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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE or
// option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed
// except according to those terms.
mod common;
use neqo_common::{Datagram, Decoder, Encoder, Role};
use neqo_transport::{
CloseReason, ConnectionParameters, Error, State, Version, MIN_INITIAL_PACKET_SIZE,
};
use test_fixture::{
default_client, default_server,
header_protection::{
apply_header_protection, decode_initial_header, initial_aead_and_hp,
remove_header_protection,
},
new_client, now, split_datagram,
};
#[test]
fn connect() {
let (_client, _server) = test_fixture::connect();
}
#[test]
fn truncate_long_packet() {
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = default_server();
let out = client.process_output(now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
let out = server.process(out.dgram(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
// This will truncate the Handshake packet from the server.
let dupe = out.as_dgram_ref().unwrap().clone();
// Count the padding in the packet, plus 1.
let tail = dupe.iter().rev().take_while(|b| **b == 0).count() + 1;
let truncated = Datagram::new(
dupe.source(),
dupe.destination(),
dupe.tos(),
&dupe[..(dupe.len() - tail)],
);
let hs_probe = client.process(Some(truncated), now()).dgram();
assert!(hs_probe.is_some());
// Now feed in the untruncated packet.
let out = client.process(out.dgram(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some()); // Throw this ACK away.
assert!(test_fixture::maybe_authenticate(&mut client));
let out = client.process_output(now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
assert!(client.state().connected());
let out = server.process(out.dgram(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
assert!(server.state().connected());
}
/// Test that reordering parts of the server Initial doesn't change things.
#[test]
fn reorder_server_initial() {
// A simple ACK_ECN frame for a single packet with packet number 0 with a single ECT(0) mark.
const ACK_FRAME: &[u8] = &[0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00];
let mut client = new_client(
ConnectionParameters::default().versions(Version::Version1, vec![Version::Version1]),
);
let mut server = default_server();
let client_initial = client.process_output(now());
let (_, client_dcid, _, _) =
decode_initial_header(client_initial.as_dgram_ref().unwrap(), Role::Client).unwrap();
let client_dcid = client_dcid.to_owned();
let server_packet = server.process(client_initial.dgram(), now()).dgram();
let (server_initial, server_hs) = split_datagram(server_packet.as_ref().unwrap());
let (protected_header, _, _, payload) =
decode_initial_header(&server_initial, Role::Server).unwrap();
// Now decrypt the packet.
let (aead, hp) = initial_aead_and_hp(&client_dcid, Role::Server);
let (header, pn) = remove_header_protection(&hp, protected_header, payload);
assert_eq!(pn, 0);
let pn_len = header.len() - protected_header.len();
let mut buf = vec![0; payload.len()];
let mut plaintext = aead
.decrypt(pn, &header, &payload[pn_len..], &mut buf)
.unwrap()
.to_owned();
// Now we need to find the frames. Make some really strong assumptions.
let mut dec = Decoder::new(&plaintext[..]);
assert_eq!(dec.decode(ACK_FRAME.len()), Some(ACK_FRAME));
assert_eq!(dec.decode_varint(), Some(0x06)); // CRYPTO
assert_eq!(dec.decode_varint(), Some(0x00)); // offset
dec.skip_vvec(); // Skip over the payload.
let end = dec.offset();
// Move the ACK frame after the CRYPTO frame.
plaintext[..end].rotate_left(ACK_FRAME.len());
// And rebuild a packet.
let mut packet = header.clone();
packet.resize(MIN_INITIAL_PACKET_SIZE, 0);
aead.encrypt(pn, &header, &plaintext, &mut packet[header.len()..])
.unwrap();
apply_header_protection(&hp, &mut packet, protected_header.len()..header.len());
let reordered = Datagram::new(
server_initial.source(),
server_initial.destination(),
server_initial.tos(),
packet,
);
// Now a connection can be made successfully.
// Though we modified the server's Initial packet, we get away with it.
// TLS only authenticates the content of the CRYPTO frame, which was untouched.
client.process_input(reordered, now());
client.process_input(server_hs.unwrap(), now());
assert!(test_fixture::maybe_authenticate(&mut client));
let finished = client.process_output(now());
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Connected);
let done = server.process(finished.dgram(), now());
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed);
client.process_input(done.dgram().unwrap(), now());
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Confirmed);
}
fn set_payload(server_packet: Option<&Datagram>, client_dcid: &[u8], payload: &[u8]) -> Datagram {
let (server_initial, _server_hs) = split_datagram(server_packet.as_ref().unwrap());
let (protected_header, _, _, orig_payload) =
decode_initial_header(&server_initial, Role::Server).unwrap();
// Now decrypt the packet.
let (aead, hp) = initial_aead_and_hp(client_dcid, Role::Server);
let (mut header, pn) = remove_header_protection(&hp, protected_header, orig_payload);
assert_eq!(pn, 0);
// Re-encode the packet number as four bytes, so we have enough material for the header
// protection sample if payload is empty.
let pn_pos = header.len() - 2;
header[pn_pos] = u8::try_from(4 + aead.expansion()).unwrap();
header.resize(header.len() + 3, 0);
header[0] |= 0b0000_0011; // Set the packet number length to 4.
// And build a packet containing the given payload.
let mut packet = header.clone();
packet.resize(header.len() + payload.len() + aead.expansion(), 0);
aead.encrypt(pn, &header, payload, &mut packet[header.len()..])
