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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
#include "nsISupports.idl"
%{C++
#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
/**
* Protocol handlers are registered with XPCOM under the following CONTRACTID prefix:
*/
#define NS_NETWORK_PROTOCOL_CONTRACTID_PREFIX "@mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name="
/**
* For example, "@mozilla.org/network/protocol;1?name=http"
*/
#if defined(MOZ_THUNDERBIRD) || defined(MOZ_SUITE)
#define IS_ORIGIN_IS_FULL_SPEC_DEFINED 1
#endif
%}
interface nsIURI;
interface nsIChannel;
interface nsILoadInfo;
/**
* nsIProtocolHandlerWithDynamicFlags
*
* Protocols that wish to return different flags depending on the URI should
* implement this interface.
*/
[scriptable, builtinclass, uuid(65a8e823-0591-4fc0-a56a-03265e0a4ce8)]
interface nsIProtocolHandlerWithDynamicFlags : nsISupports
{
/*
* Returns protocol flags for the given URI, which may be different from the
* flags for another URI of the same scheme.
*
* Only DYNAMIC_URI_FLAGS may be different from the registered flags for the
* protocol handler.
*/
unsigned long getFlagsForURI(in nsIURI aURI);
};
/**
* nsIProtocolHandler
*/
[scriptable, uuid(a87210e6-7c8c-41f7-864d-df809015193e)]
interface nsIProtocolHandler : nsISupports
{
/**
* The scheme of this protocol (e.g., "file").
*/
readonly attribute ACString scheme;
/**
* Constructs a new channel from the given URI for this protocol handler and
* sets the loadInfo for the constructed channel.
*/
nsIChannel newChannel(in nsIURI aURI, in nsILoadInfo aLoadinfo);
/**
* Allows a protocol to override blacklisted ports.
*
* This method will be called when there is an attempt to connect to a port
* that is blacklisted. For example, for most protocols, port 25 (Simple Mail
* Transfer) is banned. When a URI containing this "known-to-do-bad-things"
* port number is encountered, this function will be called to ask if the
* protocol handler wants to override the ban.
*/
boolean allowPort(in long port, in string scheme);
/**************************************************************************
* Constants for the protocol flags (the first is the default mask, the
* others are deviations):
*
* NOTE: Protocol flags are provided when the protocol handler is
* registered, either through a static component or dynamically with
* `nsIIOService.registerProtocolHandler`.
*
* NOTE: Implementation must ignore any flags they do not understand.
*/
/**
* standard full URI with authority component and concept of relative
* URIs (http, ...)
*/
const unsigned long URI_STD = 0;
/**
* no concept of relative URIs (about, javascript, finger, ...)
*/
const unsigned long URI_NORELATIVE = (1<<0);
/**
* no authority component (file, ...)
*/
const unsigned long URI_NOAUTH = (1<<1);
/**
* This protocol handler can be proxied via a proxy (socks or http)
* (e.g., irc, smtp, http, etc.). If the protocol supports transparent
* proxying, the handler should implement nsIProxiedProtocolHandler.
*
* If it supports only HTTP proxying, then it need not support
* nsIProxiedProtocolHandler, but should instead set the ALLOWS_PROXY_HTTP
* flag (see below).
*
* @see nsIProxiedProtocolHandler
*/
const unsigned long ALLOWS_PROXY = (1<<2);
/**
* This protocol handler can be proxied using a http proxy (e.g., http,
* etc.). nsIIOService::newChannelFromURI will feed URIs from this
* protocol handler to the HTTP protocol handler instead. This flag is
* ignored if ALLOWS_PROXY is not set.
*/
const unsigned long ALLOWS_PROXY_HTTP = (1<<3);
/**
* The URIs for this protocol have no inherent security context, so
* documents loaded via this protocol should inherit the security context
* from the document that loads them.
*/
const unsigned long URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT = (1<<4);
/**
* "Automatic" loads that would replace the document (e.g. <meta> refresh,
* certain types of XLinks, possibly other loads that the application
* decides are not user triggered) are not allowed if the originating (NOT
* the target) URI has this protocol flag. Note that the decision as to
* what constitutes an "automatic" load is made externally, by the caller
* of nsIScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURI. See documentation for that
* method for more information.
*
* A typical protocol that might want to set this flag is a protocol that
* shows highly untrusted content in a viewing area that the user expects
* to have a lot of control over, such as an e-mail reader.
*/
const unsigned long URI_FORBIDS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT = (1<<5);
/**
* +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
* | |
* | ALL PROTOCOL HANDLERS MUST SET ONE OF THE FOLLOWING FIVE FLAGS. |
* | |
* +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
*
* * URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE
* * URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD
* * URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE
* * URI_IS_LOCAL_FILE
* * URI_LOADABLE_BY_SUBSUMERS
*
* These flags are used to determine who is allowed to load URIs for this
* protocol. Note that if a URI is nested, only the flags for the
* innermost URI matter. See nsINestedURI.
*
* If none of these five flags are set, the ContentSecurityManager will
* deny the load.
*/
/**
* The URIs for this protocol can be loaded by anyone. For example, any
* website should be allowed to trigger a load of a URI for this protocol.
