otr_toolkit.1 - mozsearch

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.TH OTR_PARSE 1 "March 14, 2012"

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.SH NAME

otr_parse, otr_sesskeys, otr_mackey, otr_readforge, otr_modify, otr_remac \- Process Off-the-Record Messaging transcripts

.SH SYNOPSIS

.B otr_parse

.br

.B otr_sesskeys

.I our_privkey their_pubkey

.br

.B otr_mackey

.I aes_enc_key

.br

.B otr_readforge

.I aes_enc_key [newmsg]

.br

.B otr_modify

.I mackey old_text new_text offset

.br

.B otr_remac

.I mackey sender_instance receiver_instance flags snd_keyid rcv_keyid pubkey counter encdata revealed_mackeys

.SH DESCRIPTION

Off-the-Record (OTR) Messaging allows you to have private conversations

over IM by providing:

 - Encryption

   - No one else can read your instant messages.

 - Authentication

   - You are assured the correspondent is who you think it is.

 - Deniability

   - The messages you send do \fInot\fP have digital signatures that are

     checkable by a third party.  Anyone can forge messages after a

     conversation to make them look like they came from you.  However,

     \fIduring\fP a conversation, your correspondent is assured the messages

     he sees are authentic and unmodified.

 - Perfect forward secrecy

   - If you lose control of your private keys, no previous conversation

     is compromised.

.PP

The OTR Toolkit is useful for analyzing and/or

forging OTR messages.  Why do we offer this?  Primarily, to make

absolutely sure that transcripts of OTR conversations are really easy

to forge after the fact.  [Note that \fIduring\fP an OTR conversation,

messages can't be forged without real-time access to the secret keys on

the participants' computers, and in that case, all security has already

been lost.]  Easily-forgeable transcripts help us provide the

"Deniability" property: if someone claims you said something over OTR,

they'll have no proof, as anyone at all can modify a transcript to make

it say whatever they like, and still have all the verification come out

correctly.

Here are the six programs in the toolkit:

 - otr_parse

   - Parse OTR messages given on stdin, showing the values of all the

     fields in OTR protocol messages.

 - otr_sesskeys our_privkey their_pubkey

   - Shows our public key, the session id, two AES and two MAC keys

     derived from the given Diffie-Hellman keys (one private, one public).

 - otr_mackey aes_enc_key

   - Shows the MAC key derived from the given AES key.

 - otr_readforge aes_enc_key [newmsg]

   - Decrypts an OTR Data message using the given AES key, and displays

     the message.

   - If newmsg is given, replace the message with that one, encrypt

     and MAC it properly, and output the resulting OTR Data Message.

     This works even if the given key was not correct for the original

     message, so as to enable complete forgeries.

 - otr_modify mackey old_text new_text offset

   - Even if you can't read the data because you don't know either

     the AES key or the Diffie-Hellman private key, but you can make a

     good guess that the substring "old_text" appears at the given

     offset in the message, replace the old_text with the new_text

     (which must be of the same length), recalculate the MAC with the

     given mackey, and output the resulting Data message.

   - Note that, even if you don't know any text in an existing message,

     you can still forge messages of your choice using the

     otr_readforge command, above.

 - otr_remac mackey sender_instance receiver_instance flags snd_keyid rcv_keyid pubkey counter encdata revealed_mackeys

   - Make a new OTR protocol version 3 Data Message, with the given

     pieces (note that the data part is already encrypted).  MAC it

     with the given mackey.

.SH SEE ALSO

.BR "Off-the-Record Messaging" ,

at

.UR https://www.cypherpunks.ca/otr/

https://www.cypherpunks.ca/otr/

.UE

.SH AUTHOR

otr_toolkit was written by the OTR Dev Team <otr@cypherpunks.ca>.