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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "nsIThreadRetargetableStreamListener.h"
#include "nsString.h"
#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
#include "mozilla/LinkedList.h"
#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_content.h"
#include "mozilla/StoragePrincipalHelper.h"
#include "nsCORSListenerProxy.h"
#include "nsIChannel.h"
#include "nsIHttpChannel.h"
#include "HttpChannelChild.h"
#include "nsIHttpChannelInternal.h"
#include "nsError.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsNetUtil.h"
#include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h"
#include "nsIInterfaceRequestorUtils.h"
#include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h"
#include "nsMimeTypes.h"
#include "nsStringStream.h"
#include "nsGkAtoms.h"
#include "nsWhitespaceTokenizer.h"
#include "nsIChannelEventSink.h"
#include "nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback.h"
#include "nsCharSeparatedTokenizer.h"
#include "nsAsyncRedirectVerifyHelper.h"
#include "nsClassHashtable.h"
#include "nsHashKeys.h"
#include "nsStreamUtils.h"
#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
#include "nsIScriptError.h"
#include "nsILoadGroup.h"
#include "nsILoadContext.h"
#include "nsIConsoleService.h"
#include "nsINetworkInterceptController.h"
#include "nsICorsPreflightCallback.h"
#include "nsISupportsImpl.h"
#include "nsHttpChannel.h"
#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
#include "mozilla/ExpandedPrincipal.h"
#include "mozilla/LoadInfo.h"
#include "mozilla/NullPrincipal.h"
#include "nsIHttpHeaderVisitor.h"
#include "nsQueryObject.h"
#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_network.h"
#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_dom.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/nsHTTPSOnlyUtils.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/ReferrerInfo.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/RequestBinding.h"
#include "mozilla/glean/GleanMetrics.h"
#include <algorithm>
using namespace mozilla;
using namespace mozilla::net;
#define PREFLIGHT_CACHE_SIZE 100
// 5 seconds is chosen to be compatible with Chromium.
#define PREFLIGHT_DEFAULT_EXPIRY_SECONDS 5
static inline nsAutoString GetStatusCodeAsString(nsIHttpChannel* aHttp) {
nsAutoString result;
uint32_t code;
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(aHttp->GetResponseStatus(&code))) {
result.AppendInt(code);
}
return result;
}
static void LogBlockedRequest(nsIRequest* aRequest, const char* aProperty,
const char16_t* aParam, uint32_t aBlockingReason,
nsIHttpChannel* aCreatingChannel,
bool aIsWarning = false) {
nsresult rv = NS_OK;
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel = do_QueryInterface(aRequest);
if (!aIsWarning) {
NS_SetRequestBlockingReason(channel, aBlockingReason);
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> aUri;
channel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(aUri));
nsAutoCString spec;
if (aUri) {
spec = aUri->GetSpecOrDefault();
}
// Generate the error message
nsAutoString blockedMessage;
AutoTArray<nsString, 2> params;
CopyUTF8toUTF16(spec, *params.AppendElement());
if (aParam) {
params.AppendElement(aParam);
}
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 specUTF16(spec);
rv = nsContentUtils::FormatLocalizedString(
nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES, aProperty, params, blockedMessage);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
NS_WARNING("Failed to log blocked cross-site request (no formalizedStr");
return;
}
nsAutoString msg(blockedMessage.get());
nsDependentCString category(aProperty);
if (XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
if (aCreatingChannel) {
rv = aCreatingChannel->LogBlockedCORSRequest(msg, category, aIsWarning);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
return;
}
}
NS_WARNING(
"Failed to log blocked cross-site request to web console from "
"parent->child, falling back to browser console");
}
bool privateBrowsing = false;
if (aRequest) {
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadGroup> loadGroup;
rv = aRequest->GetLoadGroup(getter_AddRefs(loadGroup));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS_VOID(rv);
privateBrowsing = nsContentUtils::IsInPrivateBrowsing(loadGroup);
}
bool fromChromeContext = false;
if (channel) {
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = channel->LoadInfo();
fromChromeContext = loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->IsSystemPrincipal();
}
// we are passing aProperty as the category so we can link to the
// appropriate MDN docs depending on the specific error.
uint64_t innerWindowID = nsContentUtils::GetInnerWindowID(aRequest);
// The |innerWindowID| could be 0 if this request is created from script.
// We can always try top level content window id in this case,
// since the window id can lead to current top level window's web console.
if (!innerWindowID) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpChannel = do_QueryInterface(aRequest);
if (httpChannel) {
Unused << httpChannel->GetTopLevelContentWindowId(&innerWindowID);
}
}
nsCORSListenerProxy::LogBlockedCORSRequest(innerWindowID, privateBrowsing,
fromChromeContext, msg, category,
aIsWarning);
}
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// Preflight cache
class nsPreflightCache {
public:
struct TokenTime {
nsCString token;
TimeStamp expirationTime;
};
struct CacheEntry : public LinkedListElement<CacheEntry> {
explicit CacheEntry(nsCString& aKey, bool aPrivateBrowsing)
: mKey(aKey), mPrivateBrowsing(aPrivateBrowsing) {
MOZ_COUNT_CTOR(nsPreflightCache::CacheEntry);
}
~CacheEntry() { MOZ_COUNT_DTOR(nsPreflightCache::CacheEntry); }
void PurgeExpired(TimeStamp now);
bool CheckRequest(const nsCString& aMethod,
const nsTArray<nsCString>& aHeaders);
nsCString mKey;
bool mPrivateBrowsing{false};
nsTArray<TokenTime> mMethods;
nsTArray<TokenTime> mHeaders;
};
MOZ_COUNTED_DEFAULT_CTOR(nsPreflightCache)
~nsPreflightCache() {
Clear();
MOZ_COUNT_DTOR(nsPreflightCache);
}
bool Initialize() { return true; }
CacheEntry* GetEntry(nsIURI* aURI, nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
bool aWithCredentials,
const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes, bool aCreate);
void RemoveEntries(nsIURI* aURI, nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes);
void PurgePrivateBrowsingEntries();
void Clear();
private:
nsClassHashtable<nsCStringHashKey, CacheEntry> mTable;
LinkedList<CacheEntry> mList;
};
// Will be initialized in EnsurePreflightCache.
static nsPreflightCache* sPreflightCache = nullptr;
static bool EnsurePreflightCache() {
if (sPreflightCache) return true;
UniquePtr<nsPreflightCache> newCache(new nsPreflightCache());
if (newCache->Initialize()) {
sPreflightCache = newCache.release();
return true;
}
return false;
}
void nsPreflightCache::PurgePrivateBrowsingEntries() {
for (auto iter = mTable.Iter(); !iter.Done(); iter.Next()) {
auto* entry = iter.UserData();
if (entry->mPrivateBrowsing) {
// last private browsing window closed, remove preflight cache entries
entry->removeFrom(sPreflightCache->mList);
iter.Remove();
}
}
}
void nsPreflightCache::CacheEntry::PurgeExpired(TimeStamp now) {
for (uint32_t i = 0, len = mMethods.Length(); i < len; ++i) {
if (now >= mMethods[i].expirationTime) {
mMethods.UnorderedRemoveElementAt(i);
--i; // Examine the element again, if necessary.