* Web-safe protocols like "http" should set this flag.
*/
const unsigned long URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE = (1<<6);
/**
* The URIs for this protocol are UNSAFE if loaded by untrusted (web)
* content and may only be loaded by privileged code (for example, code
* which has the system principal). Various internal protocols should set
* this flag.
*/
const unsigned long URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD = (1<<7);
/**
* The URIs for this protocol point to resources that are part of the
* application's user interface. There are cases when such resources may
* be made accessible to untrusted content such as web pages, so this is
* less restrictive than URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD but more restrictive than
* URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE. See the documentation for
* nsIScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURI.
*/
const unsigned long URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE = (1<<8);
/**
* Loading of URIs for this protocol from other origins should only be
* allowed if those origins should have access to the local filesystem.
* It's up to the application to decide what origins should have such
* access. Protocols like "file" that point to local data should set this
* flag.
*/
const unsigned long URI_IS_LOCAL_FILE = (1<<9);
/**
* The URIs for this protocol can be loaded only by callers with a
* principal that subsumes this uri. For example, privileged code and
* websites that are same origin as this uri.
*/
const unsigned long URI_LOADABLE_BY_SUBSUMERS = (1<<10);
/**
* Channels using this protocol never call OnDataAvailable
* on the listener passed to AsyncOpen and they therefore
* do not return any data that we can use.
*/
const unsigned long URI_DOES_NOT_RETURN_DATA = (1<<11);
/**
* URIs for this protocol are considered to be local resources. This could
* be a local file (URI_IS_LOCAL_FILE), a UI resource (URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE),
* or something else that would not hit the network.
*/
const unsigned long URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE = (1<<12);
/**
* URIs for this protocol execute script when they are opened.
*/
const unsigned long URI_OPENING_EXECUTES_SCRIPT = (1<<13);
/**
* Loading channels from this protocol has side-effects that make
* it unsuitable for saving to a local file.
*/
const unsigned long URI_NON_PERSISTABLE = (1<<14);
/**
* URIs for this protocol require the webapps permission on the principal
* when opening URIs for a different domain. See bug#773886
*/
const unsigned long URI_CROSS_ORIGIN_NEEDS_WEBAPPS_PERM = (1<<15);
/**
* Channels for this protocol don't need to spin the event loop to handle
* Open() and reads on the resulting stream.
*/
const unsigned long URI_SYNC_LOAD_IS_OK = (1<<16);
/**
* All the origins whose URI has this scheme are considered potentially
* trustworthy.
* Per the SecureContext spec, https: and wss: should be considered
* a priori secure, and implementations may consider other,
* implementation-specific URI schemes as secure.
*/
const unsigned long URI_IS_POTENTIALLY_TRUSTWORTHY = (1<<17);
/**
* This URI may be fetched and the contents are visible to anyone. This is
* semantically equivalent to the resource being served with all-access CORS
* headers. This is only used in MV2 Extensions and should not otherwise
* be used.
*/
const unsigned long URI_FETCHABLE_BY_ANYONE = (1 << 18);
/**
* If this flag is set, then the origin for this protocol is the full URI
* spec, not just the scheme + host + port.
*
* Note: this is not supported in Firefox. It is currently only available
* in Thunderbird and SeaMonkey.
*/
const unsigned long ORIGIN_IS_FULL_SPEC = (1 << 19);
/**
* If this flag is set, the URI does not always allow content using the same
* protocol to link to it.
*/
const unsigned long URI_SCHEME_NOT_SELF_LINKABLE = (1 << 20);
/**
* The URIs for this protocol can be loaded by extensions.
*/
const unsigned long URI_LOADABLE_BY_EXTENSIONS = (1 << 21);
/**
* The URIs for this protocol can not be loaded into private contexts.
*/
const unsigned long URI_DISALLOW_IN_PRIVATE_CONTEXT = (1 << 22);
/**
* This protocol handler forbids accessing cookies e.g. for mail related
* protocols. Only used in Mailnews (comm-central).
*/
const unsigned long URI_FORBIDS_COOKIE_ACCESS = (1 << 23);
/**
* This is an extension web accessible uri that is loadable if checked
* against an allowlist using ExtensionPolicyService::SourceMayLoadExtensionURI.
*/
const unsigned long WEBEXT_URI_WEB_ACCESSIBLE = (1 << 24);
/**
* This URI has a webexposed origin, meaning the URI has a non-null origin
*/
const unsigned long URI_HAS_WEB_EXPOSED_ORIGIN = (1 << 25);
/**
* Flags which are allowed to be different from the static flags when
* returned from `nsIProtocolHandlerWithDynamicFlags::getFlagsForURI`.
*
* All other flags must match the flags provided when the protocol handler
* was registered.
*/
const unsigned long DYNAMIC_URI_FLAGS =
URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE | URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD |
URI_IS_POTENTIALLY_TRUSTWORTHY | URI_FETCHABLE_BY_ANYONE |
URI_LOADABLE_BY_EXTENSIONS | URI_DISALLOW_IN_PRIVATE_CONTEXT |
WEBEXT_URI_WEB_ACCESSIBLE | URI_HAS_WEB_EXPOSED_ORIGIN;
};