(MapSECStatus(rv), NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
// Wrap hash in a digest info template (RSA-PKCS1 only).
if (mAlgorithm == Algorithm::RSA_PKCS1) {
UniqueSGNDigestInfo di(
SGN_CreateDigestInfo(mOidTag, hash->data, hash->len));
if (!di) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Reuse |hash|.
SECITEM_FreeItem(hash.get(), false);
if (!SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(nullptr, hash.get(), di.get(),
SGN_DigestInfoTemplate)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
}
SECItem* params = nullptr;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech =
PK11_MapSignKeyType((mSign ? mPrivKey->keyType : mPubKey->keyType));
CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS rsaPssParams;
SECItem rsaPssParamsItem = {
siBuffer,
};
// Set up parameters for RSA-PSS.
if (mAlgorithm == Algorithm::RSA_PSS) {
rsaPssParams.hashAlg = mHashMechanism;
rsaPssParams.mgf = mMgfMechanism;
rsaPssParams.sLen = mSaltLength;
rsaPssParamsItem.data = (unsigned char*)&rsaPssParams;
rsaPssParamsItem.len = sizeof(rsaPssParams);
params = &rsaPssParamsItem;
mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS;
}
// Allocate SECItem to hold the signature.
uint32_t len = mSign ? PK11_SignatureLen(mPrivKey.get()) : 0;
UniqueSECItem sig(::SECITEM_AllocItem(nullptr, nullptr, len));
if (!sig) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
if (mSign) {
// Sign the hash.
rv = PK11_SignWithMechanism(mPrivKey.get(), mech, params, sig.get(),
hash.get());
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(MapSECStatus(rv), NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mSignature, sig.get());
} else {
// Copy the given signature to the SECItem.
if (!mSignature.ToSECItem(nullptr, sig.get())) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Verify the signature.
rv = PK11_VerifyWithMechanism(mPubKey.get(), mech, params, sig.get(),
hash.get(), nullptr);
mVerified = NS_SUCCEEDED(MapSECStatus(rv));
}
return NS_OK;
}
virtual void Resolve() override {
if (mSign) {
TypedArrayCreator<ArrayBuffer> ret(mSignature);
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(ret);
} else {
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(mVerified);
}
}
};
class DigestTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask {
public:
DigestTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
const CryptoOperationData& aData) {
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mData, aData);
nsString algName;
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
TelemetryAlgorithm telemetryAlg;
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA1)) {
telemetryAlg = TA_SHA_1;
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA256)) {
telemetryAlg = TA_SHA_224;
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA384)) {
telemetryAlg = TA_SHA_256;
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA512)) {
telemetryAlg = TA_SHA_384;
} else {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, telemetryAlg);
mOidTag = MapHashAlgorithmNameToOID(algName);
}
private:
SECOidTag mOidTag;
CryptoBuffer mData;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override {
// Resize the result buffer
uint32_t hashLen = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(mOidTag);
if (!mResult.SetLength(hashLen, fallible)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
// Compute the hash
nsresult rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_HashBuf(mOidTag, mResult.Elements(),
mData.Elements(), mData.Length()));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
return rv;
}
};
class ImportKeyTask : public WebCryptoTask {
public:
void Init(nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal, JSContext* aCx, const nsAString& aFormat,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages) {
mFormat = aFormat;
mDataIsSet = false;
mDataIsJwk = false;
// This stuff pretty much always happens, so we'll do it here
mKey = new CryptoKey(aGlobal);
mKey->SetExtractable(aExtractable);
mKey->ClearUsages();
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aKeyUsages.Length(); ++i) {
mEarlyRv = mKey->AddUsage(aKeyUsages[i]);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
}
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, mAlgName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
}
static bool JwkCompatible(const JsonWebKey& aJwk, const CryptoKey* aKey) {
// Check 'ext'
if (aKey->Extractable() && aJwk.mExt.WasPassed() && !aJwk.mExt.Value()) {
return false;
}
// Check 'alg'
if (aJwk.mAlg.WasPassed() &&
aJwk.mAlg.Value() != aKey->Algorithm().JwkAlg()) {
return false;
}
// Check 'key_ops'
if (aJwk.mKey_ops.WasPassed()) {
nsTArray<nsString> usages;
aKey->GetUsages(usages);
for (size_t i = 0; i < usages.Length(); ++i) {
if (!aJwk.mKey_ops.Value().Contains(usages[i])) {
return false;
}
}
}
// Individual algorithms may still have to check 'use'
return true;
}
void SetKeyData(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JSObject*> aKeyData) {
mDataIsJwk = false;
// Try ArrayBuffer
RootedSpiderMonkeyInterface<ArrayBuffer> ab(aCx);
if (ab.Init(aKeyData)) {
if (!mKeyData.Assign(ab)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
return;
}
// Try ArrayBufferView
RootedSpiderMonkeyInterface<ArrayBufferView> abv(aCx);
if (abv.Init(aKeyData)) {
if (!mKeyData.Assign(abv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
return;
}
// Try JWK
ClearException ce(aCx);
JS::Rooted<JS::Value> value(aCx, JS::ObjectValue(*aKeyData));