--len;
}
}
for (uint32_t i = 0, len = mHeaders.Length(); i < len; ++i) {
if (now >= mHeaders[i].expirationTime) {
mHeaders.UnorderedRemoveElementAt(i);
--i; // Examine the element again, if necessary.
--len;
}
}
}
bool nsPreflightCache::CacheEntry::CheckRequest(
const nsCString& aMethod, const nsTArray<nsCString>& aHeaders) {
PurgeExpired(TimeStamp::NowLoRes());
if (!aMethod.EqualsLiteral("GET") && !aMethod.EqualsLiteral("POST")) {
struct CheckToken {
bool Equals(const TokenTime& e, const nsCString& method) const {
return e.token.Equals(method);
}
};
if (!mMethods.Contains(aMethod, CheckToken())) {
return false;
}
}
struct CheckHeaderToken {
bool Equals(const TokenTime& e, const nsCString& header) const {
return e.token.Equals(header, nsCaseInsensitiveCStringComparator);
}
} checker;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aHeaders.Length(); ++i) {
if (!mHeaders.Contains(aHeaders[i], checker)) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
nsPreflightCache::CacheEntry* nsPreflightCache::GetEntry(
nsIURI* aURI, nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, bool aWithCredentials,
const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes, bool aCreate) {
nsCString key;
if (NS_FAILED(aPrincipal->GetPrefLightCacheKey(aURI, aWithCredentials,
aOriginAttributes, key))) {
NS_WARNING("Invalid cache key!");
return nullptr;
}
CacheEntry* existingEntry = nullptr;
if (mTable.Get(key, &existingEntry)) {
// Entry already existed so just return it. Also update the LRU list.
// Move to the head of the list.
existingEntry->removeFrom(mList);
mList.insertFront(existingEntry);
return existingEntry;
}
if (!aCreate) {
return nullptr;
}
// This is a new entry, allocate and insert into the table now so that any
// failures don't cause items to be removed from a full cache.
auto newEntry =
MakeUnique<CacheEntry>(key, aOriginAttributes.mPrivateBrowsingId != 0);
NS_ASSERTION(mTable.Count() <= PREFLIGHT_CACHE_SIZE,
"Something is borked, too many entries in the cache!");
// Now enforce the max count.
if (mTable.Count() == PREFLIGHT_CACHE_SIZE) {
// Try to kick out all the expired entries.
TimeStamp now = TimeStamp::NowLoRes();
for (auto iter = mTable.Iter(); !iter.Done(); iter.Next()) {
auto* entry = iter.UserData();
entry->PurgeExpired(now);
if (entry->mHeaders.IsEmpty() && entry->mMethods.IsEmpty()) {
// Expired, remove from the list as well as the hash table.
entry->removeFrom(sPreflightCache->mList);
iter.Remove();
}
}
// If that didn't remove anything then kick out the least recently used
// entry.
if (mTable.Count() == PREFLIGHT_CACHE_SIZE) {
CacheEntry* lruEntry = static_cast<CacheEntry*>(mList.popLast());
MOZ_ASSERT(lruEntry);
// This will delete 'lruEntry'.
mTable.Remove(lruEntry->mKey);
NS_ASSERTION(mTable.Count() == PREFLIGHT_CACHE_SIZE - 1,
"Somehow tried to remove an entry that was never added!");
}
}
auto* newEntryWeakRef = mTable.InsertOrUpdate(key, std::move(newEntry)).get();
mList.insertFront(newEntryWeakRef);
return newEntryWeakRef;
}
void nsPreflightCache::RemoveEntries(
nsIURI* aURI, nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes) {
CacheEntry* entry;
nsCString key;
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(aPrincipal->GetPrefLightCacheKey(aURI, true,
aOriginAttributes, key)) &&
mTable.Get(key, &entry)) {
entry->removeFrom(mList);
mTable.Remove(key);
}
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(aPrincipal->GetPrefLightCacheKey(aURI, false,
aOriginAttributes, key)) &&
mTable.Get(key, &entry)) {
entry->removeFrom(mList);
mTable.Remove(key);
}
}
void nsPreflightCache::Clear() {
mList.clear();
mTable.Clear();
}
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// nsCORSListenerProxy
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsCORSListenerProxy, nsIStreamListener, nsIRequestObserver,
nsIChannelEventSink, nsIInterfaceRequestor,
nsIThreadRetargetableStreamListener)
/* static */
void nsCORSListenerProxy::Shutdown() {
delete sPreflightCache;
sPreflightCache = nullptr;
}
/* static */
void nsCORSListenerProxy::ClearCache() {
if (!sPreflightCache) {
return;
}
sPreflightCache->Clear();
}
// static
void nsCORSListenerProxy::ClearPrivateBrowsingCache() {
if (!sPreflightCache) {
return;
}
sPreflightCache->PurgePrivateBrowsingEntries();
}
// Usually, when using an expanded principal, there's no particularly good
// origin to do the request with. However if the expanded principal only wraps
// one principal, we can use that one instead.
//
// This is needed so that DevTools can still do CORS-enabled requests (since
// DevTools uses a triggering principal expanding the node principal to bypass
// CSP checks, see Element::CreateDevToolsPrincipal(), bug 1604562, and bug
// 1391994).
static nsIPrincipal* GetOriginHeaderPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal) {
while (aPrincipal && aPrincipal->GetIsExpandedPrincipal()) {
auto* ep = BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal)->As<ExpandedPrincipal>();
if (ep->AllowList().Length() != 1) {
break;
}
aPrincipal = ep->AllowList()[0];
}
return aPrincipal;
}
nsCORSListenerProxy::nsCORSListenerProxy(nsIStreamListener* aOuter,
nsIPrincipal* aRequestingPrincipal,
bool aWithCredentials)
: mOuterListener(aOuter),
mRequestingPrincipal(aRequestingPrincipal),
mOriginHeaderPrincipal(GetOriginHeaderPrincipal(aRequestingPrincipal)),
mWithCredentials(aWithCredentials),
mRequestApproved(false),
mHasBeenCrossSite(false),
#ifdef DEBUG
mInited(false),
#endif
mMutex("nsCORSListenerProxy") {
}
nsresult nsCORSListenerProxy::Init(nsIChannel* aChannel,
DataURIHandling aAllowDataURI) {
aChannel->GetNotificationCallbacks(
getter_AddRefs(mOuterNotificationCallbacks));
aChannel->SetNotificationCallbacks(this);
nsresult rv =
UpdateChannel(aChannel, aAllowDataURI, UpdateType::Default, false);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
{
MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);
mOuterListener = nullptr;
}
mRequestingPrincipal = nullptr;
mOriginHeaderPrincipal = nullptr;
mOuterNotificationCallbacks = nullptr;
mHttpChannel = nullptr;
}
#ifdef DEBUG
mInited = true;
#endif
return rv;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCORSListenerProxy::OnStartRequest(nsIRequest* aRequest) {
MOZ_ASSERT(mInited, "nsCORSListenerProxy has not been initialized properly");
nsresult rv = CheckRequestApproved(aRequest);
mRequestApproved = NS_SUCCEEDED(rv);
if (!mRequestApproved) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel = do_QueryInterface(aRequest);
if (channel) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
NS_GetFinalChannelURI(channel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
if (uri) {
OriginAttributes attrs;
StoragePrincipalHelper::GetOriginAttributesForNetworkState(channel,
attrs);
if (sPreflightCache) {
// OK to use mRequestingPrincipal since preflights never get
// redirected.
