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/*
* Table enumerating all implemented cipher suites
* Part of public API.
*
* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "ssl.h"
#include "sslproto.h"
/*
* The ordering of cipher suites in this table must match the ordering in
* the cipherSuites table in ssl3con.c.
*
* If new ECC cipher suites are added, also update the ssl3CipherSuite arrays
* in ssl3ecc.c.
*
* Finally, update the ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED macro in sslimpl.h.
*
* The ordering is as follows:
* * No-encryption cipher suites last
* * Export/weak/obsolete cipher suites before no-encryption cipher suites
* * Order by key exchange algorithm: ECDHE, then DHE, then ECDH, RSA.
* * Within key agreement sections, prefer AEAD over non-AEAD cipher suites.
* * Within AEAD sections, order by symmetric encryption algorithm which
* integrates message authentication algorithm: AES-128-GCM, then
* ChaCha20-Poly1305, then AES-256-GCM,
* * Within non-AEAD sections, order by symmetric encryption algorithm:
* AES-128, then Camellia-128, then AES-256, then Camellia-256, then SEED,
* then FIPS-3DES, then 3DES, then RC4. AES is commonly accepted as a
* strong cipher internationally, and is often hardware-accelerated.
* Camellia also has wide international support across standards
* organizations. SEED is only recommended by the Korean government. 3DES
* only provides 112 bits of security. RC4 is now deprecated or forbidden
* by many standards organizations.
* * Within non-AEAD symmetric algorithm sections, order by message
* authentication algorithm: HMAC-SHA256, then HMAC-SHA384, then HMAC-SHA1,
* then HMAC-MD5.
* * Within symmetric algorithm sections, order by message authentication
* algorithm: GCM, then HMAC-SHA1, then HMAC-SHA256, then HMAC-MD5.
* * Within message authentication algorithm sections, order by asymmetric
* signature algorithm: ECDSA, then RSA, then DSS.
* * As a special case, the PSK ciphers, which are only enabled when
* TLS 1.3 PSK-resumption is in use, come first.
*
* Exception: Because some servers ignore the high-order byte of the cipher
* suite ID, we must be careful about adding cipher suites with IDs larger
* than 0x00ff; see bug 946147. For these broken servers, the first three
* cipher suites, with the MSB zeroed, look like:
* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA { 0x00,0x2F }
* TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA { 0x00,0x0A }
* TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA { 0x00,0x09 }
* The broken server only supports the third and fourth ones and will select
* the third one.
*/
const PRUint16 SSL_ImplementedCiphers[] = {
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
/* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA must appear before
* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA to work around bug 946147.
*/
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
/* 56-bit DES "domestic" cipher suites */
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
/* ciphersuites with no encryption */
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5,
0
};
const PRUint16 SSL_NumImplementedCiphers =
(sizeof SSL_ImplementedCiphers) / (sizeof SSL_ImplementedCiphers[0]) - 1;
const PRUint16*
SSL_GetImplementedCiphers(void)
{
return SSL_ImplementedCiphers;
}
PRUint16
SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(void)
{
return SSL_NumImplementedCiphers;
}