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= Testing crypto code paths
== Assert-output-is-encrypted
Security-critical code paths (encrypt, sign-then-encrypt, secret-key
export) must include tests that verify the output does not leak
plaintext key material. A bug that accidentally produces an unencrypted
output, or that transmits key material before encryption is applied,
would silently compromise all of the user's secrets.
== Convention
For each encrypt / sign-export operation:
1. Generate a known plaintext containing a distinctive marker string
(e.g. `SECRET_PLAINTEXT_MARKER_12345`).
2. Run the operation and capture the full output.
3. Assert the marker string does NOT appear in the output bytes.
4. Assert the output matches expected OpenPGP packet structure (e.g.
parse with `rnp_dump_packets` and verify expected packet tags).
For secret-key export:
1. Export a secret key encrypted with a known passphrase.
2. Assert the passphrase does NOT appear in the output.
3. Assert the key material (when parseable) is encrypted.
== Where this applies
- `rnp_op_encrypt_*` (all variants: password, public-key, AEAD).
- `rnp_key_export_*` (especially secret keys).
- `rnp_op_sign_*` (verify detached sigs are detached; inline sigs wrap
the data in a literal-data packet, not raw plaintext).
== Why
A future refactor that accidentally swaps the encrypt-and-sign order,
or that skips the encryption step, would be caught by these tests. The
AEAD unauthenticated-chunk fix (#807, PR #2422) is an example of the
class of bug this discipline prevents.