sPreflightCache->RemoveEntries(uri, mRequestingPrincipal, attrs);
} else {
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannelChild> httpChannelChild =
do_QueryInterface(channel);
if (httpChannelChild) {
rv = httpChannelChild->RemoveCorsPreflightCacheEntry(
uri, mRequestingPrincipal, attrs);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
// Only warn here to ensure we fall through the request Cancel()
// and outer listener OnStartRequest() calls.
NS_WARNING("Failed to remove CORS preflight cache entry!");
}
}
}
}
}
aRequest->Cancel(NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI);
nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener> listener;
{
MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);
listener = mOuterListener;
}
listener->OnStartRequest(aRequest);
// Reason for NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI already logged in CheckRequestApproved()
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener> listener;
{
MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);
listener = mOuterListener;
}
return listener->OnStartRequest(aRequest);
}
namespace {
class CheckOriginHeader final : public nsIHttpHeaderVisitor {
public:
NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS
CheckOriginHeader() = default;
NS_IMETHOD
VisitHeader(const nsACString& aHeader, const nsACString& aValue) override {
if (aHeader.EqualsLiteral("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")) {
mHeaderCount++;
}
if (mHeaderCount > 1) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
return NS_OK;
}
private:
uint32_t mHeaderCount{0};
~CheckOriginHeader() = default;
};
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(CheckOriginHeader, nsIHttpHeaderVisitor)
} // namespace
nsresult nsCORSListenerProxy::CheckRequestApproved(nsIRequest* aRequest) {
// Check if this was actually a cross domain request
if (!mHasBeenCrossSite) {
return NS_OK;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> topChannel;
topChannel.swap(mHttpChannel);
if (StaticPrefs::content_cors_disable()) {
LogBlockedRequest(aRequest, "CORSDisabled", nullptr,
nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CORSDISABLED, topChannel);
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
// Check if the request failed
nsresult status;
nsresult rv = aRequest->GetStatus(&status);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
LogBlockedRequest(aRequest, "CORSDidNotSucceed2", nullptr,
nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CORSDIDNOTSUCCEED,
topChannel);
return rv;
}
if (NS_FAILED(status)) {
if (NS_BINDING_ABORTED != status) {
// Don't want to log mere cancellation as an error.
LogBlockedRequest(aRequest, "CORSDidNotSucceed2", nullptr,
nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CORSDIDNOTSUCCEED,
topChannel);
}
return status;
}
// Test that things worked on a HTTP level
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> http = do_QueryInterface(aRequest);
if (!http) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel = do_QueryInterface(aRequest);
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
NS_GetFinalChannelURI(channel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
if (uri && uri->SchemeIs("moz-extension")) {
// moz-extension:-URLs do not support CORS, but can universally be read
// if an extension lists the resource in web_accessible_resources.
// Access will be checked in UpdateChannel.
return NS_OK;
}
LogBlockedRequest(aRequest, "CORSRequestNotHttp", nullptr,
nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CORSREQUESTNOTHTTP,
topChannel);
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = http->LoadInfo();
if (loadInfo->GetServiceWorkerTaintingSynthesized()) {
// For synthesized responses, we don't need to perform any checks.
// Note: This would be unsafe if we ever changed our behavior to allow
// service workers to intercept CORS preflights.
return NS_OK;
}
// Check the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header
RefPtr<CheckOriginHeader> visitor = new CheckOriginHeader();
nsAutoCString allowedOriginHeader;
// check for duplicate headers
rv = http->VisitOriginalResponseHeaders(visitor);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
LogBlockedRequest(
aRequest, "CORSMultipleAllowOriginNotAllowed", nullptr,
nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CORSMULTIPLEALLOWORIGINNOTALLOWED,
topChannel);
return rv;
}
rv = http->GetResponseHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin"_ns,
allowedOriginHeader);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
auto statusCode = GetStatusCodeAsString(http);
LogBlockedRequest(aRequest, "CORSMissingAllowOrigin2", statusCode.get(),
nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CORSMISSINGALLOWORIGIN,
topChannel);
return rv;
}
// Bug 1210985 - Explicitly point out the error that the credential is
// not supported if the allowing origin is '*'. Note that this check
// has to be done before the condition
//
// >> if (mWithCredentials || !allowedOriginHeader.EqualsLiteral("*"))
//
// below since "if (A && B)" is included in "if (A || !B)".
//
if (mWithCredentials && allowedOriginHeader.EqualsLiteral("*")) {
LogBlockedRequest(aRequest, "CORSNotSupportingCredentials", nullptr,
nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CORSNOTSUPPORTINGCREDENTIALS,
topChannel);
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
if (mWithCredentials || !allowedOriginHeader.EqualsLiteral("*")) {
MOZ_ASSERT(!mOriginHeaderPrincipal->GetIsExpandedPrincipal());
nsAutoCString origin;
mOriginHeaderPrincipal->GetWebExposedOriginSerialization(origin);
if (!allowedOriginHeader.Equals(origin)) {
LogBlockedRequest(
aRequest, "CORSAllowOriginNotMatchingOrigin",
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(allowedOriginHeader).get(),
nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CORSALLOWORIGINNOTMATCHINGORIGIN,
topChannel);
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
}
// Check Access-Control-Allow-Credentials header
if (mWithCredentials) {
nsAutoCString allowCredentialsHeader;
rv = http->GetResponseHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials"_ns,
allowCredentialsHeader);
if (!allowCredentialsHeader.EqualsLiteral("true")) {
LogBlockedRequest(
aRequest, "CORSMissingAllowCredentials", nullptr,
nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CORSMISSINGALLOWCREDENTIALS, topChannel);
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCORSListenerProxy::OnStopRequest(nsIRequest* aRequest, nsresult aStatusCode) {
MOZ_ASSERT(mInited, "nsCORSListenerProxy has not been initialized properly");
nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener> listener;
{
MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);
listener = std::move(mOuterListener);
}
nsresult rv = listener->OnStopRequest(aRequest, aStatusCode);
mOuterNotificationCallbacks = nullptr;
mHttpChannel = nullptr;
return rv;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCORSListenerProxy::OnDataAvailable(nsIRequest* aRequest,
nsIInputStream* aInputStream,
uint64_t aOffset, uint32_t aCount) {
// NB: This can be called on any thread! But we're guaranteed that it is
// called between OnStartRequest and OnStopRequest, so we don't need to worry
// about races.
MOZ_ASSERT(mInited, "nsCORSListenerProxy has not been initialized properly");
if (!mRequestApproved) {
// Reason for NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI already logged in CheckRequestApproved()
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener> listener;
{
MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);
listener = mOuterListener;
}
return listener->OnDataAvailable(aRequest, aInputStream, aOffset, aCount);
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCORSListenerProxy::OnDataFinished(nsresult aStatus) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener> listener;
{
MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);
listener = mOuterListener;
}
if (!listener) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIThreadRetargetableStreamListener> retargetableListener =
do_QueryInterface(listener);
if (retargetableListener) {
return retargetableListener->OnDataFinished(aStatus);
}
return NS_OK;
}
void nsCORSListenerProxy::SetInterceptController(
nsINetworkInterceptController* aInterceptController) {
mInterceptController = aInterceptController;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCORSListenerProxy::GetInterface(const nsIID& aIID, void** aResult) {
if (aIID.Equals(NS_GET_IID(nsIChannelEventSink))) {
*aResult = static_cast<nsIChannelEventSink*>(this);
NS_ADDREF_THIS();
return NS_OK;
}
if (aIID.Equals(NS_GET_IID(nsINetworkInterceptController)) &&
mInterceptController) {
nsCOMPtr<nsINetworkInterceptController> copy(mInterceptController);
*aResult = copy.forget().take();
return NS_OK;
}
return mOuterNotificationCallbacks
? mOuterNotificationCallbacks->GetInterface(aIID, aResult)
: NS_ERROR_NO_INTERFACE;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCORSListenerProxy::AsyncOnChannelRedirect(
nsIChannel* aOldChannel, nsIChannel* aNewChannel, uint32_t aFlags,
nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback* aCb) {
nsresult rv;
if (NS_IsInternalSameURIRedirect(aOldChannel, aNewChannel, aFlags) ||
NS_IsHSTSUpgradeRedirect(aOldChannel, aNewChannel, aFlags)) {
// Internal redirects still need to be updated in order to maintain
// the correct headers. We use DataURIHandling::Allow, since unallowed
// data URIs should have been blocked before we got to the internal
// redirect.
rv = UpdateChannel(aNewChannel, DataURIHandling::Allow,
UpdateType::InternalOrHSTSRedirect, false);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
NS_WARNING(
"nsCORSListenerProxy::AsyncOnChannelRedirect: "
"internal redirect UpdateChannel() returned failure");
aOldChannel->Cancel(rv);
return rv;
}
} else {
mIsRedirect = true;
// A real, external redirect. Perform CORS checking on new URL.
rv = CheckRequestApproved(aOldChannel);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> oldURI;
NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aOldChannel, getter_AddRefs(oldURI));
if (oldURI) {
OriginAttributes attrs;
StoragePrincipalHelper::GetOriginAttributesForNetworkState(aOldChannel,
attrs);
if (sPreflightCache) {
// OK to use mRequestingPrincipal since preflights never get
// redirected.
sPreflightCache->RemoveEntries(oldURI, mRequestingPrincipal, attrs);
} else {
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannelChild> httpChannelChild =
do_QueryInterface(aOldChannel);
if (httpChannelChild) {
rv = httpChannelChild->RemoveCorsPreflightCacheEntry(
oldURI, mRequestingPrincipal, attrs);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
// Only warn here to ensure we call the channel Cancel() below
NS_WARNING("Failed to remove CORS preflight cache entry!");
}
}
}
}
aOldChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI);
// Reason for NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI already logged in
// CheckRequestApproved()
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
if (mHasBeenCrossSite) {
// Once we've been cross-site, cross-origin redirects reset our source
// origin. Note that we need to call GetChannelURIPrincipal() because
// we are looking for the principal that is actually being loaded and not
// the principal that initiated the load.
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> oldChannelPrincipal;
nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->GetChannelURIPrincipal(
aOldChannel, getter_AddRefs(oldChannelPrincipal));
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> newChannelPrincipal;
nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->GetChannelURIPrincipal(
aNewChannel, getter_AddRefs(newChannelPrincipal));
if (!oldChannelPrincipal || !newChannelPrincipal) {
rv = NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
aOldChannel->Cancel(rv);
return rv;
}
if (!oldChannelPrincipal->Equals(newChannelPrincipal)) {
// Spec says to set our source origin to a unique origin.
mOriginHeaderPrincipal =
NullPrincipal::CreateWithInheritedAttributes(oldChannelPrincipal);
}
}
bool rewriteToGET = false;
// We need to strip auth header from preflight request for
// cross-origin redirects.
// See Bug 1874132
bool stripAuthHeader =
StaticPrefs::network_fetch_redirect_stripAuthHeader() &&
NS_ShouldRemoveAuthHeaderOnRedirect(aOldChannel, aNewChannel, aFlags);
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> oldHttpChannel = do_QueryInterface(aOldChannel);
if (oldHttpChannel) {
nsAutoCString method;
Unused << oldHttpChannel->GetRequestMethod(method);
Unused << oldHttpChannel->ShouldStripRequestBodyHeader(method,
&rewriteToGET);
}
rv = UpdateChannel(
aNewChannel, DataURIHandling::Disallow,
rewriteToGET ? UpdateType::StripRequestBodyHeader : UpdateType::Default,
stripAuthHeader);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
NS_WARNING(
"nsCORSListenerProxy::AsyncOnChannelRedirect: "
"UpdateChannel() returned failure");
aOldChannel->Cancel(rv);
return rv;
}
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannelEventSink> outer =
do_GetInterface(mOuterNotificationCallbacks);
if (outer) {
return outer->AsyncOnChannelRedirect(aOldChannel, aNewChannel, aFlags, aCb);
}
aCb->OnRedirectVerifyCallback(NS_OK);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCORSListenerProxy::CheckListenerChain() {
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
nsCOMPtr<nsIThreadRetargetableStreamListener> retargetableListener;
{
MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);
retargetableListener = do_QueryInterface(mOuterListener);
}
if (!retargetableListener) {
return NS_ERROR_NO_INTERFACE;
}
return retargetableListener->CheckListenerChain();
}
// Please note that the CSP directive 'upgrade-insecure-requests' and the
// HTTPS-Only Mode are relying on the promise that channels get updated from
// http: to https: before the channel fetches any data from the netwerk. Such
// channels should not be blocked by CORS and marked as cross origin requests.
// E.g.: toplevel page: https://www.example.com loads
// xhr: http://www.example.com/foo which gets updated to
// In such a case we should bail out of CORS and rely on the promise that
// nsHttpChannel::Connect() upgrades the request from http to https.
bool CheckInsecureUpgradePreventsCORS(nsIPrincipal* aRequestingPrincipal,
nsIChannel* aChannel) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> channelURI;
nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(channelURI));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
// upgrade insecure requests is only applicable to http requests
if (!channelURI->SchemeIs("http")) {
return false;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> originalURI;
rv = aChannel->GetOriginalURI(getter_AddRefs(originalURI));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
nsAutoCString principalHost, channelHost, origChannelHost;
// if we can not query a host from the uri, there is nothing to do
if (NS_FAILED(aRequestingPrincipal->GetAsciiHost(principalHost)) ||
NS_FAILED(channelURI->GetAsciiHost(channelHost)) ||
NS_FAILED(originalURI->GetAsciiHost(origChannelHost))) {
return false;
}
// if the hosts do not match, there is nothing to do
if (!principalHost.EqualsIgnoreCase(channelHost.get())) {
return false;
}
// also check that uri matches the one of the originalURI
if (!channelHost.EqualsIgnoreCase(origChannelHost.get())) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
nsresult nsCORSListenerProxy::UpdateChannel(nsIChannel* aChannel,
DataURIHandling aAllowDataURI,
UpdateType aUpdateType,
bool aStripAuthHeader) {
MOZ_ASSERT_IF(aUpdateType == UpdateType::InternalOrHSTSRedirect,
!aStripAuthHeader);
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri, originalURI;
nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
rv = aChannel->GetOriginalURI(getter_AddRefs(originalURI));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
// Introduced for DevTools in order to allow overriding some requests
// with the content of data: URIs.
if (loadInfo->GetAllowInsecureRedirectToDataURI() && uri->SchemeIs("data")) {
return NS_OK;
}
// exempt data URIs from the same origin check.
if (aAllowDataURI == DataURIHandling::Allow && originalURI == uri) {
if (uri->SchemeIs("data")) {
return NS_OK;
}
if (loadInfo->GetAboutBlankInherits() && NS_IsAboutBlank(uri)) {
return NS_OK;
}
}
// Set CORS attributes on channel so that intercepted requests get correct
// values. We have to do this here because the CheckMayLoad checks may lead
// to early return. We can't be sure this is an http channel though, so we
// can't return early on failure.
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannelInternal> internal = do_QueryInterface(aChannel);
if (internal) {
rv = internal->SetRequestMode(dom::RequestMode::Cors);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
rv = internal->SetCorsIncludeCredentials(mWithCredentials);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
// TODO: Bug 1353683
// consider calling SetBlockedRequest in nsCORSListenerProxy::UpdateChannel
//
// Check that the uri is ok to load
uint32_t flags = loadInfo->CheckLoadURIFlags();
rv = nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(
mRequestingPrincipal, uri, flags, loadInfo->GetInnerWindowID());
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (originalURI != uri) {
rv = nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(
mRequestingPrincipal, originalURI, flags, loadInfo->GetInnerWindowID());
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
if (uri->SchemeIs("moz-extension")) {
// moz-extension:-URLs do not support CORS, but can universally be read
// if an extension lists the resource in web_accessible_resources.
// This is enforced via the CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal call above:
// moz-extension resources have the URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD flag, unless
// listed in web_accessible_resources.
return NS_OK;
}
if (!mHasBeenCrossSite &&
NS_SUCCEEDED(mRequestingPrincipal->CheckMayLoad(uri, false)) &&
(originalURI == uri ||
NS_SUCCEEDED(mRequestingPrincipal->CheckMayLoad(originalURI, false)))) {
return NS_OK;
}
// If the CSP directive 'upgrade-insecure-requests' is used or the HTTPS-Only
// Mode is enabled then we should not incorrectly require CORS if the only
// difference of a subresource request and the main page is the scheme. e.g.
// toplevel page: https://www.example.com loads
// then the xhr request will be upgraded to https before it fetches any data
// from the netwerk, hence we shouldn't require CORS in that specific case.
if (CheckInsecureUpgradePreventsCORS(mRequestingPrincipal, aChannel)) {
// Check if https-only mode upgrades this later anyway
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadinfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
if (nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::IsSafeToAcceptCORSOrMixedContent(loadinfo)) {
return NS_OK;
}
// Check if 'upgrade-insecure-requests' is used
if (loadInfo->GetUpgradeInsecureRequests() ||
loadInfo->GetBrowserUpgradeInsecureRequests()) {
return NS_OK;
}
}
// Check if we need to do a preflight, and if so set one up. This must be
// called once we know that the request is going, or has gone, cross-origin.
rv = CheckPreflightNeeded(aChannel, aUpdateType, aStripAuthHeader);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// It's a cross site load
mHasBeenCrossSite = true;
if (mIsRedirect || StaticPrefs::network_cors_preflight_block_userpass_uri()) {
// Step 9. If request’s mode is "cors", locationURL includes credentials,
// and request’s origin is not same origin with locationURL’s origin,
// then return a network error.
nsAutoCString userpass;
uri->GetUserPass(userpass);
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(userpass.IsEmpty(), NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI);
}
// If we have an expanded principal here, we'll reject the CORS request,
// because we can't send a useful Origin header which is required for CORS.
if (nsContentUtils::IsExpandedPrincipal(mOriginHeaderPrincipal)) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpChannel = do_QueryInterface(aChannel);
LogBlockedRequest(aChannel, "CORSOriginHeaderNotAdded", nullptr,
nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CORSORIGINHEADERNOTADDED,
httpChannel);
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
// Add the Origin header
nsAutoCString origin;
rv = mOriginHeaderPrincipal->GetWebExposedOriginSerialization(origin);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> http = do_QueryInterface(aChannel);
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(http, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
// hide the Origin header when requesting from .onion and requesting CORS
if (StaticPrefs::network_http_referer_hideOnionSource()) {
if (mOriginHeaderPrincipal->GetIsOnion()) {
origin.AssignLiteral("null");
}
}
rv = http->SetRequestHeader(net::nsHttp::Origin.val(), origin, false);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// Make cookie-less if needed. We don't need to do anything here if the
// channel was opened with AsyncOpen, since then AsyncOpen will take
// care of the cookie policy for us.
if (!mWithCredentials) {
nsLoadFlags flags;
rv = http->GetLoadFlags(&flags);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
flags |= nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS;
if (StaticPrefs::network_cors_preflight_allow_client_cert()) {
flags |= nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS_ALLOW_CLIENT_CERT;
}
rv = http->SetLoadFlags(flags);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
mHttpChannel = http;
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult nsCORSListenerProxy::CheckPreflightNeeded(nsIChannel* aChannel,
UpdateType aUpdateType,
bool aStripAuthHeader) {
// If this caller isn't using AsyncOpen, or if this *is* a preflight channel,
// then we shouldn't initiate preflight for this channel.
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
if (loadInfo->GetSecurityMode() !=
nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT ||
loadInfo->GetIsPreflight()) {
return NS_OK;
}
bool doPreflight = loadInfo->GetForcePreflight();
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> http = do_QueryInterface(aChannel);
if (!http) {
// Note: A preflight is not needed for moz-extension:-requests either, but
// there is already a check for that in the caller of CheckPreflightNeeded,
// in UpdateChannel.
LogBlockedRequest(aChannel, "CORSRequestNotHttp", nullptr,
nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CORSREQUESTNOTHTTP,
mHttpChannel);
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
nsAutoCString method;
Unused << http->GetRequestMethod(method);
if (!method.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("get") &&
!method.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("post") &&
!method.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("head")) {
doPreflight = true;
}
// Avoid copying the array here
const nsTArray<nsCString>& loadInfoHeaders = loadInfo->CorsUnsafeHeaders();
if (!loadInfoHeaders.IsEmpty()) {
doPreflight = true;
}
// Add Content-Type header if needed
nsTArray<nsCString> headers;
nsAutoCString contentTypeHeader;
nsresult rv = http->GetRequestHeader("Content-Type"_ns, contentTypeHeader);
// GetRequestHeader return an error if the header is not set. Don't add
// "content-type" to the list if that's the case.
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) &&
!nsContentUtils::IsAllowedNonCorsContentType(contentTypeHeader) &&
!loadInfoHeaders.Contains("content-type"_ns,
nsCaseInsensitiveCStringArrayComparator())) {
headers.AppendElements(loadInfoHeaders);
headers.AppendElement("content-type"_ns);
doPreflight = true;
}
if (!doPreflight) {
return NS_OK;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannelInternal> internal = do_QueryInterface(http);
if (!internal) {
auto statusCode = GetStatusCodeAsString(http);
LogBlockedRequest(aChannel, "CORSDidNotSucceed2", statusCode.get(),
nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CORSDIDNOTSUCCEED,
mHttpChannel);
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
internal->SetCorsPreflightParameters(
headers.IsEmpty() ? loadInfoHeaders : headers,
aUpdateType == UpdateType::StripRequestBodyHeader, aStripAuthHeader);
return NS_OK;
}
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// Preflight proxy
// Class used as streamlistener and notification callback when
// doing the initial OPTIONS request for a CORS check
class nsCORSPreflightListener final : public nsIStreamListener,
public nsIInterfaceRequestor,
public nsIChannelEventSink {
public:
nsCORSPreflightListener(nsIPrincipal* aReferrerPrincipal,
nsICorsPreflightCallback* aCallback,
nsILoadContext* aLoadContext, bool aWithCredentials,
const nsCString& aPreflightMethod,
const nsTArray<nsCString>& aPreflightHeaders)
: mPreflightMethod(aPreflightMethod),
mPreflightHeaders(aPreflightHeaders.Clone()),
mReferrerPrincipal(aReferrerPrincipal),
mCallback(aCallback),
mLoadContext(aLoadContext),
mWithCredentials(aWithCredentials) {}
NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS
NS_DECL_NSISTREAMLISTENER
NS_DECL_NSIREQUESTOBSERVER
NS_DECL_NSIINTERFACEREQUESTOR
NS_DECL_NSICHANNELEVENTSINK
nsresult CheckPreflightRequestApproved(nsIRequest* aRequest);
private:
~nsCORSPreflightListener() = default;
void AddResultToCache(nsIRequest* aRequest);
nsCString mPreflightMethod;
nsTArray<nsCString> mPreflightHeaders;
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> mReferrerPrincipal;
nsCOMPtr<nsICorsPreflightCallback> mCallback;
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadContext> mLoadContext;
bool mWithCredentials;
};
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsCORSPreflightListener, nsIStreamListener,
nsIRequestObserver, nsIInterfaceRequestor,
nsIChannelEventSink)
void nsCORSPreflightListener::AddResultToCache(nsIRequest* aRequest) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> http = do_QueryInterface(aRequest);
NS_ASSERTION(http, "Request was not http");
// The "Access-Control-Max-Age" header should return an age in seconds.
nsAutoCString headerVal;
uint32_t age = 0;
Unused << http->GetResponseHeader("Access-Control-Max-Age"_ns, headerVal);
if (headerVal.IsEmpty()) {
age = PREFLIGHT_DEFAULT_EXPIRY_SECONDS;
} else {
// Sanitize the string. We only allow 'delta-seconds' as specified by
// http://dev.w3.org/2006/waf/access-control (digits 0-9 with no leading or
// trailing non-whitespace characters).
nsACString::const_char_iterator iter, end;
headerVal.BeginReading(iter);
headerVal.EndReading(end);
while (iter != end) {
if (*iter < '0' || *iter > '9') {
return;
}
age = age * 10 + (*iter - '0');
// Cap at 24 hours. This also avoids overflow
age = std::min(age, 86400U);
++iter;
}
}
if (!age || !EnsurePreflightCache()) {
return;
}
// String seems fine, go ahead and cache.
// Note that we have already checked that these headers follow the correct
// syntax.
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
NS_GetFinalChannelURI(http, getter_AddRefs(uri));
TimeStamp expirationTime =
TimeStamp::NowLoRes() + TimeDuration::FromSeconds(age);
OriginAttributes attrs;
StoragePrincipalHelper::GetOriginAttributesForNetworkState(http, attrs);
nsPreflightCache::CacheEntry* entry = sPreflightCache->GetEntry(
uri, mReferrerPrincipal, mWithCredentials, attrs, true);
if (!entry) {
return;
}
// The "Access-Control-Allow-Methods" header contains a comma separated
// list of method names.
Unused << http->GetResponseHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Methods"_ns,
headerVal);
for (const nsACString& method :
nsCCharSeparatedTokenizer(headerVal, ',').ToRange()) {
if (method.IsEmpty()) {
continue;
}
uint32_t i;
for (i = 0; i < entry->mMethods.Length(); ++i) {
if (entry->mMethods[i].token.Equals(method)) {
entry->mMethods[i].expirationTime = expirationTime;
break;
}
}
if (i == entry->mMethods.Length()) {
nsPreflightCache::TokenTime* newMethod = entry->mMethods.AppendElement();
if (!newMethod) {
return;
}
newMethod->token = method;
newMethod->expirationTime = expirationTime;
}
}
// The "Access-Control-Allow-Headers" header contains a comma separated
// list of method names.
Unused << http->GetResponseHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Headers"_ns,
headerVal);
for (const nsACString& header :
nsCCharSeparatedTokenizer(headerVal, ',').ToRange()) {
if (header.IsEmpty()) {
continue;
}
uint32_t i;
for (i = 0; i < entry->mHeaders.Length(); ++i) {
if (entry->mHeaders[i].token.Equals(header)) {
entry->mHeaders[i].expirationTime = expirationTime;
break;
}
}
if (i == entry->mHeaders.Length()) {
nsPreflightCache::TokenTime* newHeader = entry->mHeaders.AppendElement();
if (!newHeader) {
return;
}
newHeader->token = header;
newHeader->expirationTime = expirationTime;
}
}
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCORSPreflightListener::OnStartRequest(nsIRequest* aRequest) {
#ifdef DEBUG
{
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel = do_QueryInterface(aRequest);
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = channel ? channel->LoadInfo() : nullptr;
MOZ_ASSERT(!loadInfo || !loadInfo->GetServiceWorkerTaintingSynthesized());
}
#endif
nsresult rv = CheckPreflightRequestApproved(aRequest);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
// Everything worked, try to cache and then fire off the actual request.
AddResultToCache(aRequest);
mCallback->OnPreflightSucceeded();
} else {
mCallback->OnPreflightFailed(rv);
}
return rv;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCORSPreflightListener::OnStopRequest(nsIRequest* aRequest, nsresult aStatus) {
mCallback = nullptr;
return NS_OK;
}
/** nsIStreamListener methods **/
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCORSPreflightListener::OnDataAvailable(nsIRequest* aRequest,
nsIInputStream* inStr,
uint64_t sourceOffset,
uint32_t count) {
uint32_t totalRead;
return inStr->ReadSegments(NS_DiscardSegment, nullptr, count, &totalRead);
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCORSPreflightListener::AsyncOnChannelRedirect(
nsIChannel* aOldChannel, nsIChannel* aNewChannel, uint32_t aFlags,
nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback* callback) {
// Only internal redirects allowed for now.
if (!NS_IsInternalSameURIRedirect(aOldChannel, aNewChannel, aFlags) &&
!NS_IsHSTSUpgradeRedirect(aOldChannel, aNewChannel, aFlags)) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpChannel = do_QueryInterface(aOldChannel);
LogBlockedRequest(
aOldChannel, "CORSExternalRedirectNotAllowed", nullptr,
nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CORSEXTERNALREDIRECTNOTALLOWED,
httpChannel);
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
callback->OnRedirectVerifyCallback(NS_OK);
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult nsCORSPreflightListener::CheckPreflightRequestApproved(
nsIRequest* aRequest) {
nsresult status;
nsresult rv = aRequest->GetStatus(&status);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(status, status);
// Test that things worked on a HTTP level
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> http = do_QueryInterface(aRequest);
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannelInternal> internal = do_QueryInterface(aRequest);
NS_ENSURE_STATE(internal);
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> parentHttpChannel = do_QueryInterface(mCallback);
bool succeedded;
rv = http->GetRequestSucceeded(&succeedded);
if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !succeedded) {
auto statusCode = GetStatusCodeAsString(http);
LogBlockedRequest(aRequest, "CORSPreflightDidNotSucceed3", statusCode.get(),
nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CORSPREFLIGHTDIDNOTSUCCEED,
parentHttpChannel);
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
nsAutoCString headerVal;
// The "Access-Control-Allow-Methods" header contains a comma separated
// list of method names.
Unused << http->GetResponseHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Methods"_ns,
headerVal);
bool foundMethod = mPreflightMethod.EqualsLiteral("GET") ||
mPreflightMethod.EqualsLiteral("HEAD") ||
mPreflightMethod.EqualsLiteral("POST");
for (const nsACString& method :
nsCCharSeparatedTokenizer(headerVal, ',').ToRange()) {
if (method.IsEmpty()) {
continue;
}
if (!NS_IsValidHTTPToken(method)) {
LogBlockedRequest(aRequest, "CORSInvalidAllowMethod",
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(method).get(),
nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CORSINVALIDALLOWMETHOD,
parentHttpChannel);
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
if (method.EqualsLiteral("*") && !mWithCredentials) {
foundMethod = true;
} else {
foundMethod |= mPreflightMethod.Equals(method);
}
}
if (!foundMethod) {
LogBlockedRequest(aRequest, "CORSMethodNotFound", nullptr,
nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CORSMETHODNOTFOUND,
parentHttpChannel);
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
// The "Access-Control-Allow-Headers" header contains a comma separated
// list of header names.
Unused << http->GetResponseHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Headers"_ns,
headerVal);
nsTArray<nsCString> headers;
bool wildcard = false;
bool hasAuthorizationHeader = false;
for (const nsACString& header :
nsCCharSeparatedTokenizer(headerVal, ',').ToRange()) {
if (header.IsEmpty()) {
continue;
}
if (!NS_IsValidHTTPToken(header)) {
LogBlockedRequest(aRequest, "CORSInvalidAllowHeader",
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(header).get(),
nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CORSINVALIDALLOWHEADER,
parentHttpChannel);
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
if (header.EqualsLiteral("*") && !mWithCredentials) {
wildcard = true;
} else {
headers.AppendElement(header);
}
if (header.LowerCaseEqualsASCII("authorization")) {
hasAuthorizationHeader = true;
}
}
bool authorizationInPreflightHeaders = false;
bool authorizationCoveredByWildcard = false;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPreflightHeaders.Length(); ++i) {
// Cache the result of the authorization header.
bool isAuthorization =
mPreflightHeaders[i].LowerCaseEqualsASCII("authorization");
if (wildcard) {
if (!isAuthorization) {
continue;
} else {
authorizationInPreflightHeaders = true;
if (StaticPrefs::
network_cors_preflight_authorization_covered_by_wildcard() &&
!hasAuthorizationHeader) {
// When `Access-Control-Allow-Headers` is `*` and there is no
// `Authorization` header listed, we send a deprecation warning to the
// console.
LogBlockedRequest(aRequest, "CORSAllowHeaderFromPreflightDeprecation",
nullptr, 0, parentHttpChannel, true);
glean::network::cors_authorization_header
.Get("covered_by_wildcard"_ns)
.Add(1);
authorizationCoveredByWildcard = true;
continue;
}
}
}
const auto& comparator = nsCaseInsensitiveCStringArrayComparator();
if (!headers.Contains(mPreflightHeaders[i], comparator)) {
LogBlockedRequest(
aRequest, "CORSMissingAllowHeaderFromPreflight2",
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(mPreflightHeaders[i]).get(),
nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CORSMISSINGALLOWHEADERFROMPREFLIGHT,
parentHttpChannel);
if (isAuthorization) {
glean::network::cors_authorization_header.Get("disallowed"_ns).Add(1);
}
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
}
if (authorizationInPreflightHeaders && !authorizationCoveredByWildcard) {
glean::network::cors_authorization_header.Get("allowed"_ns).Add(1);
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsCORSPreflightListener::GetInterface(const nsIID& aIID, void** aResult) {
if (aIID.Equals(NS_GET_IID(nsILoadContext)) && mLoadContext) {
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadContext> copy = mLoadContext;
copy.forget(aResult);
return NS_OK;
}
return QueryInterface(aIID, aResult);
}
void nsCORSListenerProxy::RemoveFromCorsPreflightCache(
nsIURI* aURI, nsIPrincipal* aRequestingPrincipal,
const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes) {
MOZ_ASSERT(XRE_IsParentProcess());
if (sPreflightCache) {
sPreflightCache->RemoveEntries(aURI, aRequestingPrincipal,
aOriginAttributes);
}
}
// static
nsresult nsCORSListenerProxy::StartCORSPreflight(
nsIChannel* aRequestChannel, nsICorsPreflightCallback* aCallback,
nsTArray<nsCString>& aUnsafeHeaders, nsIChannel** aPreflightChannel) {
*aPreflightChannel = nullptr;
if (StaticPrefs::content_cors_disable()) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> http = do_QueryInterface(aRequestChannel);
LogBlockedRequest(aRequestChannel, "CORSDisabled", nullptr,
nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CORSDISABLED, http);
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
nsAutoCString method;
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpChannel(do_QueryInterface(aRequestChannel));
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(httpChannel, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
Unused << httpChannel->GetRequestMethod(method);
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aRequestChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> originalLoadInfo = aRequestChannel->LoadInfo();
MOZ_ASSERT(originalLoadInfo->GetSecurityMode() ==
nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT,
"how did we end up here?");
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal = originalLoadInfo->GetLoadingPrincipal();
MOZ_ASSERT(principal && originalLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() !=
ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT,
"Should not do CORS loads for top-level loads, so a "
"loadingPrincipal should always exist.");
bool withCredentials =
originalLoadInfo->GetCookiePolicy() == nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE;
nsPreflightCache::CacheEntry* entry = nullptr;
nsLoadFlags loadFlags;
rv = aRequestChannel->GetLoadFlags(&loadFlags);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// Disable preflight cache if devtools says so or on other force reloads
bool disableCache = (loadFlags & nsIRequest::LOAD_BYPASS_CACHE);
if (sPreflightCache && !disableCache) {
OriginAttributes attrs;
StoragePrincipalHelper::GetOriginAttributesForNetworkState(aRequestChannel,
attrs);
entry = sPreflightCache->GetEntry(uri, principal, withCredentials, attrs,
false);
}
if (entry && entry->CheckRequest(method, aUnsafeHeaders)) {
aCallback->OnPreflightSucceeded();
return NS_OK;
}
// Either it wasn't cached or the cached result has expired. Build a
// channel for the OPTIONS request.