.unwrap();
apply_header_protection(&hp, &mut packet, protected_header.len()..header.len());
Datagram::new(
server_initial.source(),
server_initial.destination(),
server_initial.tos(),
packet,
)
}
/// Test that the stack treats a packet without any frames as a protocol violation.
#[test]
fn packet_without_frames() {
let mut client = new_client(
ConnectionParameters::default().versions(Version::Version1, vec![Version::Version1]),
);
let mut server = default_server();
let client_initial = client.process_output(now());
let client_initial_clone = client_initial.as_dgram_ref().unwrap().clone();
let (_, client_dcid, _, _) =
decode_initial_header(&client_initial_clone, Role::Client).unwrap();
let server_packet = server.process(client_initial.dgram(), now()).dgram();
let modified = set_payload(server_packet.as_ref(), client_dcid, &[]);
client.process_input(modified, now());
assert_eq!(
client.state(),
&State::Closed(CloseReason::Transport(Error::ProtocolViolation))
);
}
/// Test that the stack permits a packet containing only padding.
#[test]
fn packet_with_only_padding() {
let mut client = new_client(
ConnectionParameters::default().versions(Version::Version1, vec![Version::Version1]),
);
let mut server = default_server();
let client_initial = client.process_output(now());
let client_initial_clone = client_initial.as_dgram_ref().unwrap().clone();
let (_, client_dcid, _, _) =
decode_initial_header(&client_initial_clone, Role::Client).unwrap();
let server_packet = server.process(client_initial.dgram(), now()).dgram();
let modified = set_payload(server_packet.as_ref(), client_dcid, &[0]);
client.process_input(modified, now());
assert_eq!(client.state(), &State::WaitInitial);
}
/// Overflow the crypto buffer.
#[allow(clippy::similar_names)] // For ..._scid and ..._dcid, which are fine.
#[test]
fn overflow_crypto() {
let mut client = new_client(
ConnectionParameters::default().versions(Version::Version1, vec![Version::Version1]),
);
let mut server = default_server();
let client_initial = client.process_output(now()).dgram();
let (_, client_dcid, _, _) =
decode_initial_header(client_initial.as_ref().unwrap(), Role::Client).unwrap();
let client_dcid = client_dcid.to_owned();
let server_packet = server.process(client_initial, now()).dgram();
let (server_initial, _) = split_datagram(server_packet.as_ref().unwrap());
// Now decrypt the server packet to get AEAD and HP instances.
// We won't be using the packet, but making new ones.
let (aead, hp) = initial_aead_and_hp(&client_dcid, Role::Server);
let (_, server_dcid, server_scid, _) =
decode_initial_header(&server_initial, Role::Server).unwrap();
// Send in 100 packets, each with 1000 bytes of crypto frame data each,
// eventually this will overrun the buffer we keep for crypto data.
let mut payload = Encoder::with_capacity(1024);
for pn in 0..100_u64 {
payload.truncate(0);
payload
.encode_varint(0x06_u64) // CRYPTO frame type.
.encode_varint(pn * 1000 + 1) // offset
.encode_varint(1000_u64); // length
let plen = payload.len();
payload.pad_to(plen + 1000, 44);
let mut packet = Encoder::with_capacity(MIN_INITIAL_PACKET_SIZE);
packet
.encode_byte(0xc1) // Initial with packet number length of 2.
.encode_uint(4, Version::Version1.wire_version())
.encode_vec(1, server_dcid)
.encode_vec(1, server_scid)
.encode_vvec(&[]) // token
.encode_varint(u64::try_from(2 + payload.len() + aead.expansion()).unwrap()); // length
let pn_offset = packet.len();
packet.encode_uint(2, pn);
let mut packet = Vec::from(packet);
let header = packet.clone();
packet.resize(header.len() + payload.len() + aead.expansion(), 0);
aead.encrypt(pn, &header, payload.as_ref(), &mut packet[header.len()..])
.unwrap();
apply_header_protection(&hp, &mut packet, pn_offset..(pn_offset + 2));
packet.resize(MIN_INITIAL_PACKET_SIZE, 0); // Initial has to be MIN_INITIAL_PACKET_SIZE bytes!
let dgram = Datagram::new(
server_initial.source(),
server_initial.destination(),
server_initial.tos(),
packet,
);
client.process_input(dgram, now());
if let State::Closing { error, .. } = client.state() {
assert!(
matches!(error, CloseReason::Transport(Error::CryptoBufferExceeded)),
"the connection need to abort on crypto buffer"
);
assert!(pn > 64, "at least 64000 bytes of data is buffered");
return;
}
}
panic!("Was not able to overflow the crypto buffer");
}
#[test]
fn handshake_mlkem768x25519() {
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = default_server();
client
.set_groups(&[neqo_crypto::TLS_GRP_KEM_MLKEM768X25519])
.ok();
client.send_additional_key_shares(0).ok();
test_fixture::handshake(&mut client, &mut server);
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Confirmed);
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed);
assert_eq!(
client.tls_info().unwrap().key_exchange(),
neqo_crypto::TLS_GRP_KEM_MLKEM768X25519
);
assert_eq!(
server.tls_info().unwrap().key_exchange(),
neqo_crypto::TLS_GRP_KEM_MLKEM768X25519
);
}