if (!mJwk.Init(aCx, value)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
mDataIsJwk = true;
}
void SetKeyDataMaybeParseJWK(const CryptoBuffer& aKeyData) {
if (!mKeyData.Assign(aKeyData)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
return;
}
mDataIsJwk = false;
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
nsDependentCSubstring utf8(
(const char*)mKeyData.Elements(),
(const char*)(mKeyData.Elements() + mKeyData.Length()));
if (!IsUtf8(utf8)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
nsString json = NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(utf8);
if (!mJwk.Init(json)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
mDataIsJwk = true;
}
}
void SetRawKeyData(const CryptoBuffer& aKeyData) {
if (!mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
return;
}
if (!mKeyData.Assign(aKeyData)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
return;
}
mDataIsJwk = false;
}
protected:
nsString mFormat;
RefPtr<CryptoKey> mKey;
CryptoBuffer mKeyData;
bool mDataIsSet;
bool mDataIsJwk;
JsonWebKey mJwk;
nsString mAlgName;
private:
virtual void Resolve() override { mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(mKey); }
virtual void Cleanup() override { mKey = nullptr; }
};
class ImportSymmetricKeyTask : public ImportKeyTask {
public:
ImportSymmetricKeyTask(nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal, JSContext* aCx,
const nsAString& aFormat,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages) {
Init(aGlobal, aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
}
ImportSymmetricKeyTask(nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal, JSContext* aCx,
const nsAString& aFormat,
const JS::Handle<JSObject*> aKeyData,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages) {
Init(aGlobal, aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
SetKeyData(aCx, aKeyData);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS_VOID(mEarlyRv);
if (mDataIsJwk && !mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
}
void Init(nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal, JSContext* aCx, const nsAString& aFormat,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages) {
ImportKeyTask::Init(aGlobal, aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable,
aKeyUsages);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
// This task only supports raw and JWK format.
if (!mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK) &&
!mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
// If this is an HMAC key, import the hash name
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
RootedDictionary<HmacImportParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, mHashName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
}
}
virtual nsresult BeforeCrypto() override {
nsresult rv;
// If we're doing a JWK import, import the key data
if (mDataIsJwk) {
if (!mJwk.mK.WasPassed()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
// Import the key material
rv = mKeyData.FromJwkBase64(mJwk.mK.Value());
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
}
// Check that we have valid key data.
if (mKeyData.Length() == 0 &&
!mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_PBKDF2)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
// Construct an appropriate KeyAlorithm,
// and verify that usages are appropriate
if (mKeyData.Length() > UINT32_MAX / 8) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
uint32_t length = 8 * mKeyData.Length(); // bytes to bits
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM) ||
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW)) {
if (mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::ENCRYPT | CryptoKey::DECRYPT |
CryptoKey::WRAPKEY | CryptoKey::UNWRAPKEY)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW) &&
mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::WRAPKEY | CryptoKey::UNWRAPKEY)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
if ((length != 128) && (length != 192) && (length != 256)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
mKey->Algorithm().MakeAes(mAlgName, length);
if (mDataIsJwk && mJwk.mUse.WasPassed() &&
!mJwk.mUse.Value().EqualsLiteral(JWK_USE_ENC)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
} else if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HKDF) ||
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_PBKDF2)) {
if (mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::DERIVEKEY |
CryptoKey::DERIVEBITS)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
mKey->Algorithm().MakeAes(mAlgName, length);
if (mDataIsJwk && mJwk.mUse.WasPassed()) {
// There is not a 'use' value consistent with PBKDF or HKDF
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
};
} else if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
if (mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::SIGN | CryptoKey::VERIFY)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
mKey->Algorithm().MakeHmac(length, mHashName);
if (mKey->Algorithm().Mechanism() == UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
if (mDataIsJwk && mJwk.mUse.WasPassed() &&
!mJwk.mUse.Value().EqualsLiteral(JWK_USE_SIG)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
} else {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
if (NS_FAILED(mKey->SetSymKey(mKeyData))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
mKey->SetType(CryptoKey::SECRET);
if (mDataIsJwk && !JwkCompatible(mJwk, <