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo =
static_cast<mozilla::net::LoadInfo*>(originalLoadInfo.get())
->CloneForNewRequest();
static_cast<mozilla::net::LoadInfo*>(loadInfo.get())->SetIsPreflight();
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadGroup> loadGroup;
rv = aRequestChannel->GetLoadGroup(getter_AddRefs(loadGroup));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// We want to give the preflight channel's notification callbacks the same
// load context as the original channel's notification callbacks had. We
// don't worry about a load context provided via the loadgroup here, since
// they have the same loadgroup.
nsCOMPtr<nsIInterfaceRequestor> callbacks;
rv = aRequestChannel->GetNotificationCallbacks(getter_AddRefs(callbacks));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadContext> loadContext = do_GetInterface(callbacks);
// Preflight requests should never be intercepted by service workers and
// are always anonymous.
// NOTE: We ignore CORS checks on synthesized responses (see the CORS
// preflights, then we need to extend the GetResponseSynthesized() check in
// nsCORSListenerProxy::CheckRequestApproved()). If we change our behavior
// here and allow service workers to intercept CORS preflights, then that
// check won't be safe any more.
loadFlags |=
nsIChannel::LOAD_BYPASS_SERVICE_WORKER | nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS;
if (StaticPrefs::network_cors_preflight_allow_client_cert()) {
loadFlags |= nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS_ALLOW_CLIENT_CERT;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> preflightChannel;
rv = NS_NewChannelInternal(getter_AddRefs(preflightChannel), uri, loadInfo,
nullptr, // PerformanceStorage
loadGroup,
nullptr, // aCallbacks
loadFlags);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// Set method and headers
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> preHttp = do_QueryInterface(preflightChannel);
NS_ASSERTION(preHttp, "Failed to QI to nsIHttpChannel!");
rv = preHttp->SetRequestMethod("OPTIONS"_ns);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
rv = preHttp->SetRequestHeader("Access-Control-Request-Method"_ns, method,
false);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// Set the CORS preflight channel's warning reporter to be the same as the
// requesting channel so that all log messages are able to be reported through
// the warning reporter.
RefPtr<nsHttpChannel> reqCh = do_QueryObject(aRequestChannel);
RefPtr<nsHttpChannel> preCh = do_QueryObject(preHttp);
if (preCh && reqCh) { // there are other implementers of nsIHttpChannel
preCh->SetWarningReporter(reqCh->GetWarningReporter());
}
nsTArray<nsCString> preflightHeaders;
if (!aUnsafeHeaders.IsEmpty()) {
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aUnsafeHeaders.Length(); ++i) {
preflightHeaders.AppendElement();
ToLowerCase(aUnsafeHeaders[i], preflightHeaders[i]);
}
preflightHeaders.Sort();
nsAutoCString headers;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < preflightHeaders.Length(); ++i) {
if (i != 0) {
headers += ',';
}
headers += preflightHeaders[i];
}
rv = preHttp->SetRequestHeader("Access-Control-Request-Headers"_ns, headers,
false);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
// Set up listener which will start the original channel
RefPtr<nsCORSPreflightListener> preflightListener =
new nsCORSPreflightListener(principal, aCallback, loadContext,
withCredentials, method, preflightHeaders);
rv = preflightChannel->SetNotificationCallbacks(preflightListener);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (preCh && reqCh) {
// request's referrer and referrer policy should match the original request.
nsCOMPtr<nsIReferrerInfo> referrerInfo;
rv = reqCh->GetReferrerInfo(getter_AddRefs(referrerInfo));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (referrerInfo) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIReferrerInfo> newReferrerInfo =
static_cast<dom::ReferrerInfo*>(referrerInfo.get())->Clone();
rv = preCh->SetReferrerInfo(newReferrerInfo);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
}
// Start preflight
rv = preflightChannel->AsyncOpen(preflightListener);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// Return newly created preflight channel
preflightChannel.forget(aPreflightChannel);
return NS_OK;
}
// static
void nsCORSListenerProxy::LogBlockedCORSRequest(
uint64_t aInnerWindowID, bool aPrivateBrowsing, bool aFromChromeContext,
const nsAString& aMessage, const nsACString& aCategory, bool aIsWarning) {
nsresult rv = NS_OK;
// Build the error object and log it to the console
nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(
do_GetService(NS_CONSOLESERVICE_CONTRACTID, &rv));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
NS_WARNING("Failed to log blocked cross-site request (no console)");
return;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIScriptError> scriptError =
do_CreateInstance(NS_SCRIPTERROR_CONTRACTID, &rv);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
NS_WARNING("Failed to log blocked cross-site request (no scriptError)");
return;
}
uint32_t errorFlag =
aIsWarning ? nsIScriptError::warningFlag : nsIScriptError::errorFlag;
// query innerWindowID and log to web console, otherwise log to
// the error to the browser console.
if (aInnerWindowID > 0) {
rv = scriptError->InitWithSanitizedSource(aMessage,
u""_ns, // sourceName
u""_ns, // sourceLine
0, // lineNumber
0, // columnNumber
errorFlag, aCategory,
aInnerWindowID);
} else {
rv = scriptError->Init(aMessage,
u""_ns, // sourceName
u""_ns, // sourceLine
0, // lineNumber
0, // columnNumber
errorFlag, aCategory, aPrivateBrowsing,
aFromChromeContext); // From chrome context
}
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
NS_WARNING(
"Failed to log blocked cross-site request (scriptError init failed)");
return;
}
console->LogMessage(scriptError